

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 17824

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ISSN: 2365-9793

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## ABSTRACT

### Partisan Mortality Cycles\*

Geographic disparities in mortality rates in the US are pronounced and growing. The Black-White mortality gap is volatile but persistent, while the Rich-Poor mortality gap is increasing dramatically. While the causes of these inequalities are not understood, recent attention has focused on the role of place-specific factors. Here, we explore the importance of politics as a place-specific factor contributing to spatial inequality in mortality. Specifically, we test for the existence of partisan mortality cycles using panel data on counties from 1968-2016 and information on the political ideology of state and federal political officials. We confirm the existence of partisan mortality cycles, finding lower mortality in counties governed by more liberal political regimes. Several sources of heterogeneity are also uncovered. While additional research is needed, the analysis here suggests that analyses of spatial, racial, and income differences in mortality ought to start with the political system.

**JEL Classification:** I10, I18, J10

**Keywords:** geographic disparities, ideology, mortality, political cycles

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\* The authors wish to thank the Editor, three anonymous referees, Tatyana Deryugina, John Francois, John Holbein, Kandice Kapinos, Jason Lindo, John Mullahy, Orgul Ozturk, Alicia Plemmons, and Hannes Schwandt for useful comments, as well as conference participants at the Southern Economic Association and seminar participants at SMU. All errors are our own.


*“[A]ll manner of domestic-policy issues have been recast as matters of life and death – urgent, uncompromising, and absolute.”*

- *The New Yorker*, 22 November 2009<sup>1</sup>

## 1 Introduction

The age-adjusted mortality rate in the US has fallen sharply over the past century. Cutler *et al.* (2006, p. 97) state, “Through the twentieth century in the United States and other high-income countries, growth in real incomes was accompanied by a historically unprecedented decline in mortality rates that caused life expectancy at birth to grow by nearly 30 years.” As shown in Figure 1, the age-adjusted all-cause mortality rate has fallen from roughly 1,300 per 100,000 people in 1968 to below 800 in 2016. Yet, the improvement has not been shared equally as large disparities exist in the US based on geographic location. The interquartile range across counties follows a U-shaped pattern, falling from a high of roughly 250 per 100,000 people in 1968 to a low of less than 160 in the early 1980s and rising to nearly 210 in 2016. Figure A1 in Appendix A shows the variation across counties in more detail at six different points in time.<sup>2</sup> The figure reveals that the southeastern part of the US, along with isolated areas in the upper Midwest and Southwest, have higher mortality rates than much of the remainder of the country.

Figure 1: Historical Age-Adjusted Mortality Rate




Notes: The age-adjusted mortality rate in each year is computed as the population-weighted average of county-level age-adjusted mortality rates. The interquartile range is the difference in the 75<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the age-adjusted mortality rates at the county-level.

<sup>1</sup><https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/30/the-politics-of-death>

<sup>2</sup>The Supplemental Appendix is available at <https://smu.box.com/s/114p6kflefc2j1ul5ixsff633g1xmfc3>.

Figure 2: Historical Racial & Income Differences in Age-Adjusted Mortality Rates



Notes: The age-adjusted mortality rate in each year used to compute the mortality ratio is obtained as the population-weighted average of county-level age-adjusted mortality rates by race and sex in Panel (A) and by whether the county-level per capita income is above or below the year-specific median county-level per capita income in Panel (B).

Inequality in mortality by race and income has also varied tremendously over this time period. Panel A in Figure 2 shows the ratio of Black-to-White age-adjusted all-cause mortality rates separately by sex.<sup>3</sup> The mortality rate for Black females fluctuated between 25% and 35% higher than for White females over the period from 1968 until about 2005. The ratio has declined since 2005 and was about 15% higher in 2016. The mortality rate for Black males increased from about 20% higher than for White males in the early 1970s to more than 40% higher in the early to mid-1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the ratio has declined, hovering around 20% since 2011. Panel B in Figure 2 shows the ratio of age-adjusted all-cause mortality rates in counties with per capita income below the year-specific median to counties above the median. The mortality rate in low-income counties was roughly 2% higher than in high-income counties in 1980. However, since that time the gap has been widening and reached about 20% in 2016.

The decline in mortality, rise in geographic inequality in mortality, rise in the income-mortality gradient, and persistent but volatile inequality in the Black-White mortality gap, are now the focus of much attention. A growing part of this literature has examined potential origins of geographic mortality inequality “through the lens of place” (Schwandt *et al.*, 2021, p. 1). Despite this attention, much remains unknown. Couillard *et al.* (2021, p. 142) conclude that “these widening geographic disparities in state-level mortality cannot be attributed to changing spatial patterns in education levels, income inequality, or rising deaths of despair.” Peltzman (2009, p. 189) writes:

“To place the intra-U.S. geographic dispersion in life expectancy in international context, the top decile of the U.S. population is a year or two below the very top of the international distribution, which might be exemplified by Japan. The bottom decile of the U.S. population in life expectancy is at roughly the average life expectancy level of Mexico or Argentina. In terms of

<sup>3</sup>Historically, the recorded gender on a death certificate has reflected the recorded sex on the corresponding birth certificate and/or the decedent’s anatomy at death. Of late, several states have made it possible for death certificates to reflect gender identity. As most of these legislative changes have occurred after our sample, we use the term ‘sex’ to reflect the way coroners documented deaths over the majority of our sample.

characteristics, while the places in the bottom decile of the U.S. life expectancy distribution tend to have low income and education, substantial variety remains uncaptured by such observables.”

In this paper, we build on this literature by taking a step back and assessing the role of politics. We ask what role, if any, do partisan politics and, specifically, the *political ideology* of those in power contribute to the spatial and temporal trends in mortality, both overall as well as by race and sex.

Specifically, we test for the presence of what we refer to as *partisan mortality cycles*. Since Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977), there has been an extensive literature assessing, both theoretically and empirically, so-called *political* and *partisan business cycles* (e.g., Alesina, 1987; Alesina and Sachs, 1988; Rogoff, 1990; Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Hibbs, 1992). While the definitions of these terms are not exact, *political* business cycles generally refer to changes in economic conditions driven by the timing of elections and re-election concerns; they are not tied to a specific political party or ideology. This literature is usually attributed to Nordhaus (1975). In contrast, *partisan* business cycles occur when politicians choose policies aligned with the preferences of their constituents. As a result, political regimes beholden to different constituents with different preferences will lead to economic fluctuations. Hibbs (1977) is often credited for initiating this literature; Price (1997) offers an excellent review.

Our analysis is in line with the *partisan* view of fluctuations as we test for spatial and temporal fluctuations in mortality depending on the political ideology of those in power. Just as political regimes drive economic fluctuations due to distinct policy preferences, political regimes may have important consequences on both short- and long-term public health. While our hypothesis that *partisan mortality cycles* may be a salient factor underlying the rise in geographic inequality stems from the role politics played during the Covid-19 pandemic, the collision between partisan politics and public health began long ago. For decades, the US has experienced ideological clashes over health care reform, public mental health institutions, pollution, gun control, the social safety net, cigarette taxes, and more. There are also ideological differences in regulatory oversight, enforcement of public health laws, and preferences for economic redistribution. Not only might these ideological differences impact *overall* public health, but the partisan model also suggests that political regimes may focus on public health issues which primarily affect their own voter base. As Hibbs (1977, p. 1487) states, “The real winners of elections are perhaps best determined by examining the policy consequences of partisan change rather than by simply tallying the votes.”

To proceed, we build on Chetty *et al.* (2016) and Finkelstein *et al.* (2021) to construct a very simple theoretical model showing that mortality depends on local individual health capital and location- and time-specific health capital. Our approach takes a high level view and assesses whether political regimes are the origin of the black box that is the place effect. In particular, we assess whether partisan ideology is the ultimate, rather than the proximate, cause of geographic variation in mortality. As noted in Torche and Rauf (2021, p. 378), “how changes in political contexts *within countries over time* can shape health has been relatively less explored” (italics in original). If partisan mortality cycles are present, a full investigation of proximate causes are beyond the scope of the current paper. We do offer some initial thoughts at the end. Regardless, there is significant value-added in knowing whether geographic inequities in mortality are related to political regimes.

Motivated by the theoretical framework, we use county-level panel data on age-adjusted mortality from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) over the period 1968 to 2016 to estimate *event-study-like specifications* in the sense that we include both *lags* and *leads* of political variables. This allows

us to say something about whether any associations are likely causal as inclusion of leads allows us to test the crucial strict exogeneity assumption (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 325). This strategy has been used elsewhere to establish causal relationships, such as in Heyes and Saberian (2019) who analyze the causal effect of temperature on court decisions.

As political regimes can impact public health through both short-term actions (e.g., gun control or enforcement of safety regulations) and long-term actions (e.g., pollution control or safety net generosity and efficiency), we analyze two measures of mortality, *all-cause mortality* and *short-term mortality*, where the latter includes mortality attributable to causes that operate within a short window. As political regimes in the US often turn over frequently, it may be easier for one to identify partisan mortality cycles, if they exist, in short-term mortality where mortality is attributable to more immediate factors.<sup>4</sup> However, one should not dismiss the possibility of an event having an immediate impact on all-cause mortality. For example, Borgschulte and Vogler (2020) found that Medicaid expansion in 2014 reduced all-cause mortality by more than 11 deaths per 100,000 individuals within two years in treated counties.

To characterize the local political regime, our focus is on the *political ideology* of state and federal politicians. While we also explore the role of political party, we focus on ideology for two reasons. First, there is significant temporal and spatial variation in what each political party represents. In particular, the Democratic party, especially at the state level, has not always been tied to liberal ideology (Strong, 1971). The timing of the shift of white, conservative southerners from the Democratic to the Republican party varied by state (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). In addition, as we discuss below, today there remains significant ideological differences within political party, particularly at the state level. Second, Dynes and Holbein (2020) provide an exhaustive examination of the effects of state-level executive and legislative party control on 28 policy outcomes from 1960 to 2016, finding precisely estimated null effects.

Our analysis yields several important findings. First, and most importantly, we confirm the existence of *partisan political mortality cycles* as *political ideology* is associated with county-level mortality. We find a consistent pattern of *lower* all-cause and short-term mortality under more liberal regimes over the full sample period. A one standard deviation increase in liberalism is associated with 1-2 fewer all-cause deaths and 0.8-1.0 fewer short-term deaths per 100,000 in an average county-year. Moreover, the results suggest that these findings are *causal*.

Second, we uncover heterogeneity in partisan mortality cycles by race and sex, consistent with the argument in Hibbs (1977) that political regimes may focus more on issues which primarily affect their own voter base. Over the full sample period, we find a negative association between liberalism and short-term mortality for all demographic groups except Black males. However, further analysis reveals a negative, statistically meaningful association between liberalism and short-term mortality for both Black females and males during the period covering the crack epidemic (mid-1980s to the early 1990s). Ideology is also associated with the short-term mortality of White females and males from 1968–1984. Most importantly, we find no statistically meaningful evidence of partisan mortality cycles after 2000 for any group.

That we find no statistically meaningful evidence of partisan mortality cycles in the 21<sup>st</sup> century before Covid-19 is remarkable. We present evidence that this may be attributable to the rise in political polarization and greater legislative gridlock experienced since 2000. This suggests that policymakers in the current political climate are ineffective in reducing mortality. As such, amelioration of the geographic

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<sup>4</sup>The analysis of short-term mortality also avoids concerns over locational differences in place of death versus place of residence throughout one's lifetime (e.g., Fletcher *et al.*, 2022).

inequality in mortality may require solutions outside the political system. However, as noted above, we leave a careful investigation into mechanisms for future research.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 develops a motivating theory of county-specific mortality rates. Section 4 presents our empirical framework and data. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 provides evidence on possible mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Literature Review

Our examination of partisan mortality cycles contributes to four strands of literature. The first literature, as mentioned above, focuses on geographic, racial, and income inequality in mortality and the role of *economic* aspects of place in understanding these inequities (e.g., Cutler *et al.*, 2006; Peltzman, 2009; Currie and Schwandt, 2016; Case and Deaton, 2017; Vierboom *et al.*, 2019; Benjamins *et al.*, 2021; Baker *et al.*, 2021; Deryugina and Molitor, 2021; Couillard *et al.*, 2021). Place-based factors that have been examined include education (Montez and Berkman, 2014), income (Chetty *et al.*, 2016), income inequality (Deaton and Paxson, 2004; Avendano, 2012), poverty (Currie and Schwandt, 2016; Schwandt *et al.*, 2021), public health interventions (Anderson *et al.*, 2022), and social policy (Kim, 2016; Reynolds and Avendano, 2018). We add to this literature by finding an important role of *political* aspects of place in understanding mortality inequality.

The second literature explores the connection between politics and health. Several cross-country studies document associations between political regime and health (e.g., Navarro and Shi, 2001; Navarro *et al.*, 2006; Blum *et al.*, 2021). These studies find that democratic, social democratic, and egalitarian political regimes are associated with better health outcomes. Other studies focus on a single country, often assessing associations between political variables and suicide or infant mortality (e.g., Classen and Dunn, 2010; Rodriguez *et al.*, 2014; Torche and Rauf, 2021; Rodriguez *et al.*, 2022). These studies point to some association between more liberal regimes and better health outcomes. We add to this literature by examining county-level panel data over nearly five decades and focusing on the political ideology of those in power at both the state and federal levels.

The final two literatures uncover possible linkages between political regimes and mortality. Specifically, the third literature examines the effect of political ideology on economic outcomes and policy choices, while the fourth literature relates the economic environment to mortality. Examples in the former include Alesina and Roubini (1992), Kelly and Witko (2014), and Magkonis *et al.* (2021), while some in the latter include Ruhm (2000), Miller *et al.* (2009), and Coile *et al.* (2014). Overall, these studies find statistically meaningful linkages between political regimes and economic outcomes, as well as economic outcomes and mortality. We add to this literature by examining the reduced form association between political ideology and mortality.

### 3 Theory

To motivate our empirical specification, we follow Chetty *et al.* (2016) and Finkelstein *et al.* (2021) and specify the log mortality hazard rate of individual  $i$  at age  $a$  residing in location  $c$  at time  $t$  as

$$\log[m_{ict}(a)] = \theta_i + \beta a + \gamma_{ct}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\theta$  is individual-level, time invariant health capital and  $\gamma$  is location- and time-specific health capital (referred to as the *place effect* in Finkelstein *et al.* (2021) and Couillard *et al.* (2021)). Let  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$  denote the average individual-specific health capital of residents of location  $c$  at time  $t$ . Note,  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$  will generally vary over time despite  $\theta_i$  being time invariant due to changes in the local population through migration, fertility, and past mortality (Deryugina and Molitor, 2021).

We define the mortality rate of an average individual residing in location  $c$  at time  $t$  at age  $a$  as

$$\bar{m}_{ct}(a) = \exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \beta a + \gamma_{ct}). \quad (2)$$

The age-adjusted mortality rate in county  $c$  at time  $t$  is given by

$$\bar{m}_{ct} = \int_a \exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \beta a + \gamma_{ct}) f_s(a) da \quad (3)$$

where  $f_s(a)$  is the age distribution of the standard population.

Suppose age in the standard population is distributed as  $\chi^2(k)$ , a chi-squared distribution with  $k$  degrees of freedom, and  $A$  is the upper limit on age. As shown in Appendix C, this implies

$$\log \bar{m}_{ct} = \tilde{\beta} + \bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\tilde{\beta}$  is a constant that depends on  $k$  and  $A$ . Thus, the log age-adjusted mortality rate in county  $c$  at time  $t$  depends on a constant term, the average health capital of residents,  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$ , and the place effect,  $\gamma_{ct}$ .

### 4 Empirics

#### 4.1 Model

The empirical model for the age-adjusted mortality rate is based on (4). Our baseline specification is

$$\log \bar{m}_{ct} = \alpha_c + \lambda_t + f_c(t) + x_{ct}^h \beta^h + \tilde{x}_{ct}^l \beta^l + \varepsilon_{ct}, \quad (5)$$

where  $\bar{m}_{ct}$  is age-adjusted mortality rate in county  $c$  in year  $t$ ,  $\alpha_c$  and  $\lambda_t$  are location and time fixed effects,  $f_c(t)$  is a state- or county-specific, flexible control for time,  $x_{ct}^h$  is a vector of factors capturing the individual health capital,  $\theta_i$ , of the local population (entering via  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$ ),  $\tilde{x}_{ct}^l$  is a vector of factors capturing the health capital of a location (entering via the place effect,  $\gamma_{ct}$ ), and  $\varepsilon_{ct}$  is a mean zero error term capturing differences between the right-hand sides of (4) and (5).

Importantly, we envision political variables entering via  $\tilde{x}_{ct}^l$ . To explore the dynamics of the interplay, if any, between the politics and mortality, we include the political variables in an event-study-like manner.

Specifically, we model the health capital of a location as

$$\tilde{x}_{ct}^l \beta^l = \sum_{s=1}^4 p_{c,t-s} \beta_{lag,s}^l + p_{ct} \beta_0^l + \sum_{s=1}^3 p_{c,t+s} \beta_{lead,s}^l + x_{ct}^l \beta_x^l, \quad (6)$$

where  $p_{ct}$  is the vector of location-specific political variables,  $\beta_{lag,.}^l$  ( $\beta_{lead,.}^l$ ) represents the association between lagged (future) political variables and current mortality,  $\beta_0^l$  represents the contemporaneous association, and  $x_{ct}^l$  denotes the remaining covariates entering via the place effect,  $\gamma_{ct}$ .  $p_{ct}$  includes measures of state liberalism, state liberalism interacted with presidential and US Congressional ideology, and the triple interaction. Presidential and US Congressional ideology alone are absorbed by the time fixed effects. In Section 5 we focus on three different marginal effects: the average effect of a one standard deviation increase in state and presidential liberalism (referred to as *Executive Liberalism*), the average effect of a one standard deviation increase in state and federal legislative liberalism (referred to as *Legislative Liberalism*), and the average effect of a one standard deviation increase in state, presidential, and federal legislative liberalism (referred to as *Full Liberalism*). We describe the estimating equation obtained by substituting (6) into (5) as event-study-like as we expect  $\beta_{lag,.}^l$  and/or  $\beta_0^l$  to be non-zero if partisan mortality cycles are present.<sup>5</sup>

A few comments are warranted. First, despite the political variables being measured at the state and federal levels, effects at the county-level are identified through the temporal variation in these variables given the inclusion of county fixed effects. We do not aggregate the analysis to the state-level as this discards useful variation in both mortality as well as other controls that are available at the county level. Moreover, recent research finds that local politics can affect economic outcomes that are less visible to the electorate (Dippel, 2022). Second, to increase the precision of the estimates, we restrict  $\beta_{lag,s}^l, s = 1, \dots, 4$ , to be equal. Similarly, we restrict  $\beta_{lead,s}^l, s = 1, \dots, 3$ , to be equal as well.<sup>6</sup> Third, the temporal variation in the ideology variables comes from two sources: cross and within changes in political preferences. Cross changes occur when elections, resignations, or deaths cause one politician to be replaced by another. Within changes occur when the preferences of an elected official change over time. Fourth, we consider the combined effects of state and federal ideology as actions at one level of government may amplify or undermine actions at the other level.

Finally, while we believe there to be considerable value in documenting associations between political ideology and mortality across US counties given the dearth of prior research, we understand the desire for causal estimates as well. To that end, it is common in empirical models focusing on political *party* to exploit close elections in a regression discontinuity design (e.g., Dynes and Holbein, 2020). We do not pursue this strategy here given that our focus is on variation in *ideology* at the *state* and *federal* levels and across *legislative* and *executive* branches. As such, the overall political climate affecting a given county in a given year is measured using several continuous variables and their interactions, arising from *numerous* elections across *many* time periods.<sup>7</sup> Alternatively, Chyn and Shenhar (2022) use a mover design at the

<sup>5</sup>In the literature assessing the effects of political regimes on outcomes, there is ambiguity regarding how long it should take for effects to materialize, if they materialize at all. Dynes and Holbein (2020) focus on two to four years after a regime comes into power when examining a plethora of different outcomes. In studies that specifically examine health outcomes, the focus is often on a one year lag (e.g., Finkelstein *et al.*, 2012).

<sup>6</sup>Unrestricted estimates for most specifications are provided graphically in Appendix A.

<sup>7</sup>Regression discontinuity approaches have also been criticized in the political *party* context. Marshall (2024) shows that regression discontinuity approaches that exploit close elections to isolate the effects of a particular *attribute* of a politician

zip code level to identify the overall effect of place on child birthweight in California. Unfortunately, we do not have such detailed panel data on internal migration at the national level over the long period of time analyzed here.

Instead, we aim to identify the causal effects of ideology through the use of county fixed effects and rich controls for unobserved time effects and observed attributes of mortality. The key assumption required for our estimates to be unbiased is *strict exogeneity*. This assumption is testable by augmenting the model with leads of the covariates. In our case,  $\beta_{lead}^l$ , being statistically indistinguishable from zero is consistent with the political variables being strictly exogenous and thus the estimated coefficients having a causal interpretation (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 325). It is important to note that testing whether the coefficients on the leads are statistically different from zero not *only* tests whether political variables at time  $t$  are (conditionally) correlated with the idiosyncratic error term in prior periods,  $\varepsilon_{c,t-s}$ ,  $s > 0$ , but also whether they are (conditionally) correlated with the idiosyncratic error term in *any* time period,  $\varepsilon_{c,t-s}$ ,  $s = t - 1, \dots, -1, 0, 1, \dots, t - T$ , since the model is estimated using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) applied to the mean-differenced equation. This also means that the presence of the leads tests for the possibility of reverse causation as this would lead to violation of strict exogeneity.

In our baseline model  $x_{ct}^l$  also includes controls for the age distribution. In particular, we include the share of the population in detailed age categories. While age-adjusted mortality controls for the age distribution to some extent, we allow for additional effects of the age distribution that may operate through other channels. We also include the share of the population in different sex-race categories.  $x_{ct}^h$  includes the share of the population in different education categories, given the importance of education in explaining mortality (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2022; Couillard *et al.*, 2021). Lastly, we model  $f_c(t)$  using time fixed effects, state-specific linear or quadratic time trends, state-by-decade time fixed effects, or county-specific linear time trends to control for changes in local population health capital and place-specific factors affecting mortality other than politics.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, we consider an extended version of our baseline specification where  $x_{ct}^l$  also includes controls for income inequality. Specifically, we control for state-level income shares of the top 1% and 10%. We then interact each of these variables with a time invariant indicator if the county is urban or non-urban. Income inequality has recently received particular attention as a possible source of the place effect on

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(such as their ideology) can be misleading if the attribute directly impacts the vote margin.

<sup>8</sup>Anderson *et al.* (2022) similarly use time fixed effects and municipality-level linear time trends when modeling urban mortality rates. Dynes and Holbein (2020) control for state-specific linear time trends while also including time fixed effects in their analysis of policy outcomes. That said, the inclusion of unit-specific time trends is not without controversy. Wolfers (2006) argues against their inclusion in the standard difference-in-differences framework with a single binary treatment variable. Similar to Laporte and Windmeijer (2005), Wolfers (2006) argues that a single treatment dummy variable will not capture heterogeneous treatment effects over time. In the presence of such mis-specification, unit-specific time trends may capture some of the missed dynamics, biasing the estimates. In the particular application in Wolfers (2006), the author argues that this is likely to be the case due to not only the likely presence of dynamic treatment effects, but also because the direction of the omitted variable bias ‘solved’ by the unit-specific trends does not seem plausible. The solution in Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) and Wolfers (2006) is to use an event study specification, explicitly allowing for time-varying treatment effects. In our case, (6) already allows for dynamic effects of political ideology. Moreover, when the inclusion of unit-specific time trends substantively affects the estimates, relative to state-specific quadratic time trends, it does in a plausible direction. Specifically, the negative impacts of liberalism on mortality become larger (in absolute value). This implies that county-specific, unobserved time trends associated with higher mortality are positively correlated with liberalism, which is consistent with, e.g., Robert and Booske (2011) and Pacheco and Fletcher (2015). Pacheco and Fletcher (2015) conclude: “[B]etter self-rated health is associated with an increase in the likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party in young adulthood and beyond”. Finally, including year fixed effects along with state-by-decade fixed effects produces estimated effects that are, if anything, stronger than the effects obtained using unit-specific time trends.

mortality. However, we do not include these controls in our baseline specification as income inequality may be a mechanism by which partisan mortality cycles arise.

We cluster standard errors at the county level. We explored clustering at the state-year level as well as at the state-level. Clustering at the state level leads to an effective cluster size of roughly ten given the cross-cluster heterogeneity in cluster size and covariates, well below the number considered appropriate (Carter *et al.*, 2017). Clustering at the state-year level results in 180 effective clusters. While this is sufficient for hypothesis testing, the clustering is at a level such that the unit of observation (county) is not nested within clusters.<sup>9</sup> For this reason, we cluster at the county-level, which yields 735 effective clusters.

## 4.2 Data

Data on age-adjusted all-cause mortality and age-adjusted cause-specific mortality come from the US CDC's WONDER database.<sup>10</sup> We use county-level data for the period 1968-2016. This time period is optimal for our study as it begins after the point in which the literature indicates modern platforms and ideologies of the Democratic and Republican parties begin to take shape at the Federal level (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Further, it ends before the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic.

