

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

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## ABSTRACT

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# Migrants from Afghanistan on the Swedish Labour Market

The number of immigrants to Sweden has increased significantly in the last two decades. In 1990, 9 percent of the population was born abroad. Just over 60 percent of them were born in Finland, Norway and Denmark. Thirty years later, the corresponding figure of foreign born is 20 percent. The composition has also changed. Many have arrived as refugees mainly from countries outside Europe until the great wave of refugees from Ukraine in 2022. We concentrate in this article on one group, those who have come from Afghanistan, and examined how it has gone for them to establish themselves in the labour market in Sweden.

**JEL Classification:** F22, J15, J21, J60, J61

**Keywords:** Swedish labour market, employment, migrants, Afghanistan

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Afghanistan has a long history of war and conflict, which has led to many leaving the country as refugees.<sup>1</sup> Civil war and conflict in the 1970s was followed by an invasion by the Soviet Union in December 1979, in support of the Communist Party of Afghanistan that took power in 1978. The invasion was followed by a prolonged guerrilla war against the Soviet-backed regime, with those opposed to it were supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Soviet Union left Afghanistan in 1989. It was followed by military conflicts in which the Taliban took control of most of Afghanistan (90 percent in 2001). The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 were carried out by al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden. al-Qaeda was active in Afghanistan which led to that the US and also the UK attacked and overthrew the Taliban regime. Gradually, however, the Taliban gathered new strength and the war continued and escalated. The US gradually withdrew and left Afghanistan completely in 2021. The Taliban regained power over the entire country and have introduced a repressive regime with, among other things, major obstacles to girls' schooling and women's education and gainful employment (Ahmadi 2022 and ILO 2022).

Afghanistan's population consists of many ethnic groups with different languages and different religions (Barfield 2023 and Mazhar, Khan, and Goraya 2012). The largest group are Pashtuns with up to half of the country's population. That group and several other groups are Sunni Muslims. Hazaras, who make up 10–15 percent of Afghanistan's population, are Shia Muslims and have been persecuted by the Sunni Muslim majority and many have fled the country.

This brief description of Afghanistan's history points to how war and conflict have led to a very large refugee migration. Much of the refugee flow has gone to two neighboring countries – Pakistan and Iran. Conditions for refugees in both countries have been poor, and for young men from Afghanistan in Iran, there has been the threat of being forcibly recruited into the Iranian military (Mueller and Rubin 2021). From these two countries, mainly Iran, many Afghans have since fled to countries in Europe. The flight to Europe has often been very demanding (Scalettaris, Monsutti and Donini 2019).

According to information from UNHCR, there were a total of 2.8 million refugees and asylum seekers from Afghanistan registered by UNHCR in various countries in August 2021. Most were in Pakistan with 1.4 million and Iran with 780 thousand, but many also in Germany and Turkey (House of Commons Library 2021). This is a strong underestimation of

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<sup>1</sup> For a book on the recent development in Afghanistan see Seierstad (2024).

the number of refugees as many are not registered as refugees. Since August 2021, many more have moved and a number of them to countries in Europe. The UNHCR stated on its website on 26 June 2023 that it estimates the total number of refugees from Afghanistan at 5.7 million. It is the largest number of refugees from a country along with those from Syria (6.8 million) and Ukraine (5.7 million). It should be emphasized that the numbers are uncertain.

#### 1. Afghans in Sweden

The number of Afghan citizens who have applied for asylum in Sweden has, like the number who have been granted asylum, varied greatly in recent decades. The development from 2004 to 2022 can be seen in table 1. We can see that there is a time delay in the processing of asylum applications - the granting of applications does not increase in the same year as when many seek asylum, but in the years immediately following. It takes time for the Swedish Migration Agency to process the applications. It is also clear from the table that not everyone who applies is granted asylum - some leave the country before the application is processed and many are rejected with reference to the Dublin regulation (they have first arrived in another EU country and the application must be processed in that country). Some who came from Afghanistan may have applied for a residence permit for other reasons such as family ties.