We analyze two measures of county-level mortality: *all-cause mortality* and *short-term mortality*. Each measure is constructed for the full county-year population, as well as separately by race (Black and White) and sex (male and female). The distinction between all-cause and short-term mortality follows the World Health Organization (WHO) assignment of causes of death to three categories: communicable, non-communicable, and injuries (World Health Organization, 2020). Communicable causes of deaths are attributable to a non-chronic health condition, such as infectious and parasitic diseases, nutritional conditions, respiratory conditions, and maternal and perinatal conditions. Non-communicable causes of death are attributable to diseases and conditions stemming from long-term, chronic conditions. Injuries capture all non-natural causes of death, such as deaths of despair (suicide, gun violence, etc.) and car accidents. We define short-term mortality as causes of death which fall under the communicable or injuries category.<sup>11</sup> Figure A2 in Appendix A shows the variation in short-term mortality across counties at six points in time. As with all-cause mortality, the Southeast faces higher short-term mortality. However, many counties in the Southwest and Northwest/Midwest also have higher short-term mortality rates than much of the remainder of the country.

County-level data on population by age, sex, race are from the National Institute of Health.<sup>12</sup> County-level data on educational attainment are from the USDA Economic Research Service.<sup>13</sup> We classify counties

<sup>9</sup>Clustering at the state-year level leads to p-values that are roughly three times larger than when county-level clustering leads to a p-value below 0.10. Thus, for tests with p-values around 0.02 when clustering at the county-level, the p-value is approximately 0.05 when clustering at the state-year level.

<sup>10</sup>See <https://wonder.cdc.gov/mortSQL.html>.

<sup>11</sup>The term *short-term mortality* is used to represent different aspects of mortality in different contexts. In the health literature, it often refers to death within 90 days of entering the hospital. In economics, it has been used to refer to mortality within days or weeks of some intervention. Here, for lack of a better term, we use it to refer to causes of death that do not take long to be realized. Note, also, while the CDC censors cause-specific mortality with fewer than 10 deaths, we extract aggregate age-adjusted mortality for all categories we label as “short-term”. As a result, censoring in our data only occurs if there are fewer than 10 *total* short-term deaths in a county-year cell. A detailed breakdown of missing mortality data is provided in Appendix B.

<sup>12</sup>See <https://seer.cancer.gov/popdata/download.html>.

<sup>13</sup>See <https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-level-data-sets>. The data are available every ten years; we use linear interpolation for the remainder.

as urban or non-urban using the 2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes (RUCC) from the US Department of Agriculture.<sup>14</sup> The RUCC classifies counties into nine categories on the basis of metropolitan status, population size, and adjacency of nonmetropolitan areas to a metropolitan area. We define urban counties as those classified as metropolitan in 2013; thus, our definition is time invariant. State income shares come from the Frank-Sommeiller-Price series.<sup>15</sup>

To characterize the local political regime, our primary focus is on the political ideology of state and federal politicians. The federal ideological political variables are the DW-Nominate (Dynamic Weighted NOMINAL Three-step Estimation) scores available from UCLA Social Science Division's Voteview.<sup>16</sup> The Nominate scores vary from -1 to 1, with higher values corresponding to greater liberalism. Each politician receives two scores per two-year Congressional session. These scores are referred to as the first and second dimensions. Dimension 1 is interpreted as representing economic ideology. Dimension 2 is interpreted as representing social ideology. Our baseline analysis uses Dimension 1. We consider Dimension 2 to assess sensitivity. We form an overall ideology score for the US Congress by computing the median ideology score separately for the US House and the US Senate in each year and then averaging. For the state level, we use a similar ideological score capturing overall state policy liberalism (Caughey and Warshaw, 2016).<sup>17</sup> The scores vary from roughly -3 to 3, again with higher scores corresponding to greater liberalism.<sup>18</sup>

Figure 3 is similar to Figure 1 but shows trends in mortality separately by ideology for both all-cause (Panel A) and short-term (Panel B) mortality. Liberal states are defined as those with a liberalism score above the sample median; years under Republican presidents are shaded in grey. The figure reveals a persistent gap favoring liberal states. This gap becomes even more pronounced when focusing on short-term mortality. For all-cause mortality, the gap has been steadily widening since the mid-1980s.

Figure 4 is identical to Figure 3 except now each panel shows mortality separately by race (Black or White) and sex (male or female). When we decompose mortality rates based on race and sex, several important stylized facts emerge. First, all-cause mortality is highest for Black males, followed by White males, then Black females, and finally White females. This ranking persists over the entire sample period, although mortality has fallen for all groups over time. There is not much difference in short-term mortality by race and sex. Second, the gap in all-cause mortality favoring liberal states emerges by the early 1990s and widens over the remainder of the sample for all groups. Finally, the gap in short-term mortality favoring liberal states exists over the entire sample with the exception of the early to mid 1990s for Blacks.

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<sup>14</sup> See <https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urban-continuum-codes/>


<sup>15</sup> See [https://www.shsu.edu/eco\\_mwf/inequality.html](https://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html)

<sup>16</sup> See <https://www.voteview.com>. The scores are based on maximum likelihood estimates assuming a two dimensional spatial representation of each politicians ideal voting behavior and using data on their individuals roll call votes. Everson *et al.* (2016) provides an excellent technical discussion. The scores reflect a politicians positioning within this two dimensional space. There is disagreement on the correctness of interpreting the scores as a measure of ideology. McCarty (2016) provides an excellent discussion of this aspect and concludes that the scores "largely reflect an ideology-like substance" (p. 173).

<sup>17</sup> Available at <http://www.chriswarshaw.com/data.php>.

<sup>18</sup> Figures A3-A5 in Appendix A show the spatial and temporal variation in liberalism in the House, Senate, and state levels. The figures suggest that geographic political polarization has risen as California, New York, and Massachusetts have become more liberal, while southern and midwest states have become more conservative. In addition, the country as a whole has become more economically conservative over time.

Figure 3: Historical Age-Adjusted Mortality Rates by Political Ideology




(A) All-Cause

(B) ‘Short-Term’-Cause

Notes: The age-adjusted mortality rate in each year is computed as the population-weighted average of county-level age-adjusted mortality rates. Gray shaded regions denotes periods with a Republican president.

Figure 4: Historical Age-Adjusted Mortality Rates by Political Ideology Across Race and Sex



(A) All-Cause

(B) ‘Short-Term’-Cause

Notes: The age-adjusted mortality rate in each year is computed as the population-weighted average of county-level age-adjusted mortality rates. Gray shaded regions denotes periods with a Republican president.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Baseline Specifications

Tables 1 and 2 present the *marginal effects* from the baseline specification in (5). Table 1 contains the results for all-cause mortality, while Table 2 presents the results for short-term mortality. The tables display the estimates (and statistical significance) of a one standard deviation increase in state and presidential

liberalism. We refer to this as tests of *Executive Liberalism*. Similarly, we report marginal effects of a one standard deviation increase in state and federal legislative liberalism. We refer to this as tests of *Legislative Liberalism*. Finally, we report marginal effects of a one standard deviation increase in state, presidential, and federal legislative liberalism. We refer to this as tests of *Full Liberalism*.<sup>19</sup>

We consider various sets of controls across the columns in each table, but our *preferred specifications* include location and population health controls, county and year fixed effects, and county-specific linear time trends (Column 9 in each table). Column 10 in each table includes additional controls for income inequality. We focus on Columns 9 and 10 in our discussion as these include the most exhaustive set of controls. Figure 5 graphically displays the results, including both the restricted and unrestricted specifications. The actual coefficient estimates from the estimation of (5) are relegated to Tables D1-D2 in Appendix D.

The assessment of all-cause mortality in Table 1 yields two findings. First, we find a statistically significant, *negative* association at the  $p < 0.05$  level between lagged Executive Liberalism and all-cause mortality in our preferred specification (Column 9). Controlling for income inequality does not change this result (Column 10). The effect size is modest; a one standard deviation increase in Executive Liberalism in the prior four years is associated with a 0.2% decline in all-cause mortality. This translates to roughly two fewer deaths per 100,000 for the average county-year; 5,000 fewer deaths in the average year. To put this in context, a one standard deviation increase in Executive Liberalism is roughly moving from a county in Kansas in 1979 under a Republican governor and President Jimmy Carter (median of the distribution) to a county in Oregon in 2000 under a Democratic governor and President Bill Clinton (85<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution). The contemporaneous and lead effects of Executive Liberalism are relatively precisely estimated zeros. This is consistent with a negative *causal* effect of Executive Liberalism on future all-cause mortality. The top left panel in Figure 5 shows this visually.

Second, we find a statistically significant, *negative* association at the  $p < 0.10$  level between lagged Legislative Liberalism in our preferred specification (Column 9). While the point estimate is unchanged, the estimate is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels after controlling for income inequality (Column 10). The effect size is small; a one standard deviation increase in Legislative Liberalism in the prior four years is associated with a 0.1% decrease in all-cause mortality. This is roughly equivalent to moving from a county in Florida in 1991 with a 58% (61%) Democratic share of the Senate (House of Representatives) in the 102<sup>nd</sup> Congress (15<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution) to a county in Ohio in 2009 with a 58% (59%) Democratic share of the US Senate (House of Representatives) in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress (median of the distribution). The contemporaneous effects of Legislative Liberalism are precisely estimated zeros; the lead effect is statistically significant, but positive, at the  $p < 0.10$  level in Column 9. Because the lead effect is of the opposite sign of the lagged effect, we cautiously interpret this as modest evidence of a small, negative *causal* effect of Legislative Liberalism on future all-cause mortality. The middle left panel in Figure 5 shows this visually. The effects of Full Liberalism are essentially identical to those for Legislative Liberalism.

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
<sup>19</sup>Note, marginal effects are computed at the sample mean. In addition, the marginal effects of Full Liberalism *should not* be interpreted as the effects holding the other political effects constant. In other words, the marginal effect of Full Liberalism is the effect of a one standard deviation in liberalism at all levels included in the model holding constant only the non-political covariates. In addition, while a standard deviation increase in each measure of ideology is not trivial, it is much smaller than the interquartile range for each variable (presidential, congressional, and state).

Table 1: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0005	-0.0030	-0.0025	0.0003	-0.0039	-0.0025	0.0004	-0.0030	-0.0019	-0.0018
P-value	0.7646	0.0008	0.0008	0.7175	0.0000	0.0011	0.5913	0.0002	0.0066	0.0111
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0010	-0.0012	-0.0017	0.0010	-0.0031	-0.0017	0.0010	-0.0024	-0.0013	-0.0011
P-value	0.5959	0.1910	0.0213	0.2445	0.0006	0.0251	0.2040	0.0034	0.0707	0.1050
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0009	-0.0012	-0.0018	0.0010	-0.0031	-0.0017	0.0011	-0.0025	-0.0012	-0.0011
P-value	0.6247	0.1874	0.0188	0.2162	0.0005	0.0222	0.1802	0.0027	0.0848	0.1300
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0023	0.0053	0.0012	-0.0035	-0.0021	0.0010	-0.0056	-0.0037	0.0007	0.0004
P-value	0.5393	0.0716	0.6844	0.2338	0.4859	0.7357	0.0358	0.1746	0.7916	0.8728
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0032	0.0062	0.0014	-0.0029	-0.0014	0.0012	-0.0051	-0.0033	0.0009	0.0007
P-value	0.4112	0.0391	0.6399	0.3231	0.6464	0.6894	0.0556	0.2204	0.7386	0.7907
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0020	0.0060	0.0009	-0.0033	-0.0017	0.0008	-0.0055	-0.0036	0.0006	0.0005
P-value	0.6032	0.0429	0.7481	0.2632	0.5676	0.8012	0.0382	0.1784	0.8133	0.8619
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0185	-0.0060	-0.0014	-0.0022	-0.0031	-0.0016	-0.0016	-0.0008	0.0010	0.0010
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.1840	0.0536	0.0043	0.1189	0.1386	0.4524	0.2698	0.3150
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0165	-0.0025	-0.0008	-0.0021	-0.0026	-0.0011	-0.0017	-0.0006	0.0016	0.0014
P-value	0.0000	0.0239	0.4211	0.0632	0.0195	0.2857	0.1201	0.5684	0.1026	0.1414
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0161	-0.0030	-0.0012	-0.0023	-0.0026	-0.0014	-0.0018	-0.0006	0.0014	0.0013
P-value	0.0000	0.0051	0.2643	0.0406	0.0204	0.1688	0.0840	0.6035	0.1413	0.1867
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State x Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Ideology on Mortality



Notes: All-cause mortality results are shown in the left column; Short-Term mortality results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

Table 2: Marginal Effects of Ideology on Short-Term Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0117	-0.0137	-0.0074	-0.0030	-0.0109	-0.0081	-0.0025	-0.0093	-0.0077	-0.0073
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.1591	0.0000	0.2378	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0100	-0.0113	-0.0051	-0.0005	-0.0095	-0.0058	-0.0002	-0.0078	-0.0057	-0.0052
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0085	0.8275	0.0000	0.0028	0.9431	0.0004	0.0031	0.0068
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0089	-0.0113	-0.0053	-0.0007	-0.0100	-0.0060	-0.0005	-0.0084	-0.0060	-0.0055
P-value	0.0003	0.0000	0.0063	0.7355	0.0000	0.0020	0.8131	0.0002	0.0018	0.0045
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0229	0.0026	-0.0017	-0.0074	-0.0077	-0.0029	-0.0093	-0.0101	-0.0003	-0.0014
P-value	0.0044	0.7493	0.8290	0.3516	0.3421	0.7207	0.2196	0.1932	0.9681	0.8505
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0285	0.0051	0.0006	-0.0048	-0.0070	-0.0006	-0.0070	-0.0094	0.0015	0.0007
P-value	0.0004	0.5278	0.9392	0.5447	0.3931	0.9420	0.3570	0.2299	0.8509	0.9277
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0257	0.0035	-0.0011	-0.0067	-0.0083	-0.0023	-0.0086	-0.0106	0.0000	-0.0007
P-value	0.0015	0.6577	0.8918	0.4004	0.3130	0.7775	0.2590	0.1755	0.9978	0.9306
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0027	-0.0065	-0.0006	-0.0024	-0.0002	0.0004	0.0015	0.0036	0.0023	0.0021
P-value	0.2742	0.0055	0.8156	0.4002	0.9369	0.8880	0.5919	0.1757	0.3817	0.4183
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0061	-0.0064	-0.0009	-0.0029	-0.0011	0.0002	0.0008	0.0024	0.0018	0.0015
P-value	0.0160	0.0085	0.7349	0.3117	0.6759	0.9337	0.7761	0.3695	0.4847	0.5642
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0072	-0.0070	-0.0015	-0.0036	-0.0009	-0.0004	0.0002	0.0025	0.0013	0.0010
P-value	0.0050	0.0043	0.5544	0.2082	0.7499	0.8653	0.9557	0.3629	0.6233	0.7081
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
State x Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Turning to the short-term mortality in Table 2, we find statistically significant, *negative* associations between lagged Executive, Legislative, and Full Liberalism and mortality at the  $p < 0.01$  level in the majority of specifications, including our preferred specification (Column 9) and after controlling for income inequality (Column 10). Moreover, as seen in Figure 5, the estimated contemporaneous and lead effects of each dimension of liberalism on short-term mortality are precise zeros in all specifications that include year fixed effects and at least state-specific linear time trends (Columns 3-10). This is consistent with our estimates having a *causal* interpretation. The magnitude of the effects are larger than in the case of all-cause mortality in percentage terms. Specifically, we find that a one standard deviation increase in Executive (Legislative) Liberalism leads to a 0.8% (0.6%) reduction in short-term mortality; a one standard deviation increase in Full Liberalism leads to a 0.6% reduction. In absolute terms, this corresponds to roughly 0.8-1.0 fewer short-term deaths per 100,000 in the average county-year.

As an alternative way to assess the importance of political ideology, we perform a similar decomposition to Chyn and Shenhav (2022). However, the decomposition is a bit more involved in our context due to there being three dimensions to ideology (state, presidential, and congressional) and the model containing double and triple interactions between these variables. To simplify matters, we compare county-year observations experiencing above-median state, presidential, and congressional liberalism to county-year observations experiencing below-median state, presidential, and congressional liberalism. We assess what portion of the mean log gap in mortality across the two groups is explained by the mean differences in political ideology. Note, because of the interactions, the results are not symmetric when going from below- to above-median versus above- to below- median.<sup>20</sup>

For all-cause mortality, the raw mean mortality gap is 0.046 log points (favoring more conservative areas). Going from a below-median liberalism county to an above-median liberalism county reduces all-cause mortality by 0.0005 log points; reducing the mean log gap by roughly 1.0%.<sup>21</sup> Going from an above-median liberalism county to a below-median liberalism county increases all-cause mortality by 0.006 log points; reducing the mean log gap by roughly 12.0%. For short-term mortality, the mean mortality gap is 0.090 log points (favoring more liberal areas). Going from a below-median liberalism county to an above-median liberalism county reduces short-term mortality by 0.003 log points; explaining 2.9% of the mean log gap. Going from an above-median liberalism county to a below-median liberalism county increases short-term mortality by 0.015 log points; explaining 16.7% of the mean log gap. This asymmetry is consistent with transitions to more conservative regimes raising mortality, while transitions to more liberal regimes undoing only some of the adverse effects.

In sum, the baseline results point to the existence of *partisan mortality cycles* of modest magnitudes as all-cause and short-term mortality vary according to the ideology of the political regime. Moreover, the results are consistent with these partisan mortality cycles representing *causal* relationships given the statistically insignificant or contrasting estimates of the lead effects. Finally, controlling for state-level income inequality does not alter these findings.

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<sup>20</sup>To see this, consider a simple regression model:  $y = \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_1 x_2 + \varepsilon$ . If  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  increase by  $dx_1$  and  $dx_2$ , respectively, the change in  $y$  is  $\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3(dx_1 dx_2 + dx_1 x_2 + dx_2 x_1)$ . If  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  decrease by  $dx_1$  and  $dx_2$ , respectively, the change in  $y$  is  $-\beta_1 - \beta_2 + \beta_3(dx_1 dx_2 - dx_1 x_2 - dx_2 x_1)$ , which is not the negative of the former.

<sup>21</sup>Calculations are evaluated at the overall sample mean.

## 5.2 Assessing Heterogeneity

We examine several possible sources of heterogeneity. First, we assess heterogeneity across demographic groups and time periods. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the Black-White mortality gap is large and volatile over time. Moreover, the gap in life expectancy fell by 48% over this time period (Schwandt *et al.*, 2021). Prior research has found that overall geographic inequality in mortality is strongly linked to racial differences in mortality (e.g., Schwandt *et al.*, 2021). In addition, we allow for heterogeneity across time periods. Second, we examine the robustness of our findings to an alternative measure of political ideology. Finally, we assess heterogeneity across the distribution of mortality using quantile regression to further examine mortality inequality.

### 5.2.1 Race and Sex

The dependent variables are now the mortality rates of a specific race (Black or White) and sex (male or female) pair. In addition to estimating models for the full sample, we also analyze heterogeneity across different time periods: (i) 1968–1984, (ii) 1985–2000, and (iii) 2001–2016. Our choice of the three time periods is motivated by historical developments. The early part of the sample period includes a time when southern Democrats were primarily conservative. These politicians were very different from their northern Democratic counterparts (Strong, 1971). Moreover, the timing of the shift of White, conservative southerners from the Democratic party to the Republican party varied by state (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). The early time period also coincides with the deinstitutionalization period, when states drastically reduced the capacity of public mental health facilities (Lerman, 1985).

The second period, spanning 1985 to 2000, contains the crack epidemic. Fryer *et al.* (2013, p. 1652–4) state that crack cocaine was “virtually unheard of prior to the mid-1980s,” but then it “rose sharply beginning in 1985, peaked in 1989, and slowly declined thereafter.” This era saw a profound increase in the homicide rate of young black males. In addition, usage by females led to a rise in mortality due to AIDS and a decline in fetal health. This resulted in a dramatic increase in all-cause mortality among young black males in urban areas which returned to pre-crack cocaine levels by 2000 (Evans *et al.*, 2016).

The final period is characterized by a significant increase in political polarization in the US, leading to a growing chasm in the policy choices across locations. Grumbach (2018, p. 417) states that “[policy] variation is increasingly related to party control of government; prior to 2000, whether a state was controlled by Democrats or Republicans said little about the policies it would adopt, but the parties have implemented highly divergent policy agendas after 2000.” The widening policy differences across the political parties is also mirrored in the preferences of individuals. Autor *et al.* (2020, p. 1340) write: “The twenty-first century has also seen greater polarization in the policy preferences and media viewing habits of the American public. In the 1990s and early 2000s, roughly one-half of respondents took moderate positions on prominent political issues; by the late 2000s the centrist share had shrunk to under 40 percent, as individuals adopted more strident views on the left or right.”

Marginal effects are reported in Tables 3–10. Each presents the results for the full sample period and the three sub-periods. For brevity, we only present the results from our preferred specifications; those that include county-specific linear time trends with and without controls for inequality (analogous to Columns 9 and 10 in Tables 1 and 2). Figures A7–A14 in Appendix A display the results graphically for the full sample period. The coefficient estimates from (5) are in Tables D3–D10 in Appendix D.

Because many models are being estimated ( $4$  demographic groups  $\times$   $4$  time periods  $\times$   $2$  outcomes  $\times$   $2$  specifications), we follow the advice in [Benjamin \*et al.\* \(2018\)](#) and focus on estimates of lagged and contemporaneous effects that are statistically significant at at least the  $p < 0.005$  level *and* where the lead effects are either statistically insignificant at the  $p < 0.10$  level or statistically significant but of the opposite sign of the lagged and/or contemporaneous effects. Using this very *conservative* approach, if such cases arise we are confident that the effects are not due to Type I errors and have a *causal* interpretation.

Even adopting this conservative approach, several important findings arise. To start, we find no statistically meaningful effects of ideology on *all-cause mortality* for any demographic group or time period. However, we find statistically and economically meaningful estimates for *short-term mortality* for all demographic groups. Over the full sample period, contemporaneous Executive, Legislative, and Full Liberalism lower the age-adjusted short-term mortality rate for Black females and White males and females. The magnitudes range from  $3.5\%$  for Black females to  $4.0\%$  for White females to  $5.5\%$  for White males for a one standard deviation increase in liberalism.

Splitting the sample by time period, we find statistically and economically significant effects for all demographic groups in the period covering the crack epidemic. A one standard deviation increase in contemporaneous Full Liberalism leads to an  $7\%$  and  $9\%$  decrease in the age-adjusted mortality rate for Black males and females, respectively; a  $5\%$  and  $4\%$  decline for White males and females, respectively. Lagged liberalism is also a statistically and economically significant determinant of short-term mortality for all groups except Black females during this time period. A one standard deviation increase in lagged Full Liberalism over the prior four years leads to a  $20\%$  decrease in the age-adjusted mortality rate for Black males and a  $7\%$  and  $8\%$  for White males and females, respectively. This translates to nearly  $67$  fewer short-term deaths per  $100,000$  for Black males in the average county-year during this era. We also find sizable negative effects of lagged liberalism on White males and females in the first time period, covering 1968–1984.

Overall, we find no effect of ideology on all-cause mortality by demographic group. Thus, the effects found in the baseline model do not materialize in a statistically meaningful way when the sample is confined to a particular demographic group. However, liberalism consistently lowers short-term mortality across all four demographic groups during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially during the crack epidemic.

Table 3: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality for Black Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0188	-0.0182	-0.1306	-0.1352	-0.0182	-0.0202	0.0280	0.0283
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3259</i>	<i>0.3401</i>	<i>0.2055</i>	<i>0.1924</i>	<i>0.3773</i>	<i>0.3248</i>	<i>0.3989</i>	<i>0.3963</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0218	-0.0213	-0.0796	-0.0803	-0.0213	-0.0226	0.0267	0.0271
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2568</i>	<i>0.2672</i>	<i>0.0678</i>	<i>0.0652</i>	<i>0.3049</i>	<i>0.2730</i>	<i>0.4241</i>	<i>0.4182</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0216	-0.0211	-0.0699	-0.0698	-0.0194	-0.0208	0.0295	0.0296
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2617</i>	<i>0.2724</i>	<i>0.0832</i>	<i>0.0846</i>	<i>0.3500</i>	<i>0.3133</i>	<i>0.3752</i>	<i>0.3737</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0069	-0.0069	0.0502	0.0483	-0.0116	-0.0120	-0.0182	-0.0164
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0916</i>	<i>0.0874</i>	<i>0.3285</i>	<i>0.3492</i>	<i>0.1004</i>	<i>0.0984</i>	<i>0.2781</i>	<i>0.3268</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0063	-0.0064	0.0062	0.0047	-0.0101	-0.0107	-0.0178	-0.0159
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1288</i>	<i>0.1218</i>	<i>0.7270</i>	<i>0.7925</i>	<i>0.1680</i>	<i>0.1574</i>	<i>0.2890</i>	<i>0.3433</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0067	-0.0068	-0.0022	-0.0038	-0.0081	-0.0086	-0.0191	-0.0170
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1045</i>	<i>0.0983</i>	<i>0.8919</i>	<i>0.8176</i>	<i>0.2880</i>	<i>0.2732</i>	<i>0.2411</i>	<i>0.2955</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0071	0.0070	-0.1552	-0.1643	0.0040	0.0040	-0.0343	-0.0310
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2408</i>	<i>0.2523</i>	<i>0.0210</i>	<i>0.0158</i>	<i>0.7346</i>	<i>0.7362</i>	<i>0.0429</i>	<i>0.0663</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0084	0.0082	-0.0397	-0.0418	0.0063	0.0064	-0.0348	-0.0316
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1605</i>	<i>0.1717</i>	<i>0.1115</i>	<i>0.0987</i>	<i>0.5783</i>	<i>0.5759</i>	<i>0.0398</i>	<i>0.0615</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0082	0.0080	-0.0257	-0.0268	0.0072	0.0073	-0.0335	-0.0303
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1718</i>	<i>0.1836</i>	<i>0.2285</i>	<i>0.2171</i>	<i>0.5347</i>	<i>0.5309</i>	<i>0.0517</i>	<i>0.0776</i>
Location Health Controls								
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table 4: Marginal Effects of Ideology on “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0260	-0.0358	0.0672	0.0885	-0.1956	-0.1846	0.1073	0.1141
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5394</i>	<i>0.3966</i>	<i>0.6382</i>	<i>0.5402</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.0008</i>	<i>0.1797</i>	<i>0.1563</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0330	-0.0415	0.0234	0.0148	-0.1985	-0.1872	0.1243	0.1305
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4378</i>	<i>0.3268</i>	<i>0.7620</i>	<i>0.8476</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0005</i>	<i>0.1196</i>	<i>0.1047</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0309	-0.0397	0.0211	0.0048	-0.2075	-0.1979	0.1211	0.1279
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4686</i>	<i>0.3486</i>	<i>0.7611</i>	<i>0.9440</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.1291</i>	<i>0.1117</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0372	-0.0356	0.0096	0.0377	-0.0730	-0.0818	0.0341	0.0334
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0009</i>	<i>0.0017</i>	<i>0.8820</i>	<i>0.5625</i>	<i>0.0015</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.2982</i>	<i>0.3135</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0310	-0.0286	0.0410	0.0474	-0.0566	-0.0622	0.0393	0.0380
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0069</i>	<i>0.0139</i>	<i>0.1917</i>	<i>0.1338</i>	<i>0.0126</i>	<i>0.0056</i>	<i>0.2293</i>	<i>0.2455</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0338	-0.0314	0.0490	0.0488	-0.0669	-0.0737	0.0396	0.0385
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0034</i>	<i>0.0071</i>	<i>0.0502</i>	<i>0.0520</i>	<i>0.0075</i>	<i>0.0029</i>	<i>0.2170</i>	<i>0.2384</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0700	-0.0704	0.1194	0.1117	-0.0102	-0.0285	-0.0288	-0.0335
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.2289</i>	<i>0.2655</i>	<i>0.7104</i>	<i>0.2966</i>	<i>0.3808</i>	<i>0.3099</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0663	-0.0666	0.0429	0.0351	-0.0184	-0.0339	-0.0264	-0.0310
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.4009</i>	<i>0.4954</i>	<i>0.4935</i>	<i>0.2070</i>	<i>0.4196</i>	<i>0.3439</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0675	-0.0679	0.0233	0.0137	-0.0203	-0.0379	-0.0272	-0.0313
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.5748</i>	<i>0.7417</i>	<i>0.4549</i>	<i>0.1587</i>	<i>0.4102</i>	<i>0.3442</i>
Location Health Controls								
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table 5: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality for Black Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0238	-0.0250	-0.0261	-0.0296	-0.0277	-0.0274	0.0031	-0.0002
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1833</i>	<i>0.1606</i>	<i>0.7912</i>	<i>0.7645</i>	<i>0.1856</i>	<i>0.1810</i>	<i>0.9124</i>	<i>0.9956</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0266	-0.0275	-0.0542	-0.0586	-0.0258	-0.0256	0.0057	0.0024
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1373</i>	<i>0.1238</i>	<i>0.1789</i>	<i>0.1454</i>	<i>0.2169</i>	<i>0.2100</i>	<i>0.8418</i>	<i>0.9320</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0266	-0.0274	-0.0488	-0.0531	-0.0254	-0.0252	0.0028	-0.0006
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1389</i>	<i>0.1266</i>	<i>0.1866</i>	<i>0.1501</i>	<i>0.2268</i>	<i>0.2216</i>	<i>0.9211</i>	<i>0.9820</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0333	0.0334	0.0008	0.0013	-0.0133	-0.0140
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9482</i>	<i>0.9872</i>	<i>0.4970</i>	<i>0.4976</i>	<i>0.9031</i>	<i>0.8431</i>	<i>0.3206</i>	<i>0.2961</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0006	0.0010	0.0079	0.0065	0.0054	0.0060	-0.0119	-0.0128
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8644</i>	<i>0.8010</i>	<i>0.6552</i>	<i>0.7124</i>	<i>0.4243</i>	<i>0.3944</i>	<i>0.3734</i>	<i>0.3423</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0004	0.0008	0.0037	0.0020	0.0042	0.0047	-0.0105	-0.0113
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9061</i>	<i>0.8382</i>	<i>0.8117</i>	<i>0.8963</i>	<i>0.5539</i>	<i>0.5166</i>	<i>0.4232</i>	<i>0.3896</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0030	0.0031	-0.0900	-0.0961	0.0174	0.0176	-0.0028	-0.0034
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5915</i>	<i>0.5791</i>	<i>0.1415</i>	<i>0.1188</i>	<i>0.1212</i>	<i>0.1218</i>	<i>0.8437</i>	<i>0.8132</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0042	0.0042	-0.0245	-0.0272	0.0174	0.0177	-0.0010	-0.0016
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4444</i>	<i>0.4451</i>	<i>0.3085</i>	<i>0.2597</i>	<i>0.1078</i>	<i>0.1059</i>	<i>0.9428</i>	<i>0.9094</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0041	0.0041	-0.0131	-0.0153	0.0169	0.0171	-0.0023	-0.0030
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4541</i>	<i>0.4568</i>	<i>0.5267</i>	<i>0.4577</i>	<i>0.1226</i>	<i>0.1248</i>	<i>0.8705</i>	<i>0.8357</i>
Location Health Controls								
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table 6: Marginal Effects of Ideology on “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0337	0.0258	-0.2637	-0.2892	0.0045	0.0036	-0.0011	-0.0093
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4610</i>	<i>0.5712</i>	<i>0.1657</i>	<i>0.1349</i>	<i>0.9399</i>	<i>0.9522</i>	<i>0.3895</i>	<i>0.9139</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0312	0.0242	-0.0324	-0.0467	-0.0017	-0.0029	0.0087	0.0011
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4971</i>	<i>0.5981</i>	<i>0.7269</i>	<i>0.6166</i>	<i>0.9760</i>	<i>0.9598</i>	<i>0.9178</i>	<i>0.8997</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0306	0.0238	0.0051	-0.0061	-0.0084	-0.0107	0.0070	-0.0001
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5058</i>	<i>0.6031</i>	<i>0.9506</i>	<i>0.9409</i>	<i>0.8862</i>	<i>0.8574</i>	<i>0.9344</i>	<i>0.9989</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0352	-0.0344	0.0178	0.0219	-0.0861	-0.0871	0.0779	0.0740
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0077</i>	<i>0.0094</i>	<i>0.8429</i>	<i>0.8087</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.0769</i>	<i>0.0974</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0297	-0.0291	0.0231	0.0175	-0.0671	-0.0678	0.0788	0.0740
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0266</i>	<i>0.0307</i>	<i>0.5824</i>	<i>0.6766</i>	<i>0.0031</i>	<i>0.0036</i>	<i>0.0681</i>	<i>0.0919</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0324	-0.0316	0.0212	0.0141	-0.0842	-0.0857	0.0829	0.0782
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0158</i>	<i>0.0191</i>	<i>0.5406</i>	<i>0.6836</i>	<i>0.0013</i>	<i>0.0014</i>	<i>0.0580</i>	<i>0.0796</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0204	-0.0198	-0.0089	-0.0484	0.0076	0.0032	0.0103	0.0100
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2426</i>	<i>0.2576</i>	<i>0.9463</i>	<i>0.7163</i>	<i>0.7818</i>	<i>0.9059</i>	<i>0.8157</i>	<i>0.8207</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0154	-0.0160	0.0049	-0.0138	0.0008	-0.0030	0.0221	0.0216
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3733</i>	<i>0.3733</i>	<i>0.3575</i>	<i>0.9395</i>	<i>0.8293</i>	<i>0.9769</i>	<i>0.6997</i>	<i>0.6311</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0153	-0.0160	0.0119	-0.0025	0.0038	-0.0006	0.0167	0.0176
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3792</i>	<i>0.3588</i>	<i>0.8200</i>	<i>0.9611</i>	<i>0.8924</i>	<i>0.9822</i>	<i>0.7134</i>	<i>0.6987</i>
Location Health Controls								
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table 7: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality for White Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0017	0.0016	-0.0148	-0.0191	-0.0030	-0.0031	0.0013	-0.0000
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6611</i>	<i>0.6964</i>	<i>0.5592</i>	<i>0.4518</i>	<i>0.6373</i>	<i>0.6274</i>	<i>0.8945</i>	<i>0.9995</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0018	0.0017	-0.0128	-0.0134	-0.0022	-0.0024	0.0015	0.0000
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6435</i>	<i>0.6616</i>	<i>0.0952</i>	<i>0.0811</i>	<i>0.7288</i>	<i>0.7123</i>	<i>0.8768</i>	<i>0.9975</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0017	0.0016	-0.0103	-0.0105	-0.0027	-0.0028	0.0017	0.0003
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6761</i>	<i>0.6910</i>	<i>0.1572</i>	<i>0.1459</i>	<i>0.6872</i>	<i>0.6790</i>	<i>0.8541</i>	<i>0.9724</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0008	-0.0007	-0.0006	-0.0007	0.0019	0.0019	0.0004	-0.0008
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4357</i>	<i>0.4909</i>	<i>0.9678</i>	<i>0.9628</i>	<i>0.4306</i>	<i>0.4268</i>	<i>0.9182</i>	<i>0.8573</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0023	-0.0028	0.0028	0.0028	0.0005	-0.0007
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8593</i>	<i>0.9297</i>	<i>0.5177</i>	<i>0.4315</i>	<i>0.2275</i>	<i>0.2276</i>	<i>0.9001</i>	<i>0.8593</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0021	-0.0029	0.0014	0.0015	0.0006	-0.0008
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8051</i>	<i>0.8867</i>	<i>0.5216</i>	<i>0.3808</i>	<i>0.6211</i>	<i>0.6085</i>	<i>0.8861</i>	<i>0.8491</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0012	0.0011	-0.0217	-0.0255	-0.0013	-0.0013	-0.0049	-0.0057
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3419</i>	<i>0.3744</i>	<i>0.1785</i>	<i>0.1211</i>	<i>0.6569</i>	<i>0.6429</i>	<i>0.2643</i>	<i>0.1919</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0013	0.0012	-0.0088	-0.0091	-0.0021	-0.0022	-0.0046	-0.0055
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2961</i>	<i>0.2961</i>	<i>0.3559</i>	<i>0.0583</i>	<i>0.0547</i>	<i>0.4742</i>	<i>0.4460</i>	<i>0.2976</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0012	0.0011	-0.0065	-0.0066	-0.0016	-0.0016	-0.0044	-0.0052
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3510</i>	<i>0.4103</i>	<i>0.1087</i>	<i>0.1123</i>	<i>0.5971</i>	<i>0.5895</i>	<i>0.3297</i>	<i>0.2406</i>
Location Health Controls								
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table 8: Marginal Effects of Ideology on “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0228	0.0275	-0.2083	-0.2365	-0.0533	-0.0474	0.0007	0.0007
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1193</i>	<i>0.0616</i>	<i>0.0053</i>	<i>0.0015</i>	<i>0.0359</i>	<i>0.0587</i>	<i>0.9757</i>	<i>0.9762</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0178	0.0214	0.0030	-0.0306	-0.0503	-0.0444	-0.0060	-0.0063
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2289</i>	<i>0.1492</i>	<i>0.9009</i>	<i>0.2107</i>	<i>0.0384</i>	<i>0.0634</i>	<i>0.7825</i>	<i>0.7721</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0199	0.0234	0.0078	-0.0249	-0.0707	-0.0641	-0.0044	-0.0048
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1779</i>	<i>0.1145</i>	<i>0.7423</i>	<i>0.2968</i>	<i>0.0058</i>	<i>0.0111</i>	<i>0.8392</i>	<i>0.8269</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0466	-0.0475	0.0696	0.0726	-0.0220	-0.0270	0.0059	0.0042
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.1156</i>	<i>0.1017</i>	<i>0.0554</i>	<i>0.0189</i>	<i>0.5249</i>	<i>0.6531</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0514	-0.0526	0.0293	0.0233	-0.0117	-0.0160	0.0043	0.0027
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0062</i>	<i>0.0312</i>	<i>0.2811</i>	<i>0.1417</i>	<i>0.6380</i>	<i>0.7760</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0540	-0.0554	0.0321	0.0231	-0.0319	-0.0356	0.0055	0.0036
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0023</i>	<i>0.0299</i>	<i>0.0115</i>	<i>0.0050</i>	<i>0.5626</i>	<i>0.7061</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0029	-0.0027	0.1377	0.0845	0.0398	0.0352	0.0047	0.0045
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6517</i>	<i>0.6693</i>	<i>0.0040</i>	<i>0.0846</i>	<i>0.0015</i>	<i>0.0050</i>	<i>0.6358</i>	<i>0.6467</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0025	-0.0020	0.0072	-0.0130	0.0322	0.0294	0.0037	0.0033
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6898</i>	<i>0.7546</i>	<i>0.5917</i>	<i>0.3483</i>	<i>0.0104</i>	<i>0.0200</i>	<i>0.7089</i>	<i>0.7376</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0008	0.0013	-0.0029	-0.0214	0.0275	0.0243	0.0051	0.0047
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9072</i>	<i>0.8416</i>	<i>0.8110</i>	<i>0.0835</i>	<i>0.0331</i>	<i>0.0611</i>	<i>0.6135</i>	<i>0.6377</i>
Location Health Controls								
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table 9: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality for White Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0010	0.0010	-0.0011	-0.0013	-0.0023	-0.0024	0.0139	0.0131
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.80677</i>	<i>0.8/08</i>	<i>0.9649</i>	<i>0.9602</i>	<i>0.7230</i>	<i>0.7039</i>	<i>0.4504</i>	<i>0.1746</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0010	0.0010	-0.0068	-0.0032	-0.0038	-0.0038	0.0140	0.0132
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8068</i>	<i>0.8034</i>	<i>0.4006</i>	<i>0.6973</i>	<i>0.5571</i>	<i>0.5574</i>	<i>0.1440</i>	<i>0.1696</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0005	0.0006	-0.0083	-0.0045	-0.0054	-0.0055	0.0145	0.0136
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8984</i>	<i>0.8938</i>	<i>0.2862</i>	<i>0.5643</i>	<i>0.4193</i>	<i>0.4095</i>	<i>0.1284</i>	<i>0.1528</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0017	-0.0017	0.0310	0.0316	-0.0039	-0.0034	0.0083	0.0078
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0920</i>	<i>0.0966</i>	<i>0.0565</i>	<i>0.0522</i>	<i>0.1120</i>	<i>0.1663</i>	<i>0.455</i>	<i>0.0598</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0010	-0.0010	0.0010	0.0017	-0.0029	-0.0023	0.0081	0.0076
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3112</i>	<i>0.3213</i>	<i>0.7901</i>	<i>0.6630</i>	<i>0.2266</i>	<i>0.3252</i>	<i>0.0520</i>	<i>0.0692</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0012	-0.0011	-0.0009	-0.0003	-0.0045	-0.0040	0.0081	0.0076
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2607</i>	<i>0.2717</i>	<i>0.8088</i>	<i>0.9328</i>	<i>0.1255</i>	<i>0.1763</i>	<i>0.513</i>	<i>0.0715</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0019	-0.0019	-0.0046	-0.0024	0.0046	0.0041	0.0043	0.0041
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1831</i>	<i>0.1733</i>	<i>0.8000</i>	<i>0.8957</i>	<i>0.1076</i>	<i>0.1545</i>	<i>0.3448</i>	<i>0.3638</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0013	-0.0014	-0.0122	-0.0100	0.0035	0.0028	0.0051	0.0049
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3639</i>	<i>0.3507</i>	<i>0.0139</i>	<i>0.0466</i>	<i>0.2239</i>	<i>0.3309</i>	<i>0.2583</i>	<i>0.2768</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0016	-0.0017	-0.0127	-0.0105	0.0044	0.0039	0.0053	0.0051
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2554</i>	<i>0.2322</i>	<i>0.0040</i>	<i>0.0186</i>	<i>0.1468</i>	<i>0.2097</i>	<i>0.2521</i>	<i>0.2713</i>
Location Health Controls								
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table 10: Marginal Effects of Ideology on “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0123	0.0105	-0.3515	-0.3665	-0.0718	-0.0677	-0.0044	-0.0055
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4229</i>	<i>0.4911</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0022</i>	<i>0.0336</i>	<i>0.8691</i>	<i>0.8379</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0122	0.0105	-0.0011	-0.0196	-0.0592	-0.0548	-0.0029	-0.0045
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4292</i>	<i>0.4982</i>	<i>0.9668</i>	<i>0.4518</i>	<i>0.0094</i>	<i>0.0153</i>	<i>0.9110</i>	<i>0.8624</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	0.0100	0.0081	0.0065	-0.0116	-0.0820	-0.0776	-0.0027	-0.0043
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5205</i>	<i>0.6004</i>	<i>0.7961</i>	<i>0.6495</i>	<i>0.0006</i>	<i>0.0011</i>	<i>0.9192</i>	<i>0.8695</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0366	-0.0359	0.0480	0.0490	-0.0271	-0.0266	-0.0095	-0.0118
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.3317</i>	<i>0.3230</i>	<i>0.0143</i>	<i>0.0176</i>	<i>0.4329</i>	<i>0.3336</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0374	-0.0367	0.0109	0.0077	-0.0140	-0.0134	-0.0103	-0.0126
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.3771</i>	<i>0.5336</i>	<i>0.1597</i>	<i>0.1859</i>	<i>0.3901</i>	<i>0.2951</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0398	-0.0391	0.0029	-0.0017	-0.0293	-0.0281	-0.0084	-0.0111
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.8148</i>	<i>0.8881</i>	<i>0.0161</i>	<i>0.0223</i>	<i>0.4916</i>	<i>0.3689</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0005	-0.0009	-0.0839	-0.1131	0.0493	0.0469	-0.0028	-0.0034
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9299</i>	<i>0.8709</i>	<i>0.1589</i>	<i>0.0622</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.8183</i>	<i>0.7823</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0027	-0.0029	-0.0237	-0.0346	0.0436	0.0426	0.0008	-0.0001
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6432</i>	<i>0.6240</i>	<i>0.1399</i>	<i>0.0339</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.9452</i>	<i>0.9911</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-0.0003	-0.0005	-0.0252	-0.0353	0.0415	0.0397	-0.0018	-0.0026
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9621</i>	<i>0.9268</i>	<i>0.0793</i>	<i>0.0155</i>	<i>0.0005</i>	<i>0.0010</i>	<i>0.8864</i>	<i>0.8354</i>
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

### 5.2.2 Ideology Scores

Our next extension explores heterogeneity across the measure of ideology. As discussed in Section 4.2, we measure ideology using the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scores, corresponding to *economic* ideology. Tables E1-E2 in Appendix E are identical to Tables 1-2 except now ideology is measured using the second dimension, corresponding to *social* ideology. The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results. Specifically, we continue to find negative effects of liberalism on all-cause mortality, but the point estimates are larger (in absolute value). However, the strict exogeneity assumption seems to be violated. For short-term mortality, the negative effects of lagged Legislative and Full Liberalism continue to be negative and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level. The effect of lagged Executive Liberalism is negative, but smaller (in absolute value) and no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, the results suggest that ideology on economic issues matters more for mortality than ideology on social issues. This is consistent with the relationship between economic outcomes and mortality discussed in Section 2. That said, the assumption of strict exogeneity appears more troublesome when using political ideology related to social issues.

The greater importance of economic liberalism is also critical for forecasting future mortality trends. The first Trump presidency symbolized a change in US politics as social issues came to the forefront. A 2022 article in *The Atlantic* states:

“Politics seems more existential, not less. Pundits and partisans cast everything as a culture war, even those things that have little to do with culture... Elites in both parties enjoy a certain privilege – one appropriate to a rich, advanced democracy – that allows them to emphasize culture while deprioritizing economic well-being. Civilizational concerns gain more political resonance precisely as perceptions of civilizational decline intensify on right and left alike.”<sup>22</sup>

This shift away from economic issues in general, and a more liberal economic agenda in particular, may portend future public health crises.

### 5.2.3 Quantile Regression

Our final extension explores heterogeneity across the mortality distribution via quantile regression. For brevity the results are relegated to Appendix F and reveal contrasting results for all-cause and short-term mortality. For all-cause mortality, liberalism is more beneficial (or less harmful) at higher quantiles. For short-term mortality, liberalism is most beneficial at low quantiles. This implies that liberalism *ameliorates* (conditional) inequities in all-cause mortality across locations due to larger relative improvements in locations with high (conditional) all-cause mortality, but *exacerbates* (conditional) inequities in short-term mortality due to larger relative improvements in locations with low (conditional) short-term mortality. As the greater inequity in short-term mortality arises from greater *improvements* in locations that are relatively healthy, as opposed to deterioration in locations that are relatively unhealthy, this is not necessarily a bad outcome. However, it is consistent with more liberal regimes being ineffective in reducing disparities in short-term mortality. Yet, such regimes do benefit the least healthy places in terms of all-cause mortality.

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<sup>22</sup>See <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/01/republicans-democrats-forever-culture-war/621184/>

### 5.3 Role of Political Party

Our focus has been on partisan mortality cycles as driven by the ideology of political regimes. We do so since ideology scores are arguably more closely connected to actual policy decisions. Nonetheless, a large literature explores the effect of political party on various economic and social outcomes. In light of this, we briefly explore the role of political party.

To proceed, we replace our ideology measures with covariates indicating Democratic party control of the *executive* branch at the state and federal levels, Democratic party control of the *legislative* branch at the state and federal levels, and their interactions. We measure Executive Control with a dummy variable equal to one if the state governor is a Democrat (zero otherwise) and the interaction of this variable with a dummy variable equal to one if the President is a Democrat (zero otherwise). We measure Legislative Control with a dummy variable equal to one if the state legislature (both House and Senate) is controlled by a Democratic majority (zero otherwise) and the interaction of this variable with a dummy variable equal to one if the federal legislature (both House and Senate) is controlled by a Democratic majority (zero otherwise).<sup>23</sup> Finally, we measure Full Control by interacting executive and legislative control. Executive control enables the party in power the ability to enforce laws. Legislative control enables the party in power the ability to enact laws. Full control enables the party in power the ability enact and enforce laws, as well as appoint judges.

Overall, the results using political party are broadly consistent with those using ideology, particularly after noting the ideology of Southern Democrats in the early part of the sample. This highlights the importance of understanding the spatial and temporal variation in views within US political parties. More comprehensive discussion and all results are provided in Appendix G.

## 6 Mechanisms

As stated in Section I, a thorough investigation of the possible mechanisms through which liberalism impacts mortality is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can offer a few comments. First, our analysis has shown that controlling for income inequality has no effect on the association between politics and mortality. Second, Rodriguez *et al.* (2022) and others suggest a possibly important role of the social safety net. Aside from differences in the generosity of programs for which states have some discretion, states and localities can affect the efficacy of these programs and, in particular, the ease of access. A 2023 article in the *Washington Post* argues:

“State lawmakers gained autonomy over how to spend federal safety net dollars following Republican President Ronald Reagan’s push to empower the states in the 1980s. Those investments began to diverge sharply along red and blue lines, with conservative lawmakers often balking at public health initiatives they said cost too much or overstepped.”<sup>24</sup>

The article concludes: “States’ politics — and their resulting policies — are shaving years off American lives.”

<sup>23</sup>Dummy variables for the party of the President and federal legislative control are absorbed by the time fixed effects.

<sup>24</sup>See <https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/interactive/2023/republican-politics-south-midwest-life-expectancy/>.

To investigate this, we examine two prominent safety net programs: Unemployment Insurance (UI) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP; now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)). Access to both programs by eligible households came under scrutiny during the Great Recession and Covid-19 pandemic. For instance, early during the pandemic, it became clear that “Florida’s unemployment system was the slowest in the country to process claims” and “residents described nightmarish experiences as they tried to get benefits.” Governor DeSantis pointed to the prior administration during which the system was created, arguing that while “he wasn’t sure if it was Scott’s intention to discourage people from applying for benefits … the system was certainly designed to produce that outcome.”<sup>25</sup> A similar situation arose in Texas, where 600,000 individuals have lost access to Medicaid due to “procedural errors,” leading to “reverberations” causing individuals to also lose access to SNAP benefits.<sup>26</sup>

Figure 6 shows the distribution of state UI recipiency rate averaged over 1987-1996 and State FSP participation rate in 1997 by state policy liberalism.<sup>27</sup> The recipiency rate is the ratio of individuals collecting UI to the number of unemployed. The participation rate is the share of FSP-eligible households that collect FSP benefits. We examine data from the 20<sup>th</sup> century as this is the time period where we find evidence of partisan mortality cycles. In both cases, but for UI in particular, more conservative states have significantly lower rates.