Table 1. Asylum applications and granted asylums of Afghanistan citizens in 2004–2022

| Year | Number of applications | Granted applications |
|------|------------------------|----------------------|
| 2004 | 900                    | 490                  |
| 2005 | 440                    | 390                  |
| 2006 | 590                    | 800                  |
| 2007 | 610                    | 520                  |
| 2008 | 780                    | 910                  |
| 2009 | 1 690                  | 1 080                |
| 2010 | 2 390                  | 1 490                |
| 2011 | 4 120                  | 3 150                |
| 2012 | 4 760                  | 3 240                |
| 2013 | 3 010                  | 2 730                |
| 2014 | 3 100                  | 2 190                |
| 2015 | 41 560                 | 1 090                |
| 2016 | 2 970                  | 3 460                |
| 2017 | 1 680                  | 9 370                |
| 2018 | 810                    | 2 350                |
| 2019 | 830                    | 430                  |
| 2020 | 590                    | 370                  |
| 2021 | 1 490                  | 340                  |
| 2022 | 2 010                  | 890                  |

Source: The Swedish Migration Agency.

Table 2. The number of persons born in Afghanistan, other foreign born and born in Sweden aged 16–64 years and index of the development of the number of the three groups


| Year | Number       |                     |                | Index        |                     |                |
|------|--------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------------|----------------|
|      | Foreign born | Born in Afghanistan | Born in Sweden | Foreign born | Born in Afghanistan | Born in Sweden |
| 2004 | 848 000      | 5 800               | 4 897 000      | 100.0        | 100.0               | 100.0          |
| 2005 | 868 000      | 6 300               | 4 917 000      | 102.4        | 110.2               | 100.4          |
| 2006 | 905 000      | 7 800               | 4 940 000      | 106.8        | 135.3               | 100.9          |
| 2007 | 946 000      | 8 600               | 4 950 000      | 111.6        | 149.2               | 101.1          |
| 2008 | 986 000      | 9 500               | 4 951 000      | 116.3        | 164.5               | 101.1          |
| 2009 | 1 029 000    | 10 700              | 4 942 000      | 121.4        | 185.5               | 100.9          |
| 2010 | 1 066 000    | 12 200              | 4 925 000      | 125.7        | 211.9               | 100.6          |
| 2011 | 1 094 000    | 14 800              | 4 902 000      | 129.1        | 256.6               | 100.1          |
| 2012 | 1 123 000    | 18 000              | 4 876 000      | 132.5        | 312.8               | 99.6           |
| 2013 | 1 161 000    | 21 100              | 4 846 000      | 136.9        | 365.5               | 99.0           |
| 2014 | 1 209 000    | 24 000              | 4 820 000      | 142.6        | 415.9               | 98.4           |
| 2015 | 1 258 000    | 26 500              | 4 799 000      | 148.4        | 459.9               | 98.0           |
| 2016 | 1 338 000    | 29 500              | 4 785 000      | 157.8        | 512.1               | 97.7           |
| 2017 | 1 400 000    | 37 400              | 4 772 000      | 165.1        | 649.1               | 97.4           |
| 2018 | 1 454 000    | 45 000              | 4 762 000      | 171.5        | 781.8               | 97.2           |
| 2019 | 1 500 000    | 51 500              | 4 759 000      | 176.9        | 893.7               | 97.2           |
| 2020 | 1 524 000    | 53 700              | 4 758 000      | 179.7        | 931.5               | 97.2           |
| 2021 | 1 561 000    | 55 600              | 4 756 000      | 184.1        | 965.5               | 97.1           |
| 2022 | 1 600 000    | 57 900              | 4 759 000      | 188.7        | 1004.5              | 97.2           |

Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.  
Source: RAMS for 2004–2021. BAS for 2022. Own calculations.

## 2. Employment among Afghans in Sweden

Our previous investigations have shown a very strong increase in the number of employed Afghans in Sweden during the two Covid-19 years 2020 and 2021 (Andersson and Wadensjö 2022a and 2022b). Previous research has also shown that the unaccompanied children from Afghanistan have become employed to higher extent compared to unaccompanied children from other countries (Çelikaksoy and Wadensjö 2019). We will now examine in more detail how migrants from Afghanistan have fared on the Swedish labour market in the last two decades.

Figure 1. The development of the share employed of those aged 16–64 years among Afghans, other foreign born and natives 2004–2022




Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.  
 Source: RAMS for 2004–2021. BAS for 2022. Own calculations.

Figure 1 shows the development of the percentage of employed persons aged 16–64 for Afghans, other foreign-born and native born during the period 2004–2022. Other foreign-born people come from many different groups of countries (EU countries, other countries), for different reasons (work, studies, family ties, refugees) and have been in Sweden for different lengths of time, while those in the Afghan group usually came as refugees and have been in Sweden relatively few years. We find that the percentage employed is highest and stable over time among those born in Sweden, that it is lower but clearly increasing during the period for foreign born other than Afghans and that it has increased very strongly for Afghans during the period and in 2022 is the same as for other people born abroad. We will now look at the development for the same three groups but with a division into women and men. See Figure 2. We find that for those born in Sweden there are no differences between the percentage employed between women and men, but that for the other groups the percentage employed is significantly higher among men than among women. This is especially true for the Afghan group. However, there is an increase in employment among both men and women among those from Afghanistan, but it is faster for men than for women. Among men from Afghanistan in 2022, the percentage employed is higher than among other foreign-born men.



Figure 2. The development of the share employed men and women of those aged 16–64 years among Afghans, other foreign born and natives 2004–2022




Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.  
 Source: RAMS for 2004–2021. BAS for 2022. Own calculations.

Women from Afghanistan have a significantly lower percentage employed than men from Afghanistan have. Possible explanations could be traditions in the country they came from<sup>2</sup> but also differences in age composition. Many of the women are young and still in education. We will therefore look at the development for those aged 25–29, an age group where relatively few are in education, see Figure 3. We find that the percentage of employed is increasing both for Afghans and for other foreign-born in the age group. This applies most of all to Afghan men. Their employment is as high as that of native-born men at the end of the period. The percentage of employed among Afghan women also increases a lot, but the percentage is still significantly lower than for the other groups at the end of the period examined.

<sup>2</sup> See for example Seierstad (2004 and 2024) for information on the conditions for women in the labour market in Afghanistan.

Figure 3. The development of the share employed of those aged 25–29 years among Afghans, other foreign born and natives 2004–2022




Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.

Source: RAMS for 2004–2021. BAS for 2022. Own calculations.

We will now look a little closer at the group that came from Afghanistan, with a division into subgroups. We do it first by place of residence with division into women and men in three types of municipalities. We find that initially there are differences in such a way that the percentage employed is highest in big cities and municipalities close to big cities, followed by large cities and municipalities close to large cities and is lowest in smaller cities/urban areas and rural municipalities; see Figure 4. Interestingly, this difference has levelled out completely at the end of the period for men and almost completely disappeared for women. It could be explained by differences in labour market development in the three municipal groups and/or by a selective internal migration so that those from Afghanistan who cannot find work in smaller cities/towns and rural municipalities move to the metropolitan areas. Of the roughly 4,100 who lived in smaller cities/urban areas and rural municipalities, 16 percent had moved to large municipalities and municipalities close to large cities and 25 percent to big cities and municipalities close to big cities. This indicates the existence of internal migration from smaller cities/urban areas and rural municipalities to other municipalities.

Figure 4. The development of the share employed of those aged 16–64 years among Afghans, in different types of residence 2004–2022




Note: **Smaller cities** means *smaller cities/urban areas and rural municipalities*; **Big cities** means *big cities and municipalities close to big cities* and **Large cities** means *large cities and municipalities close to large cities*

Source: RAMS for 2004–2021. BAS for 2022. Own calculations.