We suspect that the ability of governments at the federal, state, and local levels to influence the efficacy of the social safety net is a major source of partisan political mortality cycles, at least until 2000. Moreover, even though these may be short-term changes in policy, they may influence all-cause and short-term mortality by exacerbating the deleterious effects of chronic conditions. For example, Borgschulte and Vogler (2020) found that areas covered by Medicaid expansion in 2014 reduced all-cause mortality by more than 11 deaths per 100,000 individuals within two years. Further, Goodman-Bacon (2018) found Medicaid’s introduction reduced infant and child mortality in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, short-term changes in policy or policy efficacy may lead to lasting changes due to political inertia.

Third, the excise tax rate on cigarettes may play an important role. Cigarettes and their taxation have large health impacts and a strong, historical partisan division. Figure 7 shows that tax rates in 1993 tend to be much higher in liberal states, consistent with Golden *et al.* (2014).<sup>28</sup>


<sup>25</sup> See <https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/08/06/899893368/gov-says-floridas-unemployment-system-was-designed-to-create-pointless-roadblock>.

<sup>26</sup> See <https://www.texastribune.org/2023/09/28/texas-hhsc-medicaid/>.

<sup>27</sup> UI data: <https://stats.bls.gov/mlr/1997/07/art2full.pdf>; FSP data: <https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/reaching-those-need-food-stamp-participation-rates-states>.


<sup>28</sup> See <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK236771/>.

Figure 6: State Participation Rates in Safety Net Programs & State Policy Liberalism



Notes: Higher values of all ideology scores correspond to greater liberalism. UI = unemployment insurance. FSP = Food Stamp Program.

Figure 7: State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & State Policy Liberalism



Notes: Higher values of all ideology scores correspond to greater liberalism.

Fourth, our findings do not appear to be driven by changes in internal migration. In theory, migration – by altering the latent health of a county’s population – may represent a time-varying, county-specific omitted variable leading to bias. In the theoretical model in Section 3, migration may enter through the local health capital,  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$ , of a county-time observation. If so and our controls,  $x_{ct}^h$ , do not fully account for the local health capital, then migration will lead to bias if it leads to a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption. However, as we are unable to reject strict exogeneity in many of our preferred specifications, we suspect that migration is either unrelated to our measures of political ideology (conditional on the

controls in the model) or that migration does not alter local health capital (conditional on the controls in the model). A few facts support this finding. To start, the health affects of political ideology that we find operate within a two-year window; even less for short-term mortality. Since any relationship between migration and ideology is likely to operate with a significant delay due to information lags and moving costs, this should mitigate their correlation in a given time period. Furthermore, variation in local health capital is likely to be driven predominantly by the elderly population who have much lower migration rates in general. For example, between 2015-2019, 2.6% (1.2%) of adults aged 65+ changed counties (states) compared to 6.1% (2.6%) for adults under the age of 65.<sup>29</sup> Lastly, Asquith and Mast (2024) show that net migration at the county-level has been fairly constant over the past five decades. Counties that have experienced population declines over this period have not seen a decrease in net migration or a significant increase in mortality, but rather a substantial decline in fertility.

That said, we augmented our model to control for county-level net migration by decade by five-year age groups (0-4, 5-9, ... 75+) from Egan-Robertson *et al.* (n.d.).<sup>30</sup> Tables H1 and H2 in Appendix H display specifications including these as additional controls. In all cases examined, the results are essentially unchanged; if anything, the effects of liberalism become stronger. Thus, our results do not appear to be driven by net migration.

As an additional exercise, we also estimated the effect of lagged political ideology and political party on net migration by decade by age group. Since the measures of net migration for each age group are constant for each decade, we regress the net migration rate for a county in, say, the 1970s on political variables from 1970. The sample includes similar observations for the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Thus, these models are estimated on county-by-decade observations, where the covariates are measured at the start of the decade. The results are shown in Tables H3 and H4 in Appendix H, where the former (latter) uses political ideology (party) as the relevant controls. The results show that liberalism is associated with lower net migration among individuals in their 20s and over the age of 50. However, Democratic control is positive for these age groups. These seemingly contradictory findings appear to be driven by a few key states (Florida and Texas for ages 50 and over and Colorado as well for individuals in their 20s) with very high net migration in the 20<sup>th</sup> century that were ideologically conservative but controlled by Democrats.


Finally, the absence of partisan mortality cycles in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a time period characterized by stagnant and even declining life expectancy in the US (Mehta *et al.*, 2020), is noteworthy and important. This holds even if we pool the demographic groups and estimate the baseline specification for each time period.<sup>31</sup> One possible explanation is that government gridlock has increased over time with the polarization of the US (Binder, 1999, 2014). Thus, political regimes face greater challenges in converting policy preferences to actual policy. Binder (2014, p. 17) argues that “levels of legislative deadlock have steadily risen over the past half-century” and “stalemate at times now reaches across three-quarters of the salient issues on Washington’s agenda.” Figure 8 provides evidence supporting this hypothesis. The figure plots two measures of the legislative productivity of US Congress from 1789 to 2003. The measures, derived in Grant and Kelly (2008), reveal an overwhelmingly downward trend since each index peaked in 1965.

<sup>29</sup>See <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2022/demo/p23-218.html>.

<sup>30</sup>The county-level net migration rates reported in the data are for a decade, and thus are constant in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.

<sup>31</sup>Results available upon request.

Figure 8: Historical Legislative Productivity of US Congress



Source: [Grant and Kelly \(2008\)](#); [Kelly \(2018\)](#).

Another possible explanation for the lack of partisan mortality cycles in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the opioid epidemic. Drug overdoses tripled between 1999 and 2020, mainly due to opioids ([Currie and Schwandt, 2021](#)). According to [Baker et al. \(2021\)](#), p. 36), opioids have been an “equal opportunity scourge” affecting all communities and demographic groups, although mortality rates are higher for low income, low education individuals. However, there is little difference in the overdose rate among individuals above and below the poverty line ([Currie and Schwandt, 2021](#)). Interestingly, [Arteaga and Barone \(2025\)](#) find that counties with greater exposure to the opioid epidemic increased their Republican vote share.

In addition to those discussed here, there are a plethora of additional plausible mechanisms that are mentioned in the literature. These include spatial variation in education and socioeconomic conditions of the place ([Rodriguez et al., 2022](#)), gun violence ([Santilli et al., 2017](#)), environmental regulatory stringency ([Fredrickson et al., 2018; Chyn and Shenay, 2022](#)), public investments in healthcare infrastructure ([Erten and Yilmaz, 2025](#)), ‘deaths of despair’ due to declines in socioeconomic mobility ([Graham and Pinto, 2019](#)) or perceived loss of social status ([Siddiqi et al., 2019](#)), among others.

Regardless of cause, the results are not encouraging in terms of the political system generating solutions to geographic and socioeconomic inequality in mortality in the near future.

## 7 Conclusion

Mortality has been declining for decades in the US prior to Covid-19. However, the overall trend masks important heterogeneity. Geographic differences in mortality rates are on the rise and racial and income disparities in mortality remain significant. Moreover, such differences remain even after controlling for the usual observed characteristics such as education and resources. As a result, we take a step back and test for the presence of *partisan mortality cycles*.

Specifically, we assess the relationship between the ideological attributes of political regimes and the

health capital of locations as reflected in age-adjusted mortality rates. Our empirical framework uses event-study like specifications. In so doing, we have been careful when giving the results a causal interpretation. In cases where the lagged and/or contemporaneous effects are statistically significant and the lead effects are either statistically insignificant or significant but in the opposite direction, we interpret the results as *consistent* with a causal effect of politics. But, the usual caveats apply. That said, even if we ‘only’ identify associations, this is important. [Baker et al. \(2021\)](#), p.26) argue that “documenting these inequalities and how they have evolved over time … is key to addressing them.” Similarly, [Torche and Rauf \(2021\)](#), p. 378) state that “understanding country trajectories is critical to examine how *plausible* variation in institutional, political, and policy contexts shapes health outcomes” (italics in original).

Overall, we find evidence of partisan mortality cycles as the political ideology of political regimes is associated with fluctuations in mortality. We consistently see that more liberal regimes are associated with *lower* all-cause and short-term mortality over the full sample period. We also document differences in partisan mortality cycles across racial and sex groups and time period. Finally, we find that liberalism reduces geographic inequality in all-cause mortality by being more beneficial in locations with the highest (conditional) levels. However, liberalism contributes to geographic inequality in short-term mortality due to larger relative improvements in locations with the lowest (conditional) levels.

In the end, our analysis indicates a complex relationship between attributes of the political regime controlling a county and the dynamics of local mortality. However, it identifies several keys areas for future research, such as an in-depth examination of the mechanisms behind the partisan mortality cycles in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the lack of such cycles in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Our cursory analysis suggests that differences in safety net participation and cigarette taxes may play an important role. But, growing legislative gridlock and political polarization, along with the opioid epidemic, may have limited the impact of political regimes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## Declarations

The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose. All data and code used for the analysis is available from the corresponding author.

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# Partisan Mortality Cycles

*Supplemental Appendices*



Daniel L. Millimet & Travis Whitacre

March 12, 2025


## Appendix A Supplemental Figures

### Appendix A.1 Descriptive Figures



Figure A1: Geographic Variation in Historical Age-Adjusted All-Cause Mortality Rates




(A) 1970





(B) 1980




(C) 1990



(D) 2000




(E) 2010




(F) 2016


Figure A2: Geographic Variation in Historical Age-Adjusted “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality Rates




(A) 1970




(B) 1980




(C) 1990



(D) 2000



(E) 2010



(F) 2016

Figure A3: Geographic Variation in Historical Liberalism in the House




Figure A4: Geographic Variation in Historical Liberalism in the Senate






Figure A5: Geographic Variation in Historical State Policy Liberalism




## **Appendix A.2 Omit Southern Region**


Figure A6: Partisan Determinants of All-Cause Mortality Omitting the Southeast Region



(A) Executive



(B) Legislative




(C) Full

Notes: Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality. Definition of the Southeast region comes from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.


### **Appendix A.3 By Race & Sex**

Figure A7: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Males




Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

Figure A8: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Males




Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

Figure A9: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Females




Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

Figure A10: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Females




Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

Figure A11: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Males




Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

Figure A12: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Males




Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

Figure A13: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Females



Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.



Figure A14: Partisan and Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Females





Notes: Results are for the full sample period, 1968–2016. Partisan results are shown in the left column; ideological results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

#### **Appendix A.4 By Political Party**



Figure A15: Partisan Determinants of Mortality



(A) Executive



(B) Legislative



(C) Full

Notes: All-cause mortality results are shown in the left column; “Short-Term”-cause results are shown in the right column. Mortality is measured in period 0. Periods -1 to -4 capture the associations between lagged political variables and current mortality; periods 1 to 3 capture the associations between future political variables and current mortality.

## Appendix B Missing Mortality Data

From 1968 – 2016, there are a total of 154,110 possible observations considering counties and county equivalents. All-cause mortality is missing for 2,232 observations, leaving a possible sample of 151,878. These 2,232 observations are also missing data on the covariates. Thus, no information is available. Missing covariates reduces the number of observations in Column 10 of Table 1 in the manuscript to 117,504. Short-term mortality is missing for 23,161 observations, leaving a possible sample of 130,949. Missing covariates reduces the number of observations in Column 10 of Table 2 in the manuscript to 105,542. Table B1 compares the 105,542 observations with non-missing short-term mortality *and* non-missing covariates to the 11,962 observations with missing short-term mortality *but* non-missing covariates. The table reports variable means as well as the normalized differences across the two columns (defined as the difference in means scaled by the square root of the sum of the variances). The results point to more incidences of missing data in counties with older, less college-educated, white populations, with smaller total populations, in rural areas, and with less income inequality. The states with the greatest frequency of missing short-term mortality are Texas, Kansas, and North Carolina. However, the normalized differences in political ideology are relatively small and positive, implying that missing data is more frequent in more liberal places.

As an additional exercise, we estimate a probit model where the indicator for missing short-term mortality is the dependent variables and the covariates are the variables in Table B1. We then compute the marginal effects from a one standard deviation increase in each covariate. Average Partial Effects (APEs) are reported in Table B2. All average marginal effects are less than 0.05 except for the population shares by race and gender and log total population which are between 0.05 and 0.10 in absolute value. Interestingly, while lower total population is a relatively strong predictor for missing short-term mortality, conditional on total population, a higher share of all race and gender groups lower the probability of missing short-term mortality (relative to the omitted group, ‘Other, Female’). In addition, the marginal effect of urban status is roughly 0.01. Thus, the overall relationship between missing short-term mortality data, while correlated with certain demographics, is only weakly correlated with political ideology.

Finally, we compare the estimates for all-cause mortality from Column 9 in Table 1 estimated on the sub-sample of observations with non-missing short-term mortality. Column 1 in Table B3 is identical to Column 9 in Table 1. Column 2 presents the new estimates. The marginal effects of lagged and contemporaneous liberalism are essentially unchanged. However, the lead effects are now larger and statistically significant at at least the  $p < 0.10$  level. This suggests that we are no more likely to find evidence that ideology matters in the sub-sample with non-missing data when assessing the determinants of short-term mortality, but our analysis is conservative in the sense that we are more likely to find violations of strict exogeneity.

Table B1: Summary Statistics by Missing Short-Term Mortality

	(1) Not Missing	(2) Missing	(3) Normalized Difference
<i>Political Ideology</i>			
State Liberalism	-0.314	-0.290	0.019
Presidential Liberalism	-0.213	-0.190	0.032
Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.030	0.047	0.088
<i>Education (Percent)</i>			
High School	33.969	33.555	-0.044
Some College	21.235	21.464	0.018
College+	14.841	13.591	-0.121
<i>Population &amp; Urban Status</i>			
Log Total	10.483	9.329	-0.644
Urban (1 = Yes)	0.418	0.248	-0.259
<i>Population by Race &amp; Gender (Percent)</i>			
White, Male	0.432	0.455	0.211
White, Female	0.444	0.458	0.127
Black, Male	0.049	0.031	-0.194
Black, Female	0.052	0.030	-0.206
Other, Male	0.011	0.013	0.033
<i>Population by Age (Percent)</i>			
Age <1	0.014	0.013	-0.218
Age 1-4	0.056	0.054	-0.130
Age 5-9	0.072	0.073	0.027
Age 11-14	0.077	0.081	0.203
Age 15-19	0.080	0.083	0.127
Age 20-24	0.071	0.063	-0.204
Age 25-29	0.068	0.059	-0.376
Age 30-34	0.068	0.059	-0.484
Age 35-39	0.067	0.059	-0.436
Age 40-44	0.064	0.061	-0.168
Age 45-49	0.061	0.064	0.160
Age 50-54	0.058	0.064	0.311
Age 55-59	0.054	0.059	0.269
Age 60-64	0.049	0.053	0.198
Age 65-69	0.043	0.046	0.150
Age 70-74	0.036	0.038	0.134
Age 75-79	0.028	0.030	0.168
Age 80-84	0.019	0.022	0.235
<i>Income Inequality</i>			
Top 1% Share	13.908	13.455	-0.073
Top 10% Share	39.581	38.370	-0.159
Observations	105542	11962	117504

Table B2: Probit Average Partial Effects for Missing Short-Term Mortality

<i>Political Ideology</i>		<i>Population by Age (Percent)</i>	
State Liberalism	0.0125*** (0.0026)	Age <1	-0.0425*** (0.0037)
Presidential Liberalism	0.0079*** (0.0009)	Age 1-4	-0.0404*** (0.0067)
Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0191*** (0.0015)	Age 5-9	0.0104 (0.0075)
<i>Education (Percent)</i>		<i>Age 11-14</i>	
High School	-0.0126*** (0.0025)	Age 15-19	-0.0278** (0.0083)
Some College	-0.0024 (0.0039)	Age 20-24	-0.0397** (0.0093)
College+	-0.0043 (0.0037)	Age 25-29	-0.0136 (0.0144)
<i>Population &amp; Urban Status</i>		<i>(0.0091)</i>	
Log Total	-0.0907*** (0.0040)	Age 30-34	-0.0245** (0.0079)
Urban (1 = Yes)	0.0104*** (0.0024)	Age 35-39	-0.0533*** (0.0081)
<i>Population by Race &amp; Gender (Percent)</i>		<i>Age 40-44</i>	
White, Male	-0.0463 (0.0473)	Age 45-49	0.0037 (0.0071)
White, Female	-0.0917* (0.0518)	Age 50-54	0.0146* (0.0077)
Black, Male	-0.0548 (0.0452)	Age 55-59	-0.0290*** (0.0082)
Black, Female	-0.0863* (0.0498)	Age 60-64	-0.0332*** (0.0075)
Other, Male	-0.0543 (0.0382)	Age 65-69	-0.0274*** (0.0076)
<i>Income Inequality</i>		<i>(0.0074)</i>	
Top 1% Share	-0.0628*** (0.0064)	Age 70-74	-0.0292*** (0.0071)
Top 10% share	0.0504*** (0.0058)	Age 75-79	-0.0277*** (0.0071)
		Age 80-84	-0.0036 (0.0074)
Observations		117504	

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable is an indicator for missing county-year short-term mortality. \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table B3: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality Using Sample with Non-Missing Short-Term Mortality

	(1)	(2)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>		
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0019	-0.0017
P-value	0.0066	0.0148
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0013	-0.0013
P-value	0.0707	0.0747
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0012	-0.0013
P-value	0.0848	0.0792
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>		
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0007	0.0006
P-value	0.7916	0.8161
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0009	0.0007
P-value	0.7386	0.8004
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0006	0.0004
P-value	0.8133	0.8946
<i>Lead Effects</i>		
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0010	0.0017
P-value	0.2698	0.0724
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0016	0.0022
P-value	0.1026	0.0209
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0014	0.0021
P-value	0.1413	0.0345
Location Health Controls	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N
State x Decade FEs	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y
Observations	117504	105542

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Column 1 is identical to Column 9 in Table 1. Column 2 is identical but uses the sub-sample with non-missing short-term mortality. \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

## Appendix C Theoretical Derivation

We follow Chetty *et al.* (2016) and Finkelstein *et al.* (2021) and specify the log mortality hazard rate of individual  $i$  at age  $a$  residing in location  $c$  at time  $t$  as

$$\log[m_{ict}(a)] = \theta_i + \beta a + \gamma_{ct}, \quad (\text{Appendix C.1})$$

where  $\theta$  is individual-level, time invariant health capital and  $\gamma$  is location- and time-specific health capital (referred to as the *place effect* in Finkelstein *et al.* (2021) and Couillard *et al.* (2021)). Let  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$  denote the average individual-specific health capital of residents of location  $c$  at time  $t$ . Note,  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$  will generally vary over time despite  $\theta_i$  being time invariant due to changes in the local population through migration, fertility, and past mortality (Deryugina and Molitor, 2021).

We define the mortality rate of an average individual residing in location  $c$  at time  $t$  at age  $a$  as

$$\bar{m}_{ct}(a) = \exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \beta a + \gamma_{ct}). \quad (\text{Appendix C.2})$$

The age-adjusted mortality rate in county  $c$  at time  $t$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{m}_{ct} &= \int_a^A \exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \beta a + \gamma_{ct}) f_s(a) da \\ &= \exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct}) \int_a^A \exp(\beta a) f_s(a) da \end{aligned} \quad (\text{Appendix C.3})$$

where  $f_s(a)$  is the age distribution of the standard population.

Suppose age in the standard population is distributed as  $\chi^2(k)$ , a chi-squared distribution with  $k$  degrees of freedom. This implies

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{m}_{ct} &= \left[ \frac{\exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct})}{2^{k/2} \Gamma(k/2)} \right] \int_1^A a^{(k/2-1)} \exp\left[\left(\beta - \frac{1}{2}\right)a\right] da \\ &= \left[ \frac{\exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct})}{2^{k/2} \Gamma(k/2)} \right] \exp\left[\left(\beta - \frac{1}{2}\right)a\right] \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{k}{2}-1} (-1)^{\frac{k}{2}-1-j} \frac{(\frac{k}{2}-1)!}{j! (\beta - \frac{1}{2})^{\frac{k}{2}-j}} a^j \right] \Big|_1^A \\ &= \left[ \frac{\exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct})}{2^{k/2} \Gamma(k/2)} \right] \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \exp\left[(\beta - \frac{1}{2}) A\right] \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{k}{2}-1} (-1)^{\frac{k}{2}-1-j} \frac{(\frac{k}{2}-1)!}{j! (\beta - \frac{1}{2})^{\frac{k}{2}-j}} A^j \right] \\ - \exp\left[(\beta - \frac{1}{2})\right] \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{k}{2}-1} (-1)^{\frac{k}{2}-1-j} \frac{(\frac{k}{2}-1)!}{j! (\beta - \frac{1}{2})^{\frac{k}{2}-j}} \right] \end{array} \right\} \\ &= \left[ \frac{\exp(\bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct})}{2^{k/2} \Gamma(k/2)} \right] \exp\left[\left(\beta - \frac{1}{2}\right) A\right] \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{k}{2}-1} (-1)^{\frac{k}{2}-1-j} \frac{(\frac{k}{2}-1)!}{j! (\beta - \frac{1}{2})^{\frac{k}{2}-j}} \left(A^j - \frac{1}{\exp(A)}\right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{Appendix C.4})$$

where  $\Gamma(\cdot)$  is the gamma function. Taking logs yields

$$\begin{aligned}
\log \bar{m}_{ct} &= \bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct} - \frac{\log 2}{2} k - \log \Gamma\left(\frac{k}{2}\right) + \left(\beta - \frac{1}{2}\right) A \\
&\quad + \log \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{k}{2}-1} (-1)^{\frac{k}{2}-1-j} \frac{(\frac{k}{2}-1)!}{j! (\beta - \frac{1}{2})^{\frac{k}{2}-j}} \left( A^j - \frac{1}{\exp(A)} \right) \right] \\
&= \tilde{\beta} + \bar{\theta}_{ct} + \gamma_{ct}
\end{aligned} \tag{Appendix C.5}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{\beta} &\equiv \left(\beta - \frac{1}{2}\right) A - \frac{\log 2}{2} k - \log \Gamma\left(\frac{k}{2}\right) \\
&\quad + \log \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{k}{2}-1} (-1)^{\frac{k}{2}-1-j} \frac{(\frac{k}{2}-1)!}{j! (\beta - \frac{1}{2})^{\frac{k}{2}-j}} \left( A^j - \frac{1}{\exp(A)} \right) \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the log age-adjusted mortality rate in county  $c$  at time  $t$  depends on a constant term, the average health capital of residents,  $\bar{\theta}_{ct}$ , and the place effect,  $\gamma_{ct}$ .

## **Appendix D Supplemental Estimation Results: Coefficients**

### **Appendix D.1 Baseline Specifications**

Table D1: Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0027 (0.0043)	0.0065** (0.0033)	0.0015 (0.0032)	-0.0037 (0.0032)	-0.0017 (0.0033)	0.0013 (0.0033)	-0.0058** (0.0029)	-0.0035 (0.0029)	0.0010 (0.0029)	0.0007 (0.0029)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0009 (0.0011)	-0.0036*** (0.0009)	-0.0014 (0.0009)	-0.0013 (0.0009)	-0.0041*** (0.0009)	-0.0015* (0.0009)	-0.0034*** (0.0009)	-0.0015* (0.0009)	-0.0015* (0.0009)	-0.0020** (0.0009)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0063* (0.0033)	0.0031 (0.0032)	0.0000 (0.0032)	0.0035 (0.0032)	0.0016 (0.0034)	0.0001 (0.0032)	0.0025 (0.0033)	-0.0009 (0.0033)	-0.0009 (0.0033)	0.0003 (0.0032)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0348*** (0.0069)	0.0119** (0.0057)	-0.0082 (0.0056)	-0.0072 (0.0057)	0.0060 (0.0058)	-0.0085 (0.0057)	-0.0077 (0.0054)	0.0037 (0.0055)	-0.0023 (0.0055)	0.0002 (0.0055)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0010 (0.0019)	-0.0040*** (0.0010)	-0.0030*** (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0009)	-0.0045*** (0.0010)	-0.0029*** (0.0008)	0.0004 (0.0009)	-0.0034*** (0.0008)	-0.0022*** (0.0008)	-0.0021*** (0.0008)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0026*** (0.0006)	0.0045*** (0.0004)	0.0011*** (0.0004)	0.0006* (0.0004)	0.0015*** (0.0004)	0.0010*** (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0009*** (0.0003)	0.0010*** (0.0003)	0.0009*** (0.0003)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0009 (0.0021)	0.0214*** (0.0013)	0.0083*** (0.0012)	0.0067*** (0.0012)	0.0090*** (0.0012)	0.0082*** (0.0012)	0.0057*** (0.0012)	0.0061*** (0.0012)	0.0069*** (0.0012)	0.0069*** (0.0012)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0083*** (0.0040)	-0.0196*** (0.0021)	-0.0063*** (0.0020)	-0.0002 (0.0019)	-0.0076*** (0.0022)	-0.0060*** (0.0020)	0.0005 (0.0020)	-0.0057*** (0.0022)	-0.0023 (0.0020)	-0.0017 (0.0020)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0207*** (0.0021)	-0.0063*** (0.0012)	-0.0014 (0.0011)	-0.0024* (0.0012)	-0.0034*** (0.0012)	-0.0016 (0.0011)	-0.0017 (0.0012)	-0.0009 (0.0011)	0.0012 (0.0010)	0.0011 (0.0010)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0001 (0.0006)	-0.0031*** (0.0004)	-0.0010*** (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0006 (0.0005)	-0.0010*** (0.0004)	-0.0000 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0180*** (0.0042)	0.0286*** (0.0019)	0.0036*** (0.0018)	0.0004 (0.0018)	0.0040*** (0.0017)	0.0033* (0.0017)	0.0033* (0.0016)	-0.0007 (0.0016)	0.0018 (0.0015)	0.0043*** (0.0016)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0126*** (0.0026)	-0.0066*** (0.0023)	-0.0066*** (0.0022)	-0.0063*** (0.0022)	-0.0029 (0.0028)	-0.0067*** (0.0023)	-0.0064*** (0.0023)	-0.0064*** (0.0022)	0.0012 (0.0022)	-0.0035 (0.0022)
Observations	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300
R <sup>2</sup>	0.017	0.469	0.488	0.491	0.491	0.554	0.560	0.560	0.560	0.560
Location Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State × Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D2: Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0250*** (0.0088)	0.0038 (0.0088)	-0.0010 (0.0087)	-0.0072 (0.0087)	-0.0073 (0.0089)	-0.0022 (0.0088)	-0.0092 (0.0084)	0.0005 (0.0083)	-0.0005 (0.0082)	
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0005 (0.0023)	-0.0072*** (0.0023)	-0.0067*** (0.0023)	-0.0065*** (0.0023)	-0.0082*** (0.0023)	-0.0066*** (0.0023)	-0.0062*** (0.0022)	-0.0073*** (0.0022)	-0.0062*** (0.0022)	-0.0076*** (0.0022)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0508*** (0.0076)	0.0144* (0.0076)	0.0133* (0.0077)	0.0154** (0.0078)	-0.0029 (0.0087)	0.0129* (0.0077)	0.0135* (0.0078)	-0.0021 (0.0084)	0.0088 (0.0078)	0.0107 (0.0078)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0941*** (0.0146)	-0.0203 (0.0140)	-0.0286** (0.0139)	-0.0352** (0.0140)	-0.0074 (0.0146)	-0.0285** (0.0139)	-0.0262* (0.0136)	-0.0081 (0.0141)	-0.0214 (0.0137)	-0.0134 (0.0138)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	-0.0125*** (0.0026)	-0.0151*** (0.0021)	-0.0080*** (0.0021)	-0.0031 (0.0023)	-0.0118*** (0.0025)	-0.0088*** (0.0021)	-0.0025 (0.0022)	-0.0099*** (0.0023)	-0.0082*** (0.0021)	-0.0077*** (0.0021)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0022** (0.0009)	0.0003 (0.0009)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	-0.0012 (0.0009)	-0.0010 (0.0009)	-0.0011 (0.0009)	-0.0012 (0.0009)	-0.0008 (0.0009)	-0.0008 (0.0009)	-0.0009 (0.0009)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0125*** (0.0029)	0.0220*** (0.0028)	0.0196*** (0.0030)	0.0213*** (0.0030)	0.0115*** (0.0033)	0.0202*** (0.0030)	0.0200*** (0.0030)	0.0123*** (0.0031)	0.0177*** (0.0033)	0.0180*** (0.0030)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0457*** (0.0063)	-0.0028 (0.0052)	-0.0050 (0.0052)	-0.0036 (0.0050)	-0.0117** (0.0057)	-0.0054 (0.0052)	-0.0070 (0.0051)	-0.0145** (0.0057)	-0.0088* (0.0053)	-0.0068 (0.0053)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	-0.0023 (0.0027)	-0.0074*** (0.0026)	-0.0008 (0.0028)	-0.0026 (0.0031)	-0.0008 (0.0029)	0.0003 (0.0028)	0.0015 (0.0030)	0.0033 (0.0029)	0.0023 (0.0028)	0.0020 (0.0028)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0046*** (0.0009)	0.0014 (0.0009)	0.0008 (0.0009)	0.0002 (0.0009)	0.0041*** (0.0012)	0.0008 (0.0009)	0.0008 (0.0009)	0.0038*** (0.0012)	0.0012 (0.0009)	0.0018* (0.0009)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0365*** (0.0042)	0.0025 (0.0042)	-0.0016 (0.0042)	-0.0045 (0.0042)	-0.0038 (0.0040)	-0.0004 (0.0040)	-0.0055 (0.0041)	-0.0061 (0.0039)	-0.0026 (0.0041)	-0.0034 (0.0041)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0150*** (0.0058)	-0.0251*** (0.0057)	-0.0261*** (0.0057)	-0.0257** (0.0057)	-0.0086 (0.0057)	-0.0258*** (0.0057)	-0.0255*** (0.0056)	-0.0146** (0.0057)	-0.0233*** (0.0055)	-0.0253*** (0.0055)
Observations	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	105542	105542	105542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.101	0.117	0.121	0.123	0.206	0.152	0.153	0.225	0.225
Location Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State × Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

## **Appendix D.2 Race & Sex**

Table D3: Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0191 (0.0194)	-0.0185 (0.0194)	-0.1536 (0.1212)	-0.1590 (0.1219)	-0.0190 (0.0220)	-0.0213 (0.0220)	0.0225 (0.0286)	0.0228 (0.0287)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0034 (0.0046)	0.0033 (0.0047)	-0.1771 (0.1685)	-0.1956 (0.1713)	-0.0009 (0.0369)	0.0026 (0.0377)	-0.0175 (0.0167)	-0.0164 (0.0168)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0274* (0.0149)	-0.0281* (0.0151)	0.3701 (0.5766)	0.3985 (0.5827)	-0.0352 (0.0893)	-0.0249 (0.0910)	0.0225 (0.0401)	0.0265 (0.0400)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0090 (0.0306)	0.0091 (0.0310)	1.1239 (0.9512)	1.2318 (0.9684)	0.0876 (0.1949)	0.0730 (0.1992)	0.0601 (0.0714)	0.0529 (0.0725)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0070* (0.0041)	-0.0071* (0.0041)	0.0590 (0.0603)	0.0567 (0.0606)	-0.0102 (0.0072)	-0.0106 (0.0074)	-0.0152 (0.0144)	-0.0137 (0.0144)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0002 (0.0019)	0.0002 (0.0019)	0.1155 (0.1361)	0.1136 (0.1371)	-0.0293* (0.0150)	-0.0296* (0.0153)	0.0042 (0.0056)	0.0047 (0.0056)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0055 (0.0058)	0.0051 (0.0060)	-0.3203 (0.3004)	-0.3171 (0.3024)	-0.0336 (0.0277)	-0.0063 (0.0291)	0.0007 (0.0262)	0.0062 (0.0267)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0265** (0.0108)	-0.0268** (0.0108)	-0.9678 (0.8469)	-0.9845 (0.8530)	0.1758* (0.0951)	0.1831* (0.0972)	-0.0439 (0.0763)	-0.0439 (0.0773)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0072 (0.0062)	0.0071 (0.0062)	-0.1824** (0.0790)	-0.1930** (0.0800)	0.0042 (0.0126)	0.0042 (0.0126)	-0.0302** (0.0144)	-0.0274* (0.0144)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0008 (0.0019)	0.0009 (0.0019)	-0.3202** (0.1323)	-0.3426** (0.1323)	-0.0007 (0.0048)	0.0012 (0.0051)	-0.0099 (0.0114)	-0.0102 (0.0114)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0118 (0.0084)	0.0114 (0.0085)	0.8396** (0.3555)	0.8902** (0.3588)	0.0262 (0.0289)	0.0276 (0.0289)	0.0261 (0.0211)	0.0264 (0.0212)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0118 (0.0116)	-0.0118 (0.0116)	1.6368** (0.7487)	1.7614** (0.7564)	0.0354 (0.0406)	0.0354 (0.0415)	0.0198 (0.0416)	0.0163 (0.0421)
Observations	54787	54787	22236	22236	18161	18161	14390	14390
R <sup>2</sup>	0.201	0.201	0.173	0.173	0.312	0.312	0.262	0.263
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D4: Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0236 (0.0401)	-0.0329 (0.0399)	0.0800 (0.1892)	0.1199 (0.1921)	-0.1728*** (0.0490)	-0.1595*** (0.0490)	0.0848 (0.0584)	0.0896 (0.0588)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0344*** (0.0098)	-0.0420*** (0.0101)	0.0346 (0.2792)	0.1764 (0.2882)	-0.0197 (0.0631)	-0.0378 (0.0631)	-0.0610** (0.0293)	-0.0597** (0.0294)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0570* (0.0292)	-0.0478* (0.0287)	-0.3636 (0.8940)	-0.7014 (0.9123)	-0.0570 (0.1277)	-0.0843 (0.1268)	0.1113* (0.0668)	0.1061 (0.0675)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.1621*** (0.0580)	0.1426*** (0.0591)	-0.1543 (1.5167)	-1.0238 (1.5704)	-0.1238 (0.3071)	-0.0721 (0.3063)	0.1867 (0.1372)	0.2044 (0.1381)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0352*** (0.0106)	-0.0336*** (0.0107)	-0.0060 (0.0955)	0.0386 (0.0959)	-0.0366* (0.0188)	-0.0455*** (0.0187)	0.0246 (0.0240)	0.0239 (0.0243)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0009 (0.0040)	-0.0004 (0.0040)	-0.1526 (0.2197)	-0.0368 (0.2205)	-0.1545*** (0.0376)	-0.1499*** (0.0378)	0.0052 (0.0101)	0.0067 (0.0102)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0447*** (0.0149)	0.0501*** (0.0153)	0.3566 (0.4691)	0.1026 (0.4702)	-0.1292* (0.0695)	-0.0954 (0.0717)	0.0722* (0.0435)	0.0670 (0.0444)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.1432*** (0.0267)	-0.1435*** (0.0262)	0.9770 (1.4299)	0.3049 (1.4337)	0.5646*** (0.2029)	0.5082*** (0.2063)	-0.0158 (0.1227)	-0.0160 (0.1235)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0664*** (0.0160)	-0.0668*** (0.0160)	0.1694 (0.1369)	0.1657 (0.1385)	-0.0094 (0.0251)	-0.0239 (0.0250)	-0.0208 (0.0240)	-0.0242 (0.0240)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0129*** (0.0046)	0.0115*** (0.0048)	0.3078 (0.2342)	0.3527 (0.2378)	0.0010 (0.0119)	-0.0095 (0.0120)	-0.0049 (0.0174)	-0.0043 (0.0174)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0285 (0.0178)	0.0287 (0.0181)	-0.8213 (0.6077)	-0.8563 (0.6153)	-0.0646 (0.0603)	-0.0592 (0.0597)	0.0223 (0.0346)	0.0234 (0.0348)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0783*** (0.0204)	-0.0784*** (0.0207)	-1.4644 (1.2447)	-1.8458 (1.2663)	-0.0547 (0.0779)	-0.0521 (0.0813)	-0.0056 (0.0578)	0.0128 (0.0586)
Observations	19738	19738	11197	11197	4413	4413	4128	4128
R <sup>2</sup>	0.387	0.388	0.448	0.449	0.398	0.402	0.317	0.318
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D5: Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0244 (0.0183)	-0.0257 (0.0183)	-0.0323 (0.1189)	-0.0365 (0.1194)	-0.0288 (0.0223)	-0.0285 (0.0219)	0.0054 (0.0251)	0.0026 (0.0250)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0008 (0.0046)	-0.0020 (0.0047)	-0.0897 (0.1658)	-0.0915 (0.1679)	-0.0064 (0.0313)	-0.0086 (0.0322)	0.0249* (0.0146)	0.0251* (0.0147)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0277** (0.0133)	-0.0241* (0.0137)	-0.1997 (0.5708)	-0.2061 (0.5757)	0.0186 (0.0715)	0.0163 (0.0733)	-0.0464 (0.0334)	-0.0480 (0.0339)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0043 (0.0286)	0.0095 (0.0292)	0.6328 (0.9250)	0.6633 (0.9385)	0.0327 (0.1541)	0.0424 (0.1577)	0.0107 (0.0634)	0.0015 (0.0646)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0002 (0.0038)	-0.0000 (0.0038)	0.0403 (0.0598)	0.0404 (0.0601)	-0.0007 (0.0069)	-0.0002 (0.0071)	-0.0108 (0.0117)	-0.0115 (0.0118)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0027 (0.0017)	0.0027 (0.0017)	0.0577 (0.1314)	0.0621 (0.1322)	0.0309** (0.0141)	0.0312** (0.0143)	0.0075 (0.0047)	0.0066 (0.0049)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0082 (0.0056)	0.0095 (0.0058)	-0.1944 (0.2961)	-0.2055 (0.2976)	0.0731*** (0.0261)	0.0732*** (0.0273)	0.0376* (0.0218)	0.0360 (0.0223)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0111 (0.0090)	-0.0099 (0.0091)	-0.5259 (0.8175)	-0.5671 (0.8221)	-0.1363 (0.0869)	-0.1392 (0.0889)	0.1436** (0.0603)	0.1436** (0.0610)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0030 (0.0057)	0.0032 (0.0057)	-0.1100 (0.0742)	-0.1174 (0.0747)	0.0188 (0.0119)	0.0190 (0.0120)	-0.0008 (0.0124)	-0.0013 (0.0124)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0004 (0.0019)	0.0007 (0.0019)	-0.2268* (0.1245)	-0.2367* (0.1259)	-0.0080* (0.0041)	-0.0079* (0.0045)	0.0150* (0.0085)	0.0148* (0.0086)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0115 (0.0079)	0.0105 (0.0080)	0.5085 (0.3350)	0.5347 (0.3369)	-0.0051 (0.0253)	-0.0037 (0.0254)	-0.0077 (0.0162)	-0.0092 (0.0163)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0049 (0.0113)	-0.0058 (0.0113)	1.3159* (0.6964)	1.3631* (0.7062)	-0.0044 (0.0391)	-0.0082 (0.0397)	0.0343 (0.0309)	0.0302 (0.0314)
Observations	52634	52634	21214	21214	17507	17507	13913	13913
R <sup>2</sup>	0.177	0.177	0.175	0.175	0.303	0.303	0.264	0.264
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D6: Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0330 (0.0420)	0.0259 (0.0418)	-0.3417 (0.2355)	-0.3743 (0.2397)	0.0091 (0.0535)	0.0114 (0.0534)	-0.0000 (0.0599)	-0.0047 (0.0606)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0293** (0.0114)	-0.0313** (0.0115)	-0.6188* (0.3505)	-0.6724* (0.3589)	-0.0192 (0.0667)	-0.0309 (0.0666)	-0.0047 (0.0310)	-0.0119 (0.0309)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0304 (0.0294)	-0.0260 (0.0296)	0.0539* (1.1007)	2.1633* (1.1258)	-0.0862 (0.1375)	-0.1136 (0.1369)	0.0820 (0.0742)	0.0719 (0.0755)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0594 (0.0651)	0.0757 (0.0662)	2.9767 (1.9015)	3.2688* (1.9432)	-0.0184 (0.3083)	0.0339 (0.3103)	-0.0231 (0.1548)	0.0544 (0.1584)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0324*** (0.0121)	-0.0316*** (0.0121)	0.0238 (0.1188)	0.0310 (0.1194)	-0.0341* (0.0191)	-0.0349* (0.0193)	0.0535* (0.0308)	0.0503 (0.0312)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0000 (0.0043)	-0.0011 (0.0044)	0.0559 (0.2636)	0.0829 (0.2642)	-0.1570*** (0.0363)	-0.1573*** (0.0365)	0.0133 (0.0115)	0.0154 (0.0120)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0355*** (0.0131)	0.0339** (0.0135)	0.0105 (0.5695)	-0.0788 (0.5744)	-0.2050*** (0.0688)	-0.2032*** (0.0690)	0.0368 (0.0474)	0.0325 (0.0486)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0986*** (0.0258)	-0.0892*** (0.0254)	-0.6574 (1.6985)	-0.9386 (1.7026)	0.6369*** (0.2128)	0.6223*** (0.2101)	0.0365 (0.1282)	0.0259 (0.1317)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0193 (0.0160)	-0.0190 (0.0161)	-0.0190 (0.1678)	-0.0684 (0.1686)	0.0004 (0.0244)	-0.0035 (0.0243)	0.0112 (0.0314)	0.0103 (0.0312)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0089** (0.0044)	0.0105** (0.0045)	-0.1110 (0.2744)	-0.1818 (0.2791)	0.0237** (0.0109)	0.0235** (0.0111)	-0.0236 (0.0200)	-0.0197 (0.0202)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0364* (0.0191)	0.0299 (0.0193)	0.1636 (0.7292)	0.3570 (0.7350)	0.0027 (0.0555)	0.0062 (0.0554)	0.0603 (0.0399)	0.0664 (0.0405)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0217 (0.0253)	-0.0315 (0.0257)	0.4392 (1.4688)	0.7945 (1.4755)	-0.0878 (0.0825)	-0.0983 (0.0826)	-0.0009 (0.0776)	0.0190 (0.0804)
Observations	13825	13825	8109	8109	3067	3067	2649	2649
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.254	0.255	0.282	0.283	0.380	0.381	0.335	0.339
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEes	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D7: Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0024 (0.0043)	0.0022 (0.0043)	-0.0156 (0.0271)	-0.0199 (0.0271)	0.0001 (0.0072)	-0.0000 (0.0072)	0.0014 (0.0090)	0.0002 (0.0090)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0033** (0.0014)	-0.0038*** (0.0014)	-0.0242 (0.0411)	-0.0339 (0.0411)	-0.0122 (0.0093)	-0.0123 (0.0094)	-0.0063 (0.0059)	-0.0074 (0.0059)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0030 (0.0047)	-0.0028 (0.0048)	-0.0006 (0.1324)	0.0194 (0.1321)	-0.0209 (0.0201)	-0.0217 (0.0203)	-0.0042 (0.0139)	-0.0042 (0.0140)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0086 (0.0084)	0.0114 (0.0084)	0.2094 (0.2327)	0.2622 (0.2326)	0.0607 (0.0418)	0.0629 (0.0423)	0.0300 (0.0285)	0.0300 (0.0288)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0010 (0.0010)	-0.0009 (0.0010)	0.0005 (0.0157)	0.0003 (0.0157)	0.0050** (0.0025)	0.0051** (0.0025)	0.0003 (0.0040)	-0.0008 (0.0040)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0009* (0.0005)	0.0009* (0.0005)	-0.0121 (0.0318)	-0.0113 (0.0317)	-0.0099** (0.0043)	-0.0103** (0.0043)	0.0028 (0.0023)	0.0022 (0.0023)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0062*** (0.0017)	0.0062*** (0.0018)	-0.0188 (0.0740)	-0.0213 (0.0739)	-0.0144 (0.0093)	-0.0155 (0.0095)	0.0040 (0.0084)	0.0016 (0.0084)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0064** (0.0027)	-0.0053** (0.0028)	0.0555 (0.1889)	0.0389 (0.1886)	0.0253 (0.0260)	0.0289 (0.0263)	-0.0006 (0.0231)	-0.0072 (0.0233)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0013 (0.0014)	0.0011 (0.0014)	-0.0226 (0.0169)	-0.0263 (0.0172)	-0.0024 (0.0033)	-0.0025 (0.0033)	-0.0046 (0.0042)	-0.0055 (0.0042)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0005)	-0.0382 (0.0289)	-0.0467 (0.0293)	0.0032** (0.0016)	0.0034** (0.0016)	-0.0010 (0.0031)	-0.0002 (0.0031)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0015 (0.0024)	0.0011 (0.0024)	0.0668 (0.0751)	0.0857 (0.0761)	0.0002 (0.0090)	0.0000 (0.0090)	0.0054 (0.0058)	0.0043 (0.0058)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0056* (0.0032)	-0.0061* (0.0032)	0.2535 (0.1664)	0.2983* (0.1681)	-0.0073 (0.0124)	-0.0064 (0.0124)	0.0164 (0.0147)	0.0162 (0.0148)
Observations	112829	112829	33595	33595	40008	40008	39226	39226
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.582	0.582	0.326	0.326	0.264	0.264	0.241	0.241
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs								
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D8: Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Males

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0277* (0.0150)	0.0320** (0.0150)	-0.2275*** (0.0794)	-0.2605*** (0.0792)	-0.0148 (0.0247)	-0.0135 (0.0244)	-0.0010 (0.0188)	-0.0010 (0.0189)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0251*** (0.0040)	-0.0225*** (0.0041)	-0.2419** (0.1168)	-0.2543** (0.1167)	-0.1255*** (0.0276)	-0.1103*** (0.0276)	0.0112 (0.0109)	0.0115 (0.0110)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0628*** (0.0131)	-0.0671*** (0.0130)	1.3016*** (0.3913)	1.2570*** (0.3884)	-0.2660*** (0.0584)	-0.2312*** (0.0588)	-0.0651** (0.0255)	-0.0651** (0.0258)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.1736*** (0.0229)	0.1585*** (0.0232)	1.1662** (0.6446)	1.2564** (0.6437)	0.3705*** (0.1281)	0.2894** (0.1279)	-0.0087 (0.0545)	-0.0125 (0.0547)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0487*** (0.0045)	-0.0496*** (0.0045)	0.0775* (0.0441)	0.0793* (0.0443)	0.0069 (0.0102)	0.0010 (0.0102)	0.0046 (0.0079)	0.0032 (0.0080)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0052*** (0.0017)	0.0055*** (0.0017)	0.0668 (0.0948)	0.0846 (0.0949)	-0.0937*** (0.0153)	-0.0908*** (0.0154)	0.0040 (0.0044)	0.0032 (0.0045)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0263*** (0.0080)	-0.0282*** (0.0081)	-0.2358 (0.2116)	-0.2869 (0.2119)	-0.1383*** (0.0284)	-0.1263*** (0.0287)	-0.0116 (0.0168)	-0.0131 (0.0170)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0974*** (0.0117)	-0.1023*** (0.0116)	-0.1375 (0.5961)	-0.3389 (0.5979)	0.1744* (0.0927)	0.1686* (0.0941)	0.0230 (0.0479)	0.0202 (0.0481)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0074 (0.0064)	-0.0070 (0.0064)	0.1356*** (0.0494)	0.0785 (0.0506)	0.0368*** (0.0127)	0.0339*** (0.0127)	0.0033 (0.0084)	0.0031 (0.0085)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0258*** (0.0021)	0.0247*** (0.0022)	0.2985*** (0.0863)	0.2273*** (0.0879)	0.0105*** (0.0047)	0.0053 (0.0047)	0.0060 (0.0062)	0.0055 (0.0062)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0317*** (0.0075)	0.0332*** (0.0076)	-0.7139*** (0.2254)	-0.5309*** (0.2289)	-0.0324 (0.0263)	-0.0311 (0.0263)	-0.0016 (0.0116)	-0.0035 (0.0117)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0282*** (0.0094)	-0.0237** (0.0096)	-1.6269*** (0.4715)	-1.2700*** (0.4798)	-0.1618*** (0.0353)	-0.1379*** (0.0358)	0.0221 (0.0280)	0.0204 (0.0280)
Observations	71277	71277	31751	31751	17966	17966	21560	21560
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.505	0.505	0.622	0.624	0.388	0.390	0.152	0.152
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEes	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Q Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D9: Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0012 (0.0045)	0.0012 (0.0045)	-0.0038 (0.0276)	-0.0033 (0.0278)	-0.0001 (0.0075)	0.0006 (0.0075)	0.0131 (0.0092)	0.0124 (0.0092)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0006 (0.0014)	-0.0008 (0.0014)	0.0230 (0.0415)	0.0161 (0.0417)	-0.0088 (0.0101)	-0.0116 (0.0101)	0.0037 (0.0057)	0.0035 (0.0057)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0007 (0.0048)	-0.0006 (0.0048)	-0.0259 (0.1380)	-0.0337 (0.1382)	-0.0348 (0.0224)	-0.0402* (0.0227)	0.0047 (0.0141)	0.0033 (0.0143)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0133 (0.0083)	-0.0121 (0.0084)	-0.1554 (0.2346)	-0.1224 (0.2361)	0.0144 (0.0464)	0.0285 (0.0469)	0.0207 (0.0282)	0.0198 (0.0284)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0019* (0.0011)	-0.0019* (0.0011)	0.0325** (0.0165)	0.0331** (0.0165)	-0.0013 (0.0025)	-0.0007 (0.0025)	0.0078** (0.0039)	0.0074* (0.0040)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0528 (0.0343)	0.0535 (0.0343)	-0.0110** (0.0044)	-0.0112** (0.0045)	0.0035 (0.0023)	0.0031 (0.0024)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0066*** (0.0018)	0.0066*** (0.0018)	-0.1769** (0.0793)	-0.1757** (0.0792)	-0.0156* (0.0091)	-0.0157* (0.0092)	-0.0021 (0.0088)	-0.0030 (0.0088)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0061** (0.0030)	-0.0053** (0.0030)	-0.2918 (0.2065)	-0.2982 (0.2064)	0.0268 (0.0284)	0.0278 (0.0289)	-0.0032 (0.0242)	-0.0065 (0.0244)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0019 (0.0015)	-0.0019 (0.0015)	-0.0065 (0.0191)	-0.0038 (0.0194)	0.0042 (0.0033)	0.0035 (0.0033)	0.0042 (0.0043)	0.0040 (0.0043)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0011** (0.0005)	-0.0010* (0.0005)	0.0083 (0.0318)	0.0078 (0.0323)	0.039*** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.015)	-0.0039 (0.0031)	-0.0038 (0.0031)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0037 (0.0025)	0.0034 (0.0025)	-0.0479 (0.0877)	-0.0479 (0.0888)	-0.0011 (0.0088)	-0.0020 (0.0088)	0.0162*** (0.0061)	0.0162*** (0.0062)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0061* (0.0032)	-0.0063* (0.0033)	-0.0557 (0.1808)	-0.0532 (0.1834)	-0.0021 (0.0137)	-0.0012 (0.0137)	0.0137 (0.0143)	0.0127 (0.0144)
Observations	112594	112594	33590	33590	39912	39912	39092	39092
R <sup>2</sup>	0.298	0.298	0.289	0.289	0.168	0.169	0.192	0.192
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table D10: Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Females