Figure 5 further shows the employment according to educational composition of those from Afghanistan compared to that of the two other groups for all aged 16–64. We find that many of them from Afghanistan, more than among those in the other two groups, only have pre-secondary education. It could be explained by the fact that the Afghan youth who were settled as refugees in Iran before coming to Sweden did not receive an education (Seddighi et al 2022). The fact that a larger proportion of women than men only have pre-secondary education could also be explained by discrimination against women in Afghanistan (Seierstad 2024 and Ahmadi 2022). Another contributing explanation could be that more of the Afghan group are teenagers or young adults and still in education. Teenagers are usually in secondary school studies and many who came as teenagers do not have time to finish their secondary school education, but go on to komvux (education for adults) and folk high school studies independent adult education college). It is therefore important to see if the educational pattern


is the same for those aged 25 or older. See Figures 6, 7 and 8. We find that irrespective of age the Afghan group has lower education.

Figure 5. The share according to level of education of men and women aged 16–64 years among Afghans, other foreign born and natives in 2022




Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.  
Source: BAS 2022. Own calculations.

Figure 6. The share with lower than completed secondary school studies as their highest education in different age groups among men and women born in Afghanistan, other foreign born and natives in 2022



Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.  
Source: BAS 2022. Own calculations.


Figure 7. The share with secondary school as their highest education among men and women in different age groups among Afghans, other foreign born and natives in 2022



Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.

Source: BAS 2022. Own calculations.

Figure 8. The share with higher education as their highest education among men and women in different age groups among Afghans, other foreign born and natives in 2022



Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.

Source: BAS 2022. Own calculations.

With the help of regression analysis, we will now take a closer look at the interplay of the factors that affect participation in the labour force and the employment of those in the labour force. See Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3. Odds ratio being in the labour force (employed or unemployed) in November 2022 of those aged 16–64 years

|  | Afghanistan             | Foreign born            | Born in Sweden            |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b><i>Man:</i></b>   |                         |                         |                           |
| Woman  | 0.338***<br>(0.00812)   | 0.804***<br>(0.00314)   | 0.909***<br>(0.00249)     |
| Age  | 1.382***<br>(0.00862)   | 1.272***<br>(0.00121)   | 1.355***<br>(0.000867)    |
| Age # Age  | 0.996***<br>(0.0000807) | 0.997***<br>(0.0000116) | 0.997***<br>(0.00000787)  |
| <b><i>Lower than secondary school:</i></b>                 |                         |                         |                           |
| Higher education   | 2.381***<br>(0.123)     | 2.414***<br>(0.0131)    | 5.638***<br>(0.0276)      |
| Secondary school   | 2.925***<br>(0.0704)    | 2.399***<br>(0.0107)    | 3.380***<br>(0.0115)      |
| <b><i>Small cities/towns and rural municipalities:</i></b> |                         |                         |                           |
| Big cities   | 0.791***<br>(0.0241)    | 0.927***<br>(0.00517)   | 0.876***<br>(0.00315)     |
| Large cities   | 0.881***<br>(0.0267)    | 0.975***<br>(0.00564)   | 0.889***<br>(0.00310)     |
| Constant   | 0.0149***<br>(0.00155)  | 0.0170***<br>(0.000308) | 0.00622***<br>(0.0000685) |
| Number of observations                                     | 57868                   | 1599553                 | 4758593                   |
| Pseudo $R^2$   | 0.138                   | 0.090                   | 0.192                     |

Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan. Exponential coefficient; standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Source: BAS November 2022. Own calculations.

Tabell 4. Odds ratio being employed among them in the labour force in November 2022 of them aged 16–64 years

|  | Afghanistan           | Foreign born            | Born in Sweden          |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b><i>Man:</i></b>   |                       |                         |                         |
| Woman  | 0.328***<br>(0.00932) | 0.702***<br>(0.00409)   | 1.151***<br>(0.00745)   |
| Age  | 0.942***<br>(0.00764) | 0.976***<br>(0.00162)   | 1.024***<br>(0.00163)   |
| Age # Age  | 1.000<br>(0.000104)   | 1.000***<br>(0.0000199) | 1.000***<br>(0.0000194) |
| <b><i>Lower than high school:</i></b>                      |                       |                         |                         |
| Higher education   | 4.610***<br>(0.261)   | 4.493***<br>(0.0397)    | 6.569***<br>(0.0823)    |
| Secondary school   | 3.336***<br>(0.0980)  | 2.213***<br>(0.0141)    | 2.227***<br>(0.0186)    |
| <b><i>Small cities/towns and rural municipalities:</i></b> |                       |                         |                         |
| Big cities   | 0.925**<br>(0.0350)   | 1.257***<br>(0.0103)    | 0.945***<br>(0.00787)   |
| Large cities   | 0.871***<br>(0.0329)  | 0.929***<br>(0.00761)   | 0.911***<br>(0.00727)   |
| Constant   | 28.31***<br>(4.150)   | 7.823***<br>(0.262)     | 8.941***<br>(0.262)     |
| Number of observations                                     | 46163                 | 1205081                 | 3912433                 |
| Pseudo $R^2$   | 0.181                 | 0.046                   | 0.033                   |

Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan. Exponential coefficient; standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Source: BAS November 2022. Own calculations.


The difference we found earlier hold up in the regression analyses. Women from Afghanistan have a lower probability than men from Afghanistan to belong to the labour force and among those in the labour force to a lower extent to be employed. The differences are smaller for other foreign-born and this type of difference does not exist for those who are native born.

There are also differences between the three groups in terms of differences in the share of the labour force and employed depending on education and the type of municipality they live in.

### 3. Incomes, occupations and industry

Those who came from Afghanistan have been employed in the labour market in Sweden to a very high extent. But what jobs do they have and what income do they get from their work? We will first look at the income. Given that most people from Afghanistan have a short education (few have post-secondary education), are young and have recently arrived to Sweden, they can be expected to have relatively low incomes, lower incomes than those born in Sweden and lower also than other foreign-born than those from Afghanistan. Figure 9 reports a comparison of the three groups' incomes from employment according to income decile groups. We find, as expected, that the Afghans are above all in the four deciles with the lowest income. But we also see that a not insignificant number are in the deciles that represent those with the highest incomes.

Figure 9. The number of individuals employed aged 20–64 years in decile groups according to the size of the employment income 2022, percent




Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.

Source: BAS 2022. Own calculations.



Figure 10 shows the distribution according to the size of earned income in decile groups separately for women and men. We then find, perhaps somewhat surprising, that the distribution among decile groups is somewhat more even within the group of Afghan women than within the group of Afghan men. A larger proportion of women than men are in decile groups with higher incomes. The same tendency exists for other foreign born – foreign-born women are slightly more often than foreign-born men in decile groups with higher incomes.

Figure 10. Men and women employed aged 20–64 years in decile groups according to the size of the employment income 2022, percent




Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan. The sum of all PAYE (Pay As You Earn – AGI in Swedish) during the year. Monthly populations for January to December are used.

Source: BAS 2022. Own calculations.

Figure 11 provides further information on the distribution of income by showing average earned income in decile 1, the median and decile 10, for those born in Afghanistan, other foreign born and those born in Sweden. The figure shows that, as expected, those from Afghanistan have lower incomes. The differences are particularly large when we look at the first decile and especially among women. The differences are also clear for the median and the tenth decile. There are good reasons to investigate what explains the existence of low earned incomes. Is it a question of low wages or part-time work, possibly combined with studies?

Figure 11. Three measures for income from employment in 2022 for employed aged 20–64 years according to country of birth and gender, SEK



Note. Sum of all AGI in 2022. Population from January to December is the basis for the calculation.

Source: BAS 2022. Own calculations.

One way to supplement the information from the income deciles is to examine whether individuals are established in the labour market or not by using another measure of labour income. If an individual has a work income during the month of November that on an annual basis corresponds to an amount higher than three income base amounts, the individual is considered established in the labour market. On a monthly basis this means approximately 18,000 SEK. For employed individuals, the percentage by background and gender that is considered to established partly in November 2020 and partly in November is shown below. See table 5.

Table 5. The share with and income from employment more than three income base amounts in November 2020 and November 2022 among those aged 20–64 years

| Country of birth    | November 2020 |       | November 2022 |       |
|---------------------|---------------|-------|---------------|-------|
|                     | Men           | Women | Men           | Women |
| Foreign born        | 86,2          | 80,2  | 87,3          | 80,6  |
| Born in Afghanistan | 70,6          | 67,1  | 84,5          | 68,5  |
| Native born         | 90,6          | 84,1  | 90,5          | 84,2  |

Note. Foreign born means foreign born except those born in Afghanistan.