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	0.0172 (0.0158)	0.0152 (0.0157)	-0.3642*** (0.0883)	-0.3819*** (0.0883)	-0.0293 (0.0237)	-0.0274 (0.0236)	-0.0050 (0.0222)	-0.0059 (0.0222)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0221** (0.0242)	-0.0213*** (0.0043)	-0.5035*** (0.1326)	-0.5070*** (0.1326)	-0.1278*** (0.0285)	-0.1212*** (0.0287)	0.0076 (0.0138)	0.0075 (0.0139)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0276** (0.0139)	-0.0276** (0.0138)	2.0179*** (0.4371)	1.9913*** (0.4371)	-0.2288*** (0.0613)	-0.2103*** (0.0618)	0.0332 (0.0326)	0.0267 (0.0333)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0524** (0.0241)	0.0460* (0.0246)	2.3953*** (0.7337)	2.4273*** (0.7376)	0.4006*** (0.1320)	0.3586*** (0.1324)	-0.0507 (0.0645)	-0.0514 (0.0652)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0379*** (0.0043)	-0.0372*** (0.0044)	0.0459 (0.0480)	0.0461 (0.0481)	-0.0027 (0.0094)	-0.0042 (0.0094)	-0.0090 (0.0101)	-0.0107 (0.0101)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0004 (0.0016)	0.0006 (0.0016)	0.0995 (0.1019)	0.1074 (0.1020)	-0.0719*** (0.0161)	-0.0661*** (0.0162)	0.0055 (0.0050)	0.0044 (0.0051)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0044 (0.0068)	-0.0042 (0.0069)	-0.1819 (0.2278)	-0.2041 (0.2280)	-0.0846*** (0.0302)	-0.0692** (0.0305)	0.0033 (0.0204)	0.0003 (0.0207)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0617*** (0.0109)	-0.0631*** (0.0108)	-0.7355 (0.6317)	-0.8281 (0.6329)	0.1781* (0.0924)	0.1505 (0.0933)	0.0326 (0.0568)	0.0265 (0.0571)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
State Liberalism	-0.0039 (0.0059)	-0.0042 (0.0059)	-0.0875 (0.0603)	-0.1184* (0.0614)	0.0459*** (0.0120)	0.0449*** (0.0121)	-0.0004 (0.0103)	-0.0010 (0.0103)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0164*** (0.0020)	0.0160*** (0.0020)	-0.1154 (0.1011)	-0.1522 (0.1028)	0.0150*** (0.0047)	0.0108** (0.0048)	-0.0122 (0.0081)	-0.0112 (0.0081)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0066 (0.0078)	0.0079 (0.0078)	0.3263 (0.2708)	0.4245 (0.2750)	-0.0046 (0.0272)	-0.0041 (0.0271)	0.0146 (0.0147)	0.0121 (0.0149)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0198** (0.0095)	-0.0204** (0.0096)	0.4182 (0.5642)	0.6039 (0.5729)	-0.1309*** (0.0369)	-0.1281*** (0.0376)	-0.0112 (0.0320)	-0.0120 (0.0320)
Observations	63715	29624	29624	16845	16845	17246	17246	17246
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.389	0.389	0.439	0.440	0.339	0.340	0.166	0.166
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEes	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Q Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

## **Appendix E Supplemental Estimation Results: Alternative Measure of Ideology**

### **Appendix E.1 Marginal Effects**

Table E1: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0002	0.0052	-0.0004	-0.0010	-0.0019	-0.0004	-0.0012	-0.0020	0.0001	0.0003
P-value	0.9264	0.0000	0.7066	0.3296	0.0963	0.6492	0.2456	0.0470	0.8808	0.7597
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0023	-0.0083	-0.0027	0.0001	-0.0051	-0.0026	0.0004	-0.0036	-0.0024	-0.0023
P-value	0.1775	0.0000	0.0004	0.8909	0.0000	0.0008	0.6330	0.0000	0.0009	0.0012
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0026	-0.0105	-0.0035	-0.0009	-0.0061	-0.0033	-0.0004	-0.0042	-0.0028	-0.0027
P-value	0.1143	0.0000	0.0000	0.2741	0.0000	0.0006	0.6006	0.0000	0.0002	0.0003
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0015	0.0059	-0.0009	-0.0055	0.0006	-0.0011	-0.0085	-0.0016	0.0000	0.0003
P-value	0.7503	0.0994	0.7854	0.1182	0.8613	0.7574	0.0071	0.6149	0.9961	0.9264
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0004	0.0048	-0.0001	-0.0022	-0.0032	-0.0002	-0.0042	-0.0041	-0.0003	-0.0004
P-value	0.9195	0.1139	0.9733	0.4526	0.2932	0.9420	0.1219	0.1320	0.9243	0.8944
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0039	0.0071	0.0001	-0.0018	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0037	-0.0018	0.0001	0.0003
P-value	0.2948	0.0203	0.9661	0.5542	0.9827	0.9816	0.1809	0.5122	0.9627	0.9093
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0146	-0.0188	-0.0044	-0.0093	-0.0078	-0.0044	-0.0079	-0.0038	-0.0020	-0.0023
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0007	0.0000	0.0000	0.0005	0.0000	0.0020	0.0059	0.0565
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0224	0.0005	0.0028	-0.0016	-0.0020	0.0026	-0.0013	-0.0002	0.0037	0.0037
P-value	0.0000	0.6436	0.0061	0.1607	0.0883	0.0126	0.2234	0.8905	0.0001	0.0002
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0207	-0.0007	0.0021	-0.0017	-0.0018	0.0018	-0.0015	-0.0004	0.0028	0.0026
P-value	0.0000	0.5478	0.0457	0.1366	0.1186	0.0857	0.1685	0.7197	0.0043	0.0077
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State x Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table E2: Marginal Effects of Ideology on “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
1σ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0181	-0.0065	-0.0035	-0.0077	-0.0112	-0.0036	-0.0065	-0.0094	-0.0026	-0.0019
P-value	0.0000	0.0097	0.1837	0.0109	0.0009	0.1705	0.0271	0.0030	0.3739	0.4602
1σ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0107	-0.0179	-0.0092	-0.0039	-0.0115	-0.0100	-0.0031	-0.0091	-0.0090	-0.0088
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0702	0.0000	0.0000	0.1500	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
1σ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0092	-0.0153	-0.0059	-0.0032	-0.0092	-0.0068	-0.0028	-0.0071	-0.0063	-0.0059
P-value	0.0001	0.0000	0.0029	0.1292	0.0000	0.0006	0.1870	0.0009	0.0014	0.0026
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
1σ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0323	0.0051	0.0014	-0.0092	-0.0005	-0.0001	-0.0135	-0.0031	0.0017	0.0025
P-value	0.0013	0.5995	0.8822	0.3373	0.9606	0.9943	0.1436	0.7440	0.8560	0.7890
1σ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0242	0.0033	-0.0028	-0.0036	-0.0071	-0.0041	-0.0062	-0.0093	-0.0021	-0.0027
P-value	0.0027	0.6836	0.7312	0.6508	0.3844	0.6086	0.4193	0.2363	0.7870	0.7320
1σ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0251	0.0034	-0.0044	-0.0032	-0.0043	-0.0055	-0.0057	-0.0075	-0.0032	-0.0031
P-value	0.0025	0.6856	0.5964	0.6994	0.6124	0.5031	0.4752	0.3524	0.6892	0.7007
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
1σ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0134	-0.0196	-0.0078	-0.0224	-0.0056	-0.0075	-0.0186	-0.0020	-0.0051	-0.0059
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0215	0.0000	0.1004	0.0280	0.0000	0.5520	0.1342	0.0850
1σ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0013	-0.0003	0.0060	-0.0006	0.0014	0.0071	0.0042	0.0069	0.0092	0.0090
P-value	0.6080	0.8848	0.0191	0.8217	0.6212	0.0052	0.1365	0.0161	0.0004	0.0005
1σ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0025	-0.0053	0.0019	-0.0027	-0.0024	0.0029	0.0009	0.0018	0.0040	0.0036
P-value	0.3433	0.0333	0.4725	0.3495	0.3995	0.2752	0.7532	0.5378	0.1369	0.1830
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State x Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

## Appendix E.2 Coefficients

Table E3: Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0025 (0.0053)	-0.0083** (0.0040)	-0.0060 (0.0039)	-0.0086** (0.0040)	-0.0062 (0.0040)	-0.0061 (0.0039)	-0.0110*** (0.0034)	-0.0068** (0.0034)	-0.0048 (0.0034)	-0.0047 (0.0034)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0012 (0.0035)	0.0246*** (0.0023)	0.0081*** (0.0023)	0.0041* (0.0024)	0.0113*** (0.0023)	0.0080*** (0.0023)	0.0030 (0.0021)	0.0084*** (0.0021)	0.0079*** (0.0021)	0.0083*** (0.0021)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0334 (0.0356)	0.1583*** (0.0308)	0.0679*** (0.0302)	0.0706** (0.0301)	0.0307 (0.0309)	0.0677** (0.0303)	0.0750*** (0.0265)	0.0677** (0.0267)	0.0522** (0.0267)	0.0501* (0.0267)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0992** (0.0452)	-0.2227*** (0.0369)	-0.0845** (0.0362)	-0.0227*** (0.0366)	-0.0356 (0.0368)	-0.0593 (0.0367)	-0.0833** (0.0367)	-0.0222 (0.0342)	-0.0463 (0.0342)	-0.0785** (0.0342)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0036* (0.0019)	-0.0023** (0.0011)	-0.0009 (0.0009)	-0.0011 (0.0011)	-0.0026** (0.0011)	-0.0008 (0.0009)	-0.0009 (0.0010)	-0.0009 (0.0010)	-0.0002 (0.0008)	-0.0000 (0.0008)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0056** (0.0025)	0.0134*** (0.0010)	0.0009 (0.0010)	-0.0002 (0.0010)	0.0009 (0.0012)	0.0005 (0.0012)	-0.0006 (0.0010)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	0.0006 (0.0009)	0.0005 (0.0009)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0119 (0.0081)	-0.0805*** (0.0067)	-0.0241*** (0.0066)	0.0138 (0.0091)	-0.0360*** (0.0078)	-0.0239*** (0.0066)	0.0153* (0.0084)	-0.0214*** (0.0074)	-0.0279*** (0.0063)	-0.0292*** (0.0065)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0666** (0.0339)	-0.1915*** (0.0150)	-0.0251* (0.0150)	-0.0190 (0.0151)	-0.0300* (0.0161)	-0.0204 (0.0150)	-0.0096 (0.0137)	-0.0098 (0.0143)	-0.0144 (0.0137)	-0.0135 (0.0138)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0219*** (0.0034)	-0.0231*** (0.0016)	-0.0033*** (0.0015)	-0.0073*** (0.0017)	-0.0092*** (0.0015)	-0.0033*** (0.0015)	-0.0042*** (0.0013)	-0.0011 (0.0014)	-0.0011 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0014)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0092*** (0.0020)	0.0036*** (0.0011)	-0.0026*** (0.0011)	-0.0052*** (0.0011)	-0.0027*** (0.0011)	-0.0027*** (0.0011)	-0.0053*** (0.0010)	-0.0018* (0.0010)	-0.0020*** (0.0010)	-0.0020*** (0.0010)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0362 (0.0360)	0.2740*** (0.0168)	0.0752*** (0.0157)	0.0639*** (0.0159)	0.0811*** (0.0156)	0.0711*** (0.0157)	0.0458*** (0.0145)	0.0463*** (0.0143)	0.0596*** (0.0141)	0.0612*** (0.0141)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0658*** (0.0242)	-0.0630*** (0.0151)	0.0130 (0.0148)	0.0538*** (0.0150)	-0.0065 (0.0176)	0.0134 (0.0149)	0.0551*** (0.0146)	-0.0055 (0.0169)	0.0006 (0.0145)	0.0006 (0.0145)
Observations	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	117504	117504	117504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.468	0.488	0.491	0.491	0.555	0.560	0.617	0.617	0.617
Location Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State × Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968–1979 together. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table E4: Ideological Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0352*** (0.0104)	-0.0113 (0.0101)	-0.0117 (0.0101)	-0.0173* (0.0101)	-0.0111 (0.0104)	-0.0138 (0.0101)	-0.0192** (0.0095)	-0.0127 (0.0098)	-0.0094 (0.0096)	-0.0095 (0.0095)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0003 (0.0070)	0.0276*** (0.0069)	0.0217*** (0.0069)	0.0117* (0.0070)	0.0172** (0.0071)	0.0224*** (0.0070)	0.0156** (0.0068)	0.0156** (0.0068)	0.0186** (0.0068)	0.0202*** (0.0068)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0984 (0.0742)	0.1638*** (0.0727)	0.0989 (0.0727)	0.1515*** (0.0728)	0.0366 (0.0760)	0.1054 (0.0729)	0.1421** (0.0703)	0.0817 (0.0738)	0.0757 (0.0708)	0.0757 (0.0708)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0131 (0.1056)	-0.2983*** (0.1049)	-0.2672** (0.1047)	-0.1179 (0.1065)	-0.1309 (0.1094)	-0.2713** (0.1061)	-0.0733 (0.1032)	-0.1346 (0.1057)	-0.2239** (0.1032)	-0.2270** (0.1034)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	-0.0044 (0.0028)	-0.0078*** (0.0024)	-0.0020 (0.0024)	-0.0069** (0.0024)	-0.0095*** (0.0029)	-0.0027 (0.0024)	-0.0061** (0.0024)	-0.0022 (0.0028)	-0.0076*** (0.0027)	-0.0013 (0.0023)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0254*** (0.0032)	0.0011 (0.0024)	-0.0031 (0.0024)	-0.0025 (0.0028)	-0.0045 (0.0030)	-0.0021 (0.0035)	-0.0016 (0.0028)	-0.0042 (0.0029)	-0.0010 (0.0034)	-0.0012 (0.0028)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0843*** (0.0158)	-0.1352*** (0.0156)	-0.0922*** (0.0160)	-0.0306 (0.0226)	-0.0357** (0.0192)	-0.0947*** (0.0161)	0.0313 (0.0222)	-0.0254 (0.0193)	-0.0860*** (0.0167)	-0.0930*** (0.0171)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.3054*** (0.0420)	0.0384 (0.0345)	0.0973*** (0.0394)	0.0407 (0.0412)	0.0947** (0.0469)	0.0860** (0.0392)	0.0231 (0.0400)	0.0847** (0.0454)	0.0636 (0.0391)	0.0688* (0.0394)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0055 (0.0040)	-0.0139*** (0.0035)	-0.0008 (0.0041)	-0.0136*** (0.0044)	-0.0015 (0.0038)	-0.0006 (0.0041)	-0.0114*** (0.0043)	0.0005 (0.0037)	-0.0009 (0.0039)	-0.0016 (0.0040)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0331*** (0.0035)	-0.0125*** (0.0032)	-0.0127*** (0.0032)	-0.0180*** (0.0033)	-0.0076** (0.0033)	-0.0124*** (0.0034)	-0.0144*** (0.0033)	-0.0045 (0.0033)	-0.0075** (0.0032)	-0.0078** (0.0032)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0790* (0.0430)	0.1541*** (0.0358)	0.0839*** (0.0402)	0.1468*** (0.0409)	0.0349 (0.0396)	0.0968** (0.0401)	0.1815*** (0.0396)	0.0781** (0.0380)	0.1227*** (0.0389)	0.1296*** (0.0391)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.4334*** (0.0482)	0.0386 (0.0429)	0.0587 (0.0435)	0.1535*** (0.0442)	0.0080 (0.0524)	0.0516 (0.0437)	0.0926** (0.0438)	-0.0501 (0.0507)	-0.0173 (0.0440)	-0.0218 (0.0440)
Observations	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	105542	105542	105542	105542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.101	0.117	0.122	0.123	0.205	0.152	0.153	0.225	0.225
Location Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State x Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

## Appendix F Supplemental Estimation Results: Quantile Regression

Figure 1 documents a stark increase in the interquartile range of county-level all-cause mortality since around the mid 1980s. Figure 2 highlights a dramatic increase in the mortality gap between counties with per capita income above and below the median. To explore the role of politics in these gaps, we do not wish to split the sample into high and low per capita income counties as income is likely endogenous to politics given the prior literature on partisan business cycles discussed in Section 2. Instead, we explore heterogeneity in the associations between ideology and mortality across the distribution of mortality. To do so, we estimate (5) using fixed effect quantile regression (Machado and Santos Silva, 2019).<sup>32</sup> Tables F1–F2 present the marginal effects of liberalism at the 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90 quantiles, controlling for state-specific linear time trends given the added complexity of the model. Tables F3–F4 presents the coefficient estimates. As before, we chose to be conservative and focus on specifications where the lagged and contemporaneous effects are statistically significant and where the lead effects are either statistically insignificant at the  $p < 0.10$  level or statistically significant but of the opposite sign of the lagged and/or contemporaneous effects.

Two interesting results emerge. First, the statistically significant, *negative* effect of lagged Executive Liberalism on all-cause mortality documented in Table 1 holds for the upper quantiles at the  $p < 0.10$  level. Here, the magnitudes increase (in absolute value) as one moves to higher quantiles; the effects are precise zeros at the 0.10 and 0.25 quantiles and -0.2% for three highest quantiles.

Second, the statistically significant, *negative* effects of lagged Executive, Legislative, and Full Liberalism on short-term mortality documented in Table 2 holds across nearly all quantiles. The lone exception is the statistically insignificant effects at the  $p < 0.10$  level of Legislative Liberalism at the 0.90 quantile. However, the magnitudes decline (in absolute value) as one moves to higher quantiles. For example, a one standard deviation increase in Full Liberalism reduces the short-term mortality rate by 0.7% at the 0.10 quantile, 0.6% at the median, and 0.5% at the 0.90 quantile.

In sum, the quantile regression reveal contrasting results for all-cause and short-term mortality. For all-cause mortality, liberalism is more beneficial (or less harmful) at higher quantiles. For short-term mortality, the opposite occurs. Here, liberalism is most beneficial at low quantiles. This implies that liberalism *ameliorates* (conditional) inequities in all-cause mortality across locations due to larger relative improvements in locations with high (conditional) all-cause mortality, but *exacerbates* (conditional) inequities in short-term mortality due to larger relative improvements in locations with low (conditional) short-term mortality. As the greater inequity in short-term mortality arises from greater *improvements* in locations that are relatively healthy, as opposed to deterioration in locations that are relatively unhealthy, this is not necessarily a bad outcome. However, it is consistent with more liberal regimes being unable to lessen disparities in short-term mortality. Yet, such regimes do benefit the least healthy places in terms of all-cause mortality.

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<sup>32</sup>Estimation performed in Stata using `xtqreg`.

Table F1: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality Across Quantiles

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0008	-0.0008	-0.0012	-0.0011	-0.0015	-0.0015	-0.0019	-0.0018	-0.0022	-0.0022
P-value	0.5087	0.5427	0.1750	0.2011	0.0152	0.0205	0.0204	0.0255	0.0569	0.0653
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0003	-0.0002	-0.0006	-0.0005	-0.0009	-0.0008	-0.0013	-0.0012	-0.0015	-0.0015
P-value	0.8325	0.8826	0.5006	0.5630	0.1435	0.1831	0.1234	0.1508	0.1821	0.2078
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0005	-0.0004	-0.0009	-0.0008	-0.0013	-0.0012	-0.0017	-0.0016
P-value	0.9131	0.9712	0.5538	0.6289	0.1455	0.1919	0.1074	0.1359	0.1531	0.1792
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0022	-0.0022	-0.0017	-0.0018	-0.0012	-0.0014	-0.0008	-0.0010	-0.0004	-0.0007
P-value	0.6963	0.6931	0.6508	0.6328	0.6641	0.6192	0.8348	0.7811	0.9441	0.8951
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0017	-0.0016	-0.0014	-0.0014	-0.0011	-0.0011	-0.0008	-0.0009	-0.0005	-0.0007
P-value	0.7661	0.7734	0.7195	0.7188	0.7103	0.6924	0.8368	0.8094	0.9234	0.8957
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0019	-0.0018	-0.0017	-0.0017	-0.0014	-0.0015	-0.0012	-0.0013	-0.0010	-0.0012
P-value	0.7358	0.7460	0.6628	0.6658	0.6145	0.6017	0.7418	0.7183	0.8446	0.8191
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0003	0.0002	0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0006	-0.0006
P-value	0.8587	0.9240	0.9384	0.9823	0.8633	0.7837	0.7374	0.6950	0.7197	0.7001
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0009	0.0007	0.0006	0.0004	0.0002	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0004	-0.0005
P-value	0.6079	0.6841	0.6271	0.7294	0.7965	0.9264	0.9285	0.8399	0.8117	0.7583
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0007	0.0005	0.0004	0.0002	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0005	-0.0006	-0.0007
P-value	0.6924	0.7679	0.7615	0.8644	0.9960	0.8707	0.7595	0.6789	0.6899	0.6412
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FE <sub>S</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE <sub>S</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)										
State Time Trends (Quadratic)										
County Time Trends (Linear)										
Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.90	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).


Table F2: Marginal Effects of Ideology on “Short Term”-Cause Mortality Across Quantiles

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0092	-0.0083	-0.0084	-0.0077	-0.0075	-0.0070	-0.0066	-0.0064	-0.0059	-0.0059
P-value	0.0066	0.0149	0.0003	0.0009	0.0000	0.0000	0.0018	0.0027	0.0473	0.0496
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0069	-0.0060	-0.0063	-0.0055	-0.0051	-0.0049	-0.0046	-0.0043	-0.0042	-0.0042
P-value	0.0413	0.0796	0.0064	0.0163	0.0010	0.0027	0.0223	0.0305	0.1495	0.1568
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0071	-0.0061	-0.0065	-0.0057	-0.0059	-0.0053	-0.0050	-0.0048	-0.0047	-0.0047
P-value	0.0364	0.0770	0.0046	0.0135	0.0005	0.0016	0.0134	0.0195	0.1106	0.1172
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0026	0.0006	-0.0003	-0.0018	-0.0033	-0.0043	-0.0061	-0.0067	-0.0084	-0.0087
P-value	0.8673	0.9678	0.9800	0.8646	0.6667	0.5697	0.5249	0.4840	0.5298	0.5177
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0049	0.0035	0.0018	0.0008	-0.0015	-0.0022	-0.0045	-0.0049	-0.0071	-0.0072
P-value	0.7518	0.8193	0.8622	0.9410	0.8481	0.7769	0.6375	0.6091	0.5995	0.5929
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0038	0.0026	0.0006	-0.0004	-0.0029	-0.0035	-0.0061	-0.0065	-0.0088	-0.0089
P-value	0.8039	0.8662	0.9557	0.9725	0.7053	0.6453	0.5239	0.5012	0.5126	0.5080
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0005	-0.0010	0.0007	0.0004	0.0021	0.0018	0.0033	0.0032	0.0044	0.0044
P-value	0.9069	0.8325	0.8184	0.9015	0.3684	0.4209	0.2513	0.2665	0.2817	0.2833
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0010	-0.0016	0.0002	-0.0003	0.0015	0.0012	0.0028	0.0025	0.0038	0.0037
P-value	0.8267	0.7275	0.9459	0.9327	0.5072	0.6083	0.3425	0.3820	0.3552	0.3677
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0015	-0.0021	-0.0003	-0.0008	0.0010	0.0007	0.0023	0.0020	0.0033	0.0032
P-value	0.7410	0.6481	0.9236	0.8068	0.6590	0.7695	0.4381	0.4836	0.4206	0.4372
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)										
State Time Trends (Quadratic)										
County Time Trends (Linear)										
Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.90	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

To link these results to the current rise in geographic mortality disparities, Figure F1 shows trends in state policy liberalism (left panel) and median liberalism of US Senators and Representatives (right panel) over time. Panel A shows a persistent trend away from liberalism at the state level starting around 1990 and lasting until about 2005. It is striking that the rapid decline in state policy liberalism during the 1990s roughly coincides with the dramatic increase in the interquartile range seen in Figure I. The fact that we find liberal regimes to reduce inequities in all-cause mortality by having larger effects at higher (conditional) quantiles points to partisan mortality cycles as a potentially salient factor contributing to the geographic inequality in mortality. Panel B shows that the ideology of the median US Senator and Representative is quite volatile and shows more of a trend toward extremes than toward any particular ideology when using the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores.