Source: BAS 2020 and 2022. Own calculations.

The percentage with an income from work in November that on an annual basis exceeds three basic income amounts is higher for those born in Sweden than for both groups of foreign born. However, the difference narrows between 2020 and 2022. We see a startling change for men from Afghanistan from 70.6 percent in November 2020 to 84.5 percent in November 2022. The percentage also increases for women from Afghanistan, but it is only a minor increase from a low level. With the help of regression analysis, we have seen a little more of the importance of different factors for the probability of being established in the labour market (measured according to the same measures as in Tables 3 and 4). We found that women are less established than men. This applies to all three groups, but mostly to those from Afghanistan. There are also other differences between the three groups, such as the type of area they live in.

We will now look at the type of work the Afghans have in Sweden and do it by looking at the distribution by industry. Table 6 reports the development from 2018 up to and including 2022. The number increases over time in all industries, but there is a concentration to certain industries. Above all, many of them work in health care and social services. But many are also found in industries such as retail work, manufacturing, property services etc. and hotels and restaurants.

Table 6. The number of employed Afghans according to industry 2018–2022

| Industry  | 2018 | 2019 | 2020  | 2021  | 2022  |
|---|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Healthcare; social services   | 5805 | 7816 | 10594 | 12486 | 13724 |
| Retailing; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles,                      | 1657 | 2194 | 2643  | 3303  | 3838  |
| Manufacturing   | 1282 | 1694 | 1935  | 2771  | 3493  |
| Rental, real estate services, travel services and other support services, | 1397 | 1753 | 1910  | 2736  | 3237  |
| Hotels and restaurants  | 1406 | 2257 | 2258  | 2729  | 3082  |
| Transport and warehousing   | 1342 | 1695 | 1682  | 2089  | 2355  |
| Education   | 1542 | 1764 | 1805  | 2077  | 2260  |
| Construction  | 612  | 814  | 1097  | 1754  | 2160  |
| Public administration and defense; social insurance                       | 516  | 533  | 797   | 838   | 921   |
| Activities in law, economics, science and technology                      | 331  | 420  | 422   | 477   | 533   |
| Other service activities  | 223  | 322  | 326   | 392   | 449   |
| Culture, entertainment and leisure  | 124  | 255  | 224   | 266   | 263   |
| Information and communication activities                                  | 109  | 178  | 155   | 190   | 228   |
| Real estate activities  | 137  | 164  | 199   | 225   | 227   |
| Unknown   | 495  | 693  | 129   | 134   | 197   |
| Finance and insurance activities  | 66   | 70   | 85    | 101   | 135   |
| Agriculture, hunting and forestry   | 42   | 73   | 112   | 125   | 101   |
| Water supply; sewage treatment, waste management and sanitation           | 29   | 37   | 44    | 62    | 74    |
| Supply of electricity, gas, heating and cooling                           | 21   | 25   | 33    | 45    | 60    |
| Extraction of minerals  | 4    | 7    | 8     | 17    | 20    |

Source: BAS 2018–2022, own calculations.

## Conclusions

The main result is that employment development has been strong and fast for the Afghans who are in Sweden. This applies regardless of the type of municipality they live in and applies above all to men. Men from Afghanistan have almost the same percentage of employed people as men born in Sweden. It is interesting to further investigate what explains this. For women from Afghanistan, on the other hand, the employment is significantly lower than that for women born in Sweden, although the percent employed increases over time for this group as well. It is important to further investigate what explains this low employment rate for Afghan women. Is it the case that many in the group are still studying?

Few among those from Afghanistan have a post-secondary education. This may help to explain that they often have relatively low incomes. They are overrepresented in the lower decile groups, although there are those with high incomes. However, the proportion of men from Afghanistan who have an income that is so high that it can be seen as being established in the labour market is increasing rapidly. The number of Afghans is increasing in all industries, but there is a concentration in certain industries. In particular, many are working in healthcare and social services. It is interesting to follow whether this concentration persists over time or whether a larger proportion will eventually work in other industries.

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