Figure F1: State & Federal Ideology Over Time



(A) State

(B) Federal

Table F3: Ideological Determinants of All-Cause Mortality Across Quantiles

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	-0.0020 (0.0060)	-0.0019 (0.0060)	-0.0016 (0.0042)	-0.0016 (0.0042)	-0.0011 (0.0031)	-0.0013 (0.0031)	-0.0007 (0.0040)	-0.0009 (0.0040)	-0.0003 (0.0057)	-0.0006 (0.0057)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0027 (0.0019)	-0.0032* (0.0019)	-0.0021 (0.0013)	-0.0026* (0.0013)	-0.0015 (0.0010)	-0.0020** (0.0010)	-0.0009 (0.0013)	-0.0014 (0.0013)	-0.0004 (0.0018)	-0.0009 (0.0018)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0015 (0.0065)	0.0017 (0.0065)	0.0008 (0.0045)	0.0010 (0.0045)	-0.0001 (0.0033)	0.0003 (0.0033)	-0.0010 (0.0043)	-0.0004 (0.0043)	-0.0017 (0.0061)	-0.0010 (0.0061)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0041 (0.0116)	0.0069 (0.0116)	-0.0007 (0.0080)	0.0020 (0.0080)	-0.0062 (0.0059)	-0.0036 (0.0060)	-0.0114 (0.0077)	-0.0089 (0.0077)	-0.0158 (0.0109)	-0.0134 (0.0110)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	-0.0011 (0.0013)	-0.0011 (0.0013)	-0.0014 (0.0009)	-0.0014 (0.0009)	-0.0018*** (0.0007)	-0.0017** (0.0007)	-0.0021** (0.0009)	-0.0024* (0.0009)	-0.0024* (0.0012)	-0.0024* (0.0013)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0013*** (0.0005)	0.0013*** (0.0005)	0.0008** (0.0004)	0.0008** (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0000 (0.0007)	0.0000 (0.0007)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0070*** (0.0023)	0.0071*** (0.0023)	0.0068*** (0.0016)	0.0069*** (0.0016)	0.0066*** (0.0012)	0.0067*** (0.0012)	0.0064*** (0.0012)	0.0065*** (0.0015)	0.0062*** (0.0015)	0.0063*** (0.0021)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0031 (0.0035)	-0.0026 (0.0036)	-0.0033 (0.0024)	-0.0029 (0.0025)	-0.0036** (0.0018)	-0.0032* (0.0018)	-0.0039* (0.0023)	-0.0035 (0.0024)	-0.0041 (0.0033)	-0.0037 (0.0033)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0004 (0.0018)	0.0002 (0.0018)	0.0001 (0.0013)	-0.0000 (0.0013)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	-0.0003 (0.0012)	-0.0004 (0.0012)	-0.0005 (0.0017)	-0.0006 (0.0017)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0001 (0.0007)	-0.0004 (0.0005)	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.0005 (0.0003)	-0.0005 (0.0003)	-0.0006 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0006 (0.0006)	-0.0005 (0.0006)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0048 (0.0033)	0.0047 (0.0033)	0.0039* (0.0023)	0.0037 (0.0023)	0.0028* (0.0017)	0.0025 (0.0017)	0.0018 (0.0022)	0.0015 (0.0022)	0.0010 (0.0022)	0.0005 (0.0031)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0054 (0.0042)	-0.0060 (0.0042)	-0.0055* (0.0029)	-0.0061** (0.0029)	-0.0057*** (0.0022)	-0.0062*** (0.0022)	-0.0058** (0.0028)	-0.0063*** (0.0028)	-0.0059 (0.0040)	-0.0064 (0.0040)
Observations	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)										
County Time Trends (Quadratic)										
Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.90	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table F4: Ideological Determinants of “Short Term”-Cause Mortality Across Quantiles

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	0.0037 (0.0165)	0.0019 (0.0165)	0.0006 (0.0111)	-0.0007 (0.0111)	-0.0026 (0.0081)	-0.0036 (0.0103)	-0.0057 (0.0103)	-0.0063 (0.0103)	-0.0083 (0.0144)	-0.0085 (0.0144)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0068 (0.0049)	-0.0090* (0.0049)	-0.0065** (0.0033)	-0.0083** (0.0033)	-0.0063*** (0.0024)	-0.0076*** (0.0024)	-0.0060** (0.0030)	-0.0069** (0.0031)	-0.0058 (0.0043)	-0.0063 (0.0043)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0132 (0.0160)	0.0159 (0.0160)	0.0112 (0.0108)	0.0134 (0.0108)	0.0091 (0.0079)	0.0107 (0.0079)	0.0071 (0.0100)	0.0082 (0.0100)	0.0055 (0.0140)	0.0060 (0.0141)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0060 (0.0295)	0.0079 (0.0297)	-0.0131 (0.0199)	-0.0019 (0.0201)	-0.0207 (0.0146)	-0.0124 (0.0147)	-0.0279 (0.0185)	-0.0223 (0.0185)	-0.0339 (0.0259)	-0.0306 (0.0261)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	-0.0099*** (0.0036)	-0.0089*** (0.0036)	-0.0090*** (0.0025)	-0.0082*** (0.0025)	-0.0080*** (0.0018)	-0.0075*** (0.0018)	-0.0071*** (0.0018)	-0.0068*** (0.0023)	-0.0063*** (0.0032)	-0.0062* (0.0032)
State × Presidential Liberalism	-0.0005 (0.0018)	-0.0004 (0.0018)	-0.0006 (0.0012)	-0.0005 (0.0012)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	-0.0007 (0.0011)	-0.0008 (0.0011)	-0.0008 (0.0016)	-0.0009 (0.0016)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0206*** (0.0057)	0.0208*** (0.0058)	0.0189*** (0.0039)	0.0191*** (0.0039)	0.0171*** (0.0028)	0.0172*** (0.0028)	0.0154*** (0.0029)	0.0153*** (0.0036)	0.0140*** (0.0036)	0.0140*** (0.0051)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0046 (0.0091)	-0.0010 (0.0092)	-0.0067 (0.0061)	-0.0067 (0.0062)	-0.0039 (0.0045)	-0.0090** (0.0045)	-0.0069 (0.0045)	-0.0111* (0.0057)	-0.0098* (0.0057)	-0.0128 (0.0080)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
State Liberalism	-0.0007 (0.0050)	-0.0013 (0.0050)	0.0006 (0.0033)	0.0001 (0.0034)	0.0020 (0.0024)	0.0017 (0.0025)	0.0017 (0.0031)	0.0033 (0.0031)	0.0044 (0.0044)	0.0044 (0.0044)
State × Presidential Liberalism	0.0011 (0.0018)	0.0020 (0.0018)	0.0014 (0.0018)	0.0021* (0.0012)	0.0016* (0.0012)	0.0022** (0.0009)	0.0019* (0.0011)	0.0023** (0.0011)	0.0024 (0.0015)	0.0024 (0.0016)
State × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0031 (0.0084)	-0.0035 (0.0084)	-0.0030 (0.0057)	-0.0035 (0.0057)	-0.0030 (0.0042)	-0.0035 (0.0042)	-0.0029 (0.0053)	-0.0029 (0.0053)	-0.0028 (0.0053)	-0.0035 (0.0074)
State × Presidential × Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0224** (0.0110)	-0.0258** (0.0110)	-0.0232** (0.0074)	-0.0232** (0.0075)	-0.0241*** (0.0054)	-0.0263*** (0.0055)	-0.0249*** (0.0069)	-0.0265*** (0.0069)	-0.0267*** (0.0097)	-0.0267*** (0.0097)
Observations	105542	105542	105542	105542	105542	105542	105542	105542	105542	105542
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)										
State Time Trends (Quadratic)										
County Time Trends (Linear)										
Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

## Appendix G Supplemental Estimation Results: Role of Political Party

Our focus has been on partisan mortality cycles as driven by the ideology of political regimes. We do so since ideology scores are arguably more closely connected to actual policy decisions. Nonetheless, a large literature explores the effect of political party on various economic and social outcomes. One subset of this literature examines associations between the political party of the US president and various outcomes. For example, Alesina and Sachs (1988) analyze data from 1948 to 1984, finding that macroeconomic outcomes differ by presidential party. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) use monthly data from 1927 to 1998 to assess the differences in several financial variables by presidential party. The authors find excess stock market returns to be 9-16% higher under Democratic presidents arising from higher real stock returns and lower interest rates with no difference in risk. Blinder and Watson (2016) assess data from President Truman through President Obama, documenting a robust 1.8% gap in GDP growth favoring Democratic presidencies, not attributable to reverse causality, congressional control, and fiscal or monetary policy performances. Another subset of this literature focuses on state-level partisanship. Most recently, Dynes and Holbein (2020) examine 28 policy outcomes using state-level panel data from 1960 to 2016 and both fixed effects and regression discontinuity methods. The measures of partisanship reflect the party of the governor and the party controlling the state House and Senate. Overall, the authors find precisely estimated, null effects.

In light of this, we briefly explore the role of political party. To do so, we replace our ideology measures with covariates indicating Democratic party control of the *executive* branch at the state and federal levels, Democratic party control of the *legislative* branch at the state and federal levels, and their interactions. We measure Executive Control with a dummy variable equal to one if the state governor is a Democrat (zero otherwise) and the interaction of this variable with a dummy variable equal to one if the President is a Democrat (zero otherwise). We measure Legislative Control with a dummy variable equal to one if the state legislature (both House and Senate) is controlled by a Democratic majority (zero otherwise) and the interaction of this variable with a dummy variable equal to one if the federal legislature (both House and Senate) is controlled by a Democratic majority (zero otherwise).<sup>33</sup> Finally, we measure Full Control by interacting executive and legislative control. Executive control enables the party in power the ability to enforce laws. Legislative control enables the party in power the ability to enact laws. Full control enables the party in power the ability to enact and enforce laws, as well as appoint judges.<sup>34</sup>

Estimates are provided in Appendix G.1–Appendix G.3; corresponding figures are shown in Appendix A.4. For the tables reporting marginal effects, we report tests of significance for the sum of the coefficients on Democratic governor and the interaction between Democratic governor and president. We refer to this as tests of Democratic *Executive Control*. Similarly, we report tests of significance for the sum of the coefficients on Democratic majority in the state legislature and the interaction between Democratic majority in the state and federal legislature. We refer to this as tests of Democratic *Legislative Control*. Finally, we report tests of significance of the sum of all partisan variables. We refer to this as tests of Democratic *Full Control*. As in the analysis of political ideology, our preferred specifications include

<sup>33</sup>We do not include a dummy variable for either the party of the President or federal legislative control as this is absorbed by the time fixed effects; only the interaction term is identified.

<sup>34</sup>Note, our measures of partisanship are defined as one under Democratic control and zero otherwise. Thus, the measures equal zero under either Republican control or in divided governments. The state data are from Dynes and Holbein (2020); available at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VGWNP9>. The federal Congressional data are from <https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm> and <https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/>.

location and population health controls, county and year fixed effects, and county-specific time trends.


A few interesting results emerge. First, in the baseline specifications, we find statistically significant, *positive* associations at the  $p < 0.10$  level between lagged Democratic Legislative and Full Control and all-cause mortality in our preferred specification with or without controlling for income inequality. The effects are modest, as Democratic Legislative (Full) Control over the prior four years is associated with a 0.1% (0.2%) *increase* in current all-cause mortality. This corresponds to roughly 1 (2) *additional* deaths per 100,000 in the average county-year; 2,500 (5,000) additional deaths in the average year. The fact that the estimated contemporaneous and lead effects of Democratic Legislative and Full Control are precise zeros is consistent with these estimates having a causal interpretation. For short-term mortality, there is some evidence of a *negative* association with contemporaneous Democratic Executive, Legislative, and Full Control. However, the results for the lead effects suggest this should be interpreted with caution.

The *positive* effect of lagged Democratic control on all-cause mortality is in stark contrast to the *negative* effects of lagged liberalism on all-cause (and short-term) mortality. A possible explanation is that the overall effect of political party masks considerable heterogeneity in what the parties have stood for over time as the early part of our sample covers the period when many Southern Democrats transitioned to the Republican party in response to the pro-Civil Rights stance adopted by some Democratic presidents ([Strong, 1971](#)). As such, Democratic affiliation is not always synonymous with liberalism, particularly during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nor is the Republican party always synonymous with conservatism.

To explore this, Figure [G1](#) plots ideology scores by government branch and partisan control both pre- and post-2000. Panel A plots state policy liberalism by time period and party of the governor. Governor political party is not indicative of ideology, particularly under Democratic governors. There is even a mass of liberal states with Republican governors since 2001. The same holds for Democratic control of state legislatures in Panel B. Prior to 2001, the distribution of state policy liberalism is bimodal for states under Democratic control of the state legislature. Since 2001, state policy liberalism is highly correlated with the party controlling the state legislature, yet each distribution contains a long tail in the opposite direction.

Panels C and D show similar plots at the national level. Here, political party and ideology scores of individual representatives and senators align with current perceptions of both parties. Thus, it is critical not to naively ascribe the ideology and policy preferences of the current national party platforms to state and local politicians. This is consistent with our view of partisan mortality cycles based on the partisan business cycle framework originating in [Hibbs \(1977\)](#). Under this framework, politicians are beholden to the policy preferences of the constituents that voted them into office. As such, if the ideology of the national party diverges from the ideology of a politician's local base, politicians should reflect the latter more than former. For example, California has an extremely high state policy liberalism score in the early 2000s despite Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger being governor. Conversely, Mississippi historically has some of the lowest state policy liberalism scores despite having Democratic governors during most of our sample period. Similarly, Alabama and Mississippi, until recently, were primarily under Democratic state legislative control, yet have some of the lowest state policy liberalism scores.

Figure G1: Historical Ideology Scores by Government Branch, Partisan Control, and Time Period



Notes: Higher values of all ideology scores correspond to greater liberalism.

To further examine the potential role of Southern Democrats last century, we re-estimate the baseline specification for the effects of political party on all-cause mortality omitting the Southeast region of the US (as defined by the US BEA).<sup>35</sup> The results are displayed in Figure A6 in Appendix A. Now, all estimates are statistically insignificant at the  $p < 0.05$  level.

The second interesting finding in the analysis of political party effects is that there is a lot of heterogeneity across demographic groups and over time. To begin, the positive association between Democratic control and all-cause mortality found in the baseline specification is confined to White females when using the full sample. However, when splitting the sample by time period, we only find a *negative* association with Black females during the period 1985–2000. In contrast, the negative association between Democratic control and short-term mortality is common to all demographic groups when using the full sample period. Moreover, the effects are not trivial. For example, Democratic Legislative Control over the prior four

<sup>35</sup>This includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia.

years reduces the short-term mortality rate by 3.9% (2.7%) for Black males (females). This corresponds to roughly 1 fewer short-term death per 100,000 in the average county-year for Black males. We also find negative effects of contemporaneous Democratic Executive (and Legislative) Control for White males (females). Here, Democratic Control leads to roughly a 2–3% reduction in the short-term mortality rates. Splitting the sample by time period, we find that these negative associations are only statistically meaningful for White males and females during the period 1985–2000, and White females during the period 1968–1984. There is a *positive* association between Democratic control and the short-term mortality of White males during the period 1968–1984. Finally, there is no statistically meaningful evidence of partisan mortality cycles after 2000, consistent with the prior results based on political ideology.

Finally, quantile regression estimates indicate that Democratic control is associated with lower geographic inequality in all-cause mortality due to larger negative and smaller positive associations in locations with the highest (conditional) mortality levels. However, consistent with the effects of liberalism, Democratic control contributes to geographic inequality in short-term mortality due to larger (in absolute value) negative associations in locations with the lowest (conditional) levels.

Overall, the results using political party are broadly consistent with those using ideology, particularly after accounting for the ideology of Southern Democrats in the early part of the sample. This highlights the importance of understanding the spatial and temporal variation in views within US political parties.

## Appendix G.1 Baseline Specification

Table G1: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
Executive Control	-0.0003	0.0035	0.0023	0.0017	0.0027	0.0023	0.0012	0.0019	0.0022	0.0021
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6999</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0042</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0249</i>	<i>0.0010</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>
Legislative Control	0.0211	-0.0054	0.0009	0.0013	-0.0016	0.0010	0.0015	-0.0005	0.0009	0.0010
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0803</i>	<i>0.0176</i>	<i>0.0148</i>	<i>0.0656</i>	<i>0.0031</i>	<i>0.4347</i>	<i>0.0587</i>	<i>0.0440</i>
Full Control	0.0230	-0.0115	-0.0006	-0.0011	-0.0033	-0.0008	0.0003	-0.0015	0.0015	0.0015
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.4806</i>	<i>0.2298</i>	<i>0.0007</i>	<i>0.3467</i>	<i>0.7005</i>	<i>0.0991</i>	<i>0.0709</i>	<i>0.0570</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
Executive Control	-0.0044	0.0018	-0.0018	-0.0016	-0.0016	-0.0017	-0.0016	-0.0000	-0.0018	-0.0019
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0045</i>	<i>0.2323</i>	<i>0.2464</i>	<i>0.2931</i>	<i>0.3211</i>	<i>0.2788</i>	<i>0.2267</i>	<i>0.9892</i>	<i>0.1760</i>	<i>0.1652</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0116	0.0007	0.0005	0.0012	-0.0004	0.0007	0.0011	-0.0001	0.0004	0.0003
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.6236</i>	<i>0.7283</i>	<i>0.4298</i>	<i>0.7977</i>	<i>0.6256</i>	<i>0.4258</i>	<i>0.9306</i>	<i>0.7966</i>	<i>0.8474</i>
Full Control	0.0004	-0.0025	-0.0029	-0.0028	-0.0002	-0.0026	-0.0012	0.0006	-0.0013	-0.0012
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8369</i>	<i>0.2487</i>	<i>0.1676</i>	<i>0.1752</i>	<i>0.9216</i>	<i>0.2190</i>	<i>0.5358</i>	<i>0.7716</i>	<i>0.5227</i>	<i>0.5400</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
Executive Control	-0.0174	-0.0007	-0.0001	0.0004	0.0003	-0.0001	0.0009	0.0019	0.0011	0.0010
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.3293</i>	<i>0.9250</i>	<i>0.5860</i>	<i>0.6915</i>	<i>0.8354</i>	<i>0.1363</i>	<i>0.0118</i>	<i>0.0598</i>	<i>0.0761</i>
Legislative Control	0.0376	-0.0116	-0.0019	-0.0010	-0.0020	-0.0018	-0.0005	-0.0015	0.0001	0.0002
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0120</i>	<i>0.1875</i>	<i>0.0096</i>	<i>0.0205</i>	<i>0.4478</i>	<i>0.0327</i>	<i>0.9410</i>	<i>0.7985</i>
Full Control	0.0181	-0.0141	-0.0028	-0.0019	-0.0026	-0.0027	-0.0007	-0.0016	-0.0002	0.0000
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0058</i>	<i>0.0650</i>	<i>0.0167</i>	<i>0.0094</i>	<i>0.4497</i>	<i>0.1122</i>	<i>0.7936</i>	<i>0.9962</i>
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G2: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
Executive Control	0.0032	0.0075	0.0061	0.0047	0.0036	0.0058	0.0039	0.0033	0.0055	0.0054
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0055</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.0131</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0021</i>	<i>0.0152</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>
Legislative Control	0.0179	-0.0026	-0.0005	0.0008	-0.0008	-0.0001	0.0016	0.0021	0.0004	0.0007
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0411</i>	<i>0.7206</i>	<i>0.5463</i>	<i>0.6416</i>	<i>0.9387</i>	<i>0.2183</i>	<i>0.1712</i>	<i>0.7509</i>	<i>0.5971</i>
Full Control	0.0064	-0.0037	-0.0024	-0.0022	0.0011	-0.0019	-0.0011	0.0034	0.0001	0.0004
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0922</i>	<i>0.2823</i>	<i>0.3554</i>	<i>0.6574</i>	<i>0.4050</i>	<i>0.6385</i>	<i>0.1693</i>	<i>0.9670</i>	<i>0.8471</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
Executive Control	-0.0051	-0.0105	-0.0142	-0.0128	-0.0115	-0.0143	-0.0094	-0.0056	-0.0113	-0.0115
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1157</i>	<i>0.0028</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.0017</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0049</i>	<i>0.1064</i>	<i>0.0007</i>	<i>0.0006</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0069	-0.0057	-0.0095	-0.0071	-0.0057	-0.0105	-0.0057	-0.0063	-0.0091	-0.0095
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0511</i>	<i>0.1623</i>	<i>0.0201</i>	<i>0.0785</i>	<i>0.1650</i>	<i>0.0100</i>	<i>0.1391</i>	<i>0.1080</i>	<i>0.0183</i>	<i>0.0132</i>
Full Control	-0.0158	-0.0137	-0.0203	-0.0168	-0.0110	-0.0206	-0.0150	-0.0094	-0.0173	-0.0172
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.0125</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0024</i>	<i>0.0576</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0043</i>	<i>0.0878</i>	<i>0.0011</i>	<i>0.0011</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
Executive Control	0.0038	0.0060	0.0058	0.0054	0.0052	0.0057	0.0045	0.0053	0.0047	0.0046
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0065</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.0034</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0021</i>	<i>0.0018</i>	<i>0.0006</i>	<i>0.0010</i>
Legislative Control	0.0319	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0015	-0.0014	-0.0022	-0.0019	-0.0029	-0.0026	-0.0023
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.2017</i>	<i>0.1930</i>	<i>0.4170</i>	<i>0.4651</i>	<i>0.2178</i>	<i>0.2875</i>	<i>0.1123</i>	<i>0.1319</i>	<i>0.1857</i>
Full Control	0.0077	-0.0084	-0.0089	-0.0074	-0.0049	-0.0091	-0.0064	-0.0044	-0.0068	-0.0062
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0005</i>	<i>0.0012</i>	<i>0.0006</i>	<i>0.0046</i>	<i>0.0752</i>	<i>0.0005</i>	<i>0.0118</i>	<i>0.0992</i>	<i>0.0064</i>	<i>0.0122</i>
Location Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G3: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0115*** (0.0012)	-0.0014 (0.0011)	-0.0011 (0.0011)	-0.0013 (0.0011)	-0.0017 (0.0011)	-0.0010 (0.0011)	-0.0007 (0.0010)	-0.0006 (0.0010)	-0.0014 (0.0010)	-0.0013 (0.0010)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0158*** (0.0015)	0.0032** (0.0016)	-0.0007 (0.0016)	-0.0003 (0.0016)	-0.0006 (0.0017)	-0.0006 (0.0016)	-0.0009 (0.0015)	0.0005 (0.0015)	-0.0004 (0.0014)	-0.0006 (0.0014)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0008 (0.0013)	-0.0021 (0.0014)	-0.0019 (0.0013)	-0.0010 (0.0013)	-0.0015 (0.0014)	-0.0020 (0.0014)	-0.0009 (0.0013)	-0.0019 (0.0013)	-0.0022* (0.0013)	-0.0021* (0.0013)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0124*** (0.0014)	0.0028 (0.0017)	0.0024 (0.0017)	0.0021 (0.0017)	0.0011 (0.0018)	0.0028 (0.0018)	0.0020 (0.0017)	0.0018 (0.0016)	0.0025 (0.0016)	0.0024 (0.0016)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0164*** (0.0020)	-0.0051** (0.0021)	-0.0017 (0.0020)	-0.0024 (0.0020)	0.0018 (0.0021)	-0.0017 (0.0020)	-0.0017 (0.0018)	-0.0007 (0.0018)	0.0002 (0.0017)	0.0004 (0.0017)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0031*** (0.0006)	-0.0009** (0.0004)	0.0017*** (0.0004)	0.0010*** (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0017*** (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0034*** (0.0007)	0.0045*** (0.0007)	0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0023*** (0.0007)	0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0011* (0.0006)	0.0020*** (0.0006)	0.021*** (0.0006)	0.020*** (0.0006)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0075*** (0.0007)	0.0046*** (0.0006)	0.0026*** (0.0005)	0.0020*** (0.0005)	0.0016*** (0.0005)	0.0024*** (0.0005)	0.0021*** (0.0005)	0.0021*** (0.0005)	0.030*** (0.0005)	0.030*** (0.0005)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0287*** (0.0006)	-0.0100*** (0.0007)	-0.0017*** (0.0006)	-0.0007 (0.0006)	-0.0032*** (0.0006)	-0.0015*** (0.0006)	-0.0006 (0.0006)	-0.0024*** (0.0006)	-0.0024*** (0.0006)	-0.0020*** (0.0006)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0021* (0.0012)	-0.0096*** (0.0011)	-0.0038*** (0.0009)	-0.0040*** (0.0010)	-0.0044*** (0.0011)	-0.0041*** (0.0009)	-0.0023** (0.0009)	-0.0029*** (0.0009)	-0.0016* (0.0009)	-0.0015* (0.0009)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0179*** (0.0006)	-0.0008 (0.0005)	0.0011** (0.0005)	0.0007 (0.0005)	-0.0006 (0.0005)	0.0011** (0.0005)	-0.0006 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0006 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0004)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0353*** (0.0008)	0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0011 (0.0008)	-0.0003 (0.0008)	-0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0009 (0.0008)	-0.0013* (0.0008)	0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0025*** (0.0007)	0.014*** (0.0007)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0229*** (0.0008)	-0.0031*** (0.0006)	-0.0010* (0.0006)	-0.0007 (0.0006)	-0.0024*** (0.0006)	-0.0011* (0.0006)	-0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0019*** (0.0006)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	-0.0001 (0.0006)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0347*** (0.0008)	-0.0086*** (0.0009)	-0.0009 (0.0008)	-0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0004 (0.0008)	-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0007)	0.0004 (0.0007)	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0003 (0.0007)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0022 (0.0014)	-0.0017 (0.0011)	-0.0009 (0.0010)	-0.0013 (0.0010)	-0.0010 (0.0012)	-0.0008 (0.0010)	-0.0011 (0.0010)	-0.0019* (0.0010)	-0.0014 (0.0010)	-0.0012 (0.0009)
Observations	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	129300	117504	117504	117504	117504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.166	0.462	0.488	0.491	0.490	0.554	0.560	0.560	0.617	0.617
Location Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Income Inequality Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State × Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G4: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0078*** (0.0027)	-0.0055* (0.0028)	-0.0048* (0.0028)	-0.0041 (0.0028)	-0.0028 (0.0029)	-0.0045 (0.0029)	-0.0040 (0.0027)	-0.0026 (0.0027)	-0.0058** (0.0027)	-0.0055** (0.0027)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0129*** (0.0033)	-0.0050 (0.0038)	-0.0094** (0.0038)	-0.0087** (0.0038)	-0.0088** (0.0040)	-0.0087** (0.0038)	-0.0097** (0.0038)	-0.0054 (0.0036)	-0.0026 (0.0036)	-0.0060* (0.0036)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0106*** (0.0030)	-0.0066* (0.0034)	-0.0089** (0.0035)	-0.0060* (0.0035)	-0.0051 (0.0035)	-0.0051 (0.0035)	-0.0093*** (0.0035)	-0.0033 (0.0032)	-0.0042 (0.0032)	-0.0067** (0.0032)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0037 (0.0035)	0.0009 (0.0045)	-0.0006 (0.0045)	-0.0011 (0.0045)	-0.0007 (0.0045)	-0.0012 (0.0045)	-0.0023 (0.0045)	-0.0020 (0.0042)	-0.0023 (0.0042)	-0.0029 (0.0042)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0039 (0.0046)	0.0025 (0.0050)	0.0033 (0.0050)	0.0032 (0.0050)	0.0063 (0.0053)	0.0042 (0.0050)	0.0000 (0.0048)	0.0025 (0.0050)	0.0031 (0.0048)	0.0037 (0.0048)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0041*** (0.0009)	0.0008 (0.0009)	0.0025*** (0.0009)	0.0010 (0.0009)	0.0016 (0.0010)	0.0024*** (0.0009)	0.0003 (0.0009)	0.0008 (0.0010)	0.0011 (0.0009)	0.0011 (0.0009)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0010 (0.0012)	0.0067*** (0.0016)	0.0036** (0.0015)	0.0037** (0.0016)	0.0019 (0.0017)	0.0035** (0.0015)	0.0036** (0.0015)	0.0025 (0.0015)	0.0044*** (0.0015)	0.0043*** (0.0015)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0115*** (0.0011)	0.0058*** (0.0011)	0.046*** (0.0011)	0.048*** (0.0011)	0.0048*** (0.0012)	0.0052*** (0.0013)	0.0052*** (0.0013)	0.0043*** (0.0013)	0.0046*** (0.0013)	0.0046*** (0.0013)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0294*** (0.0011)	-0.0084*** (0.0014)	-0.0051*** (0.0015)	-0.0039*** (0.0015)	-0.0059*** (0.0015)	-0.0053*** (0.0015)	-0.0026* (0.0015)	-0.0032* (0.0015)	-0.0042*** (0.0014)	-0.0039*** (0.0014)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0146*** (0.0021)	-0.0085*** (0.0023)	-0.0080*** (0.0023)	-0.0077*** (0.0023)	-0.0119*** (0.0023)	-0.0123*** (0.0026)	-0.0113*** (0.0026)	-0.0066*** (0.0023)	-0.0021 (0.0024)	-0.0057*** (0.0022)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0058*** (0.0012)	0.0029*** (0.0012)	0.0026*** (0.0012)	0.0017 (0.0012)	0.0032** (0.0014)	0.0029** (0.0012)	0.0023* (0.0012)	0.0008 (0.0013)	0.0023* (0.0011)	0.0009 (0.0011)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0020 (0.0015)	0.0031* (0.0018)	0.0031* (0.0017)	0.0037** (0.0017)	0.0019 (0.0019)	0.0027 (0.0022)	0.0027 (0.0018)	0.0029 (0.0021)	0.0037** (0.0017)	0.0037** (0.0017)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0062*** (0.0013)	0.0003 (0.0014)	0.0003 (0.0014)	0.0004 (0.0014)	0.0024 (0.0015)	0.0024 (0.0015)	0.0007 (0.0014)	-0.0004 (0.0014)	0.0039*** (0.0017)	0.0003 (0.0017)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0381*** (0.0017)	-0.0027 (0.0020)	-0.0029 (0.0019)	-0.0019 (0.0020)	0.0010 (0.0020)	-0.0029 (0.0019)	-0.0029 (0.0019)	-0.0014 (0.0019)	0.0011 (0.0019)	-0.0028 (0.0019)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0280*** (0.0023)	-0.0119*** (0.0026)	-0.0123*** (0.0026)	-0.0113*** (0.0026)	-0.0125*** (0.0030)	-0.0087*** (0.0026)	-0.0087*** (0.0026)	-0.0068*** (0.0026)	-0.0089*** (0.0025)	-0.0085*** (0.0025)
Observations	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	113261	105542	105542	105542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.095	0.116	0.120	0.123	0.205	0.150	0.153	0.224	0.224
Location Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N
State x Decade FEs	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

## Appendix G.2 Race & Sex

Table G5: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Males: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0031	0.0031	0.0271	0.0256	-0.0122	-0.0120	0.0021	0.0009
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2473</i>	<i>0.2533</i>	<i>0.2565</i>	<i>0.2854</i>	<i>0.0509</i>	<i>0.0549</i>	<i>0.6948</i>	<i>0.8655</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0020	-0.0020	-0.0023	-0.0021	0.0038	0.0039	-0.0077	-0.0068
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5465</i>	<i>0.5400</i>	<i>0.8602</i>	<i>0.8728</i>	<i>0.4678</i>	<i>0.4609</i>	<i>0.2865</i>	<i>0.3504</i>
Full Control	0.0012	0.0011	0.0004	-0.0012	-0.0056	-0.0072	0.0046	0.0089
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8001</i>	<i>0.8215</i>	<i>0.9822</i>	<i>0.9416</i>	<i>0.5089</i>	<i>0.4125</i>	<i>0.8531</i>	<i>0.7223</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0077	-0.0076	-0.0021	-0.0027	-0.0097	-0.0093	-0.0003	0.0016
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3368</i>	<i>0.3403</i>	<i>0.9657</i>	<i>0.9572</i>	<i>0.2940</i>	<i>0.3233</i>	<i>0.9833</i>	<i>0.8975</i>
Legislative Control	0.0118	0.0115	0.0056	0.0053	0.0029	0.0017	0.0037	0.0085
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2569</i>	<i>0.2681</i>	<i>0.8553</i>	<i>0.8613</i>	<i>0.8638</i>	<i>0.9237</i>	<i>0.7330</i>	<i>0.4559</i>
Full Control	-0.0036	-0.0037	-0.0213	-0.0212	-0.0094	-0.0126	0.0195	0.0272
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.7975</i>	<i>0.7909</i>	<i>0.5615</i>	<i>0.5662</i>	<i>0.6165</i>	<i>0.5098</i>	<i>0.4106</i>	<i>0.2699</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0029	0.0029	0.0155	0.0155	-0.0042	-0.0041	0.0024	0.0015
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3196</i>	<i>0.3320</i>	<i>0.5434</i>	<i>0.5501</i>	<i>0.4114</i>	<i>0.4195</i>	<i>0.6986</i>	<i>0.8441</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0027	-0.0027	-0.0139	-0.0131	0.0071	0.0066	-0.0055	-0.0044
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5237</i>	<i>0.5240</i>	<i>0.3952</i>	<i>0.4247</i>	<i>0.5198</i>	<i>0.5532</i>	<i>0.3724</i>	<i>0.4875</i>
Full Control	0.0024	0.0024	-0.0115	-0.0115	0.0008	-0.0004	0.0088	0.0099
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6856</i>	<i>0.6878</i>	<i>0.5604</i>	<i>0.5623</i>	<i>0.9438</i>	<i>0.9758</i>	<i>0.5340</i>	<i>0.4868</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G6: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Males: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0206	0.0211	0.1090	0.1155	0.0098	0.0062	-0.0155	-0.0143
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0017</i>	<i>0.0012</i>	<i>0.0090</i>	<i>0.0057</i>	<i>0.5514</i>	<i>0.7013</i>	<i>0.1391</i>	<i>0.1737</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0394	-0.0402	-0.0222	-0.0226	0.0009	-0.0000	0.0041	0.0028
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.2042</i>	<i>0.2060</i>	<i>0.9501</i>	<i>0.9978</i>	<i>0.7948</i>	<i>0.8563</i>
Full Control	0.0026	0.0024	0.0066	0.0135	-0.0142	-0.0027	0.0706	0.0647
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8253</i>	<i>0.8406</i>	<i>0.8117</i>	<i>0.6269</i>	<i>0.5486</i>	<i>0.9100</i>	<i>0.1093</i>	<i>0.1449</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0340	-0.0357	-0.1030	-0.1113	0.0314	0.0289	0.0015	0.0040
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0339</i>	<i>0.0256</i>	<i>0.1275</i>	<i>0.1076</i>	<i>0.1643</i>	<i>0.1960</i>	<i>0.9419</i>	<i>0.8435</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0347	-0.0323	-0.0000	-0.0018	-0.0112	-0.0128	-0.0071	-0.0087
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0317</i>	<i>0.0456</i>	<i>0.9992</i>	<i>0.9588</i>	<i>0.7152</i>	<i>0.6822</i>	<i>0.7642</i>	<i>0.7129</i>
Full Control	-0.0230	-0.0264	-0.0019	-0.0071	-0.0637	-0.0544	0.0932	0.0858
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3302</i>	<i>0.2650</i>	<i>0.9669</i>	<i>0.8766</i>	<i>0.0897</i>	<i>0.1445</i>	<i>0.0365</i>	<i>0.0590</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0022	-0.0019	-0.0544	-0.0553	0.0272	0.0253	-0.0129	-0.0112
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.7719</i>	<i>0.7997</i>	<i>0.1506</i>	<i>0.1648</i>	<i>0.0523</i>	<i>0.0723</i>	<i>0.2344</i>	<i>0.3077</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0075	-0.0091	0.0031	0.0015	-0.0093	-0.0116	0.0007	-0.0018
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4526</i>	<i>0.3559</i>	<i>0.8988</i>	<i>0.9514</i>	<i>0.6441</i>	<i>0.5663</i>	<i>0.9547</i>	<i>0.8820</i>
Full Control	-0.0422	-0.0429	-0.0327	-0.0329	0.0135	0.0140	0.0058	0.0042
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0021</i>	<i>0.0017</i>	<i>0.2690</i>	<i>0.2637</i>	<i>0.6226</i>	<i>0.6071</i>	<i>0.8184</i>	<i>0.8694</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G7: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Males: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0142** (0.0061)	-0.0141** (0.0061)	-0.0124 (0.0150)	-0.0122 (0.0153)	-0.0073 (0.0105)	-0.0086 (0.0106)	-0.0068 (0.0075)	-0.0061 (0.0075)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0065 (0.0086)	0.0065 (0.0086)	0.0103 (0.0484)	0.0095 (0.0488)	-0.0023 (0.0138)	-0.0007 (0.0140)	0.0066 (0.0142)	0.0076 (0.0142)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0147 (0.0093)	0.0147 (0.0093)	0.0153 (0.0326)	0.0176 (0.0328)	0.0083 (0.0153)	0.0083 (0.0153)	0.0011 (0.0106)	0.0032 (0.0108)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0029 (0.0115)	-0.0031 (0.0115)	-0.0097 (0.0397)	-0.0122 (0.0399)	-0.0055 (0.0197)	-0.0066 (0.0199)	0.0026 (0.0118)	0.0053 (0.0121)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0077 (0.0111)	-0.0076 (0.0111)	-0.0247 (0.0473)	-0.0239 (0.0474)	-0.0026 (0.0145)	-0.0050 (0.0149)	0.0161 (0.0259)	0.0171 (0.0261)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0017 (0.0019)	0.0017 (0.0020)	0.0056 (0.0069)	0.0059 (0.0069)	0.0032 (0.0031)	0.0032 (0.0031)	0.0021 (0.0034)	0.0019 (0.0034)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0014 (0.0032)	0.0014 (0.0032)	0.0214 (0.0244)	0.0198 (0.0245)	-0.0153** (0.0076)	-0.0153** (0.0076)	0.0000 (0.0060)	-0.0010 (0.0061)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0012 (0.0025)	0.0012 (0.0025)	-0.0222 (0.0240)	-0.0213 (0.0243)	0.0015 (0.0063)	0.0004 (0.0065)	-0.0078 (0.0058)	-0.0072 (0.0058)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0032 (0.0035)	-0.0032 (0.0035)	0.0199 (0.0249)	0.0192 (0.0251)	0.0023 (0.0059)	0.0035 (0.0061)	0.0001 (0.0075)	0.0004 (0.0075)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0001 (0.0049)	-0.0001 (0.0049)	-0.0244 (0.0243)	-0.0248 (0.0243)	0.0028 (0.0089)	0.0010 (0.0093)	0.0102 (0.0260)	0.0148 (0.0265)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0046* (0.0027)	0.0045* (0.0027)	0.0116 (0.0085)	0.0131 (0.0087)	0.0040 (0.0048)	0.0040 (0.0048)	0.0097* (0.0051)	0.0097* (0.0051)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0016 (0.0038)	-0.0016 (0.0038)	0.0038 (0.0038)	0.0024 (0.0072)	-0.0082 (0.0278)	-0.0080 (0.0067)	-0.0074 (0.0075)	-0.0080 (0.0076)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0013 (0.0033)	0.0013 (0.0033)	0.0012 (0.0195)	-0.0105 (0.0198)	-0.0089 (0.0067)	-0.0049 (0.0067)	-0.0052 (0.0070)	-0.0119** (0.0059)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0040 (0.0047)	-0.0039 (0.0047)	-0.0039 (0.0251)	-0.0042 (0.0251)	0.0120 (0.0107)	0.0117 (0.0107)	0.0064 (0.0065)	0.0059 (0.0066)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0022 (0.0057)	0.0023 (0.0057)	-0.0131 (0.0249)	-0.0139 (0.0253)	-0.0021 (0.0087)	-0.0028 (0.0087)	0.0120 (0.0152)	0.0129 (0.0152)
Observations	54787	54787	22236	22236	18161	18161	14390	14390
R <sup>2</sup>	0.200	0.200	0.173	0.173	0.312	0.312	0.262	0.263
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G8: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Males: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0100 (0.0125)	-0.0112 (0.0125)	-0.0147 (0.0231)	-0.0169 (0.0238)	-0.0456* (0.0235)	-0.0399* (0.0232)	0.0123 (0.0151)	0.0089
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0241 (0.0180)	-0.0246 (0.0181)	-0.0883 (0.0671)	-0.0944 (0.0677)	0.0770** (0.0316)	0.0689** (0.0309)	-0.0109 (0.0235)	-0.0049 (0.0238)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0623*** (0.0183)	-0.0605*** (0.0184)	-0.0849 (0.0740)	-0.0910 (0.0746)	0.0010 (0.0255)	-0.0051 (0.0254)	-0.0002 (0.0208)	-0.0034 (0.0213)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0276 (0.0203)	0.0282 (0.0203)	0.0849 (0.0780)	0.0892 (0.0785)	-0.0122 (0.0327)	-0.0077 (0.0324)	-0.0069 (0.0228)	-0.0054 (0.0229)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0457** (0.0203)	0.0416** (0.0205)	0.1012 (0.0659)	0.1060 (0.0664)	-0.0840** (0.0376)	-0.0705* (0.0377)	0.0988** (0.0492)	0.0905* (0.0493)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0062 (0.0054)	0.0068 (0.0053)	-0.0184 (0.0116)	-0.0183 (0.0118)	-0.0143* (0.0084)	-0.0139* (0.0082)	-0.0122* (0.0066)	-0.0130* (0.0067)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0144** (0.0085)	0.0143** (0.0084)	0.1275*** (0.0446)	0.1337*** (0.0446)	0.0241 (0.0203)	0.0202 (0.0201)	-0.0032 (0.0201)	-0.0012 (0.0067)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0113* (0.0061)	-0.0109* (0.0061)	0.0659 (0.0473)	0.0611 (0.0483)	-0.0078 (0.0164)	-0.0032 (0.0167)	0.0248** (0.0167)	0.0259** (0.0112)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0281*** (0.0085)	-0.0294*** (0.0084)	-0.0881* (0.0475)	-0.0838* (0.0479)	0.0086 (0.0136)	0.0032 (0.0141)	-0.0207 (0.0157)	-0.0231 (0.0157)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0215* (0.0123)	0.0215* (0.0123)	-0.0802* (0.0413)	-0.0793* (0.0412)	-0.0249 (0.0262)	-0.0089 (0.0264)	0.0820* (0.0479)	0.0761 (0.0484)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0344*** (0.0065)	0.0334*** (0.0064)	0.0513*** (0.0148)	0.0451*** (0.0147)	-0.0077 (0.0118)	-0.0074 (0.0120)	-0.0101 (0.0098)	-0.0112 (0.0099)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0366*** (0.0102)	-0.0353*** (0.0102)	-0.1056*** (0.0398)	-0.1004** (0.0419)	0.0349* (0.0191)	0.0326* (0.0190)	-0.0028 (0.0150)	0.0000 (0.0153)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0006 (0.0078)	0.0019 (0.0078)	0.0861*** (0.0362)	0.0791** (0.0371)	0.0107 (0.0143)	0.0105 (0.0148)	-0.0061 (0.0118)	-0.0072 (0.0123)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0081 (0.0108)	-0.0109 (0.0108)	-0.0829* (0.0451)	-0.0776* (0.0455)	-0.0200 (0.0207)	-0.0221 (0.0208)	0.0068 (0.0113)	0.0053 (0.0112)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0325*** (0.0114)	-0.0319*** (0.0114)	0.0186 (0.0388)	0.0209 (0.0402)	-0.0044 (0.0219)	0.0003 (0.0218)	0.0181 (0.0288)	0.0172 (0.0289)
Observations	19738	19738	11,197	11,197	4413	4413	4128	4128
R <sup>2</sup>	0.388	0.388	0.453	0.453	0.391	0.394	0.318	0.319
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
County FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE <sub>s</sub>	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G9: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Females: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0030	0.0033	-0.0326	-0.0325	0.0003	0.0003	-0.0019	-0.0007
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2117</i>	<i>0.1770</i>	<i>0.1592</i>	<i>0.1609</i>	<i>0.9570</i>	<i>0.9659</i>	<i>0.6746</i>	<i>0.8776</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0013	-0.0011	-0.0177	-0.0186	-0.0021	-0.0020	-0.0058	-0.0064
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6765</i>	<i>0.7290</i>	<i>0.1552</i>	<i>0.1374</i>	<i>0.6881</i>	<i>0.7025</i>	<i>0.3311</i>	<i>0.2851</i>
Full Control	-0.0031	-0.0026	-0.0370	-0.0371	0.0011	0.0010	0.0195	0.0145
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4886</i>	<i>0.5671</i>	<i>0.0152</i>	<i>0.0152</i>	<i>0.8938</i>	<i>0.9000</i>	<i>0.3305</i>	<i>0.4754</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0068	-0.0076	0.0548	0.0573	-0.0255	-0.0255	-0.0235	-0.0263
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3530</i>	<i>0.3011</i>	<i>0.1983</i>	<i>0.1806</i>	<i>0.0047</i>	<i>0.0053</i>	<i>0.0221</i>	<i>0.0120</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0171	-0.0171	-0.0195	-0.0200	-0.0133	-0.0129	-0.0190	-0.0242
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0731</i>	<i>0.0741</i>	<i>0.4840</i>	<i>0.4714</i>	<i>0.4201</i>	<i>0.4441</i>	<i>0.0385</i>	<i>0.0115</i>
Full Control	-0.0305	-0.0310	-0.0497	-0.0482	-0.0216	-0.0222	-0.0193	-0.0278
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0155</i>	<i>0.0143</i>	<i>0.1346</i>	<i>0.1491</i>	<i>0.2267</i>	<i>0.2209</i>	<i>0.3204</i>	<i>0.1706</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0023	0.0027	-0.0300	-0.0275	0.0002	0.0003	0.0044	0.0051
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3985</i>	<i>0.3352</i>	<i>0.1991</i>	<i>0.2459</i>	<i>0.9696</i>	<i>0.9453</i>	<i>0.3269</i>	<i>0.2678</i>
Legislative Control	0.0016	0.0020	-0.0054	-0.0062	0.0136	0.0137	0.0007	-0.0003
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6927</i>	<i>0.6199</i>	<i>0.7249</i>	<i>0.6870</i>	<i>0.2542</i>	<i>0.2480</i>	<i>0.8890</i>	<i>0.9554</i>
Full Control	0.0073	0.0079	-0.0036	-0.0040	0.0076	0.0070	0.0032	0.0013
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1751</i>	<i>0.1407</i>	<i>0.8462</i>	<i>0.8320</i>	<i>0.5298</i>	<i>0.5602</i>	<i>0.7792</i>	<i>0.9094</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G10: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Females: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0088	0.0101	-0.0246	-0.0274	0.0137	0.0132	-0.0275	-0.0231
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1613</i>	<i>0.1125</i>	<i>0.5373</i>	<i>0.4942</i>	<i>0.3214</i>	<i>0.3361</i>	<i>0.0073</i>	<i>0.0247</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0273	-0.0272	-0.0567	-0.0610	0.0010	0.0015	-0.0054	-0.0071
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0008</i>	<i>0.0009</i>	<i>0.0083</i>	<i>0.0053</i>	<i>0.9376</i>	<i>0.9037</i>	<i>0.7485</i>	<i>0.6742</i>
Full Control	-0.0083	-0.0063	-0.0425	-0.0459	-0.0162	-0.0134	0.0429	0.0267
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5239</i>	<i>0.6286</i>	<i>0.1860</i>	<i>0.1556</i>	<i>0.4189</i>	<i>0.5168</i>	<i>0.4296</i>	<i>0.6234</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0088	-0.0120	-0.0401	-0.0297	0.0180	0.0169	-0.0068	-0.0228
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6231</i>	<i>0.5020</i>	<i>0.5633</i>	<i>0.6741</i>	<i>0.3838</i>	<i>0.4195</i>	<i>0.7614</i>	<i>0.3298</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0159	-0.0169	-0.0034	-0.0060	-0.0023	-0.0026	-0.0080	-0.0305
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4416</i>	<i>0.4134</i>	<i>0.9389</i>	<i>0.8922</i>	<i>0.9394</i>	<i>0.9312</i>	<i>0.7603</i>	<i>0.2443</i>
Full Control	-0.0531	-0.0521	-0.0399	-0.0352	-0.0350	-0.0352	-0.0116	-0.0368
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0797</i>	<i>0.0853</i>	<i>0.4991</i>	<i>0.5510</i>	<i>0.3667</i>	<i>0.3629</i>	<i>0.7955</i>	<i>0.4212</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0027	0.0036	-0.0555	-0.0470	0.0179	0.0184	-0.0067	-0.0062
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.7328</i>	<i>0.6481</i>	<i>0.1568</i>	<i>0.2407</i>	<i>0.1422</i>	<i>0.1380</i>	<i>0.5693</i>	<i>0.5989</i>
Legislative Control	0.0021	0.0028	0.0075	0.0054	-0.0112	-0.0110	0.0219	0.0214
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8432</i>	<i>0.7868</i>	<i>0.7969</i>	<i>0.8522</i>	<i>0.5537</i>	<i>0.5628</i>	<i>0.1211</i>	<i>0.1328</i>
Full Control	-0.0152	-0.0125	-0.0043	-0.0050	0.0319	0.0302	0.0153	0.0043
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2745</i>	<i>0.3713</i>	<i>0.9011</i>	<i>0.8863</i>	<i>0.1768</i>	<i>0.1854</i>	<i>0.6264</i>	<i>0.8901</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G11: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for Black Females: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0044 (0.0059)	-0.0042 (0.0059)	0.0088 (0.0148)	0.0102 (0.0149)	0.0018 (0.0114)	0.0018 (0.0114)	0.0133** (0.0066)	0.0131** (0.0066)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0024 (0.0081)	-0.0034 (0.0081)	0.0459 (0.0423)	0.0471 (0.0424)	-0.0273* (0.0142)	-0.0273* (0.0143)	-0.0367*** (0.0113)	-0.0395*** (0.0116)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0031 (0.0089)	-0.0029 (0.0090)	-0.0424 (0.0332)	-0.0446 (0.0335)	0.0013 (0.0159)	0.0014 (0.0159)	-0.0114 (0.0086)	-0.0134 (0.0087)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0140 (0.0107)	-0.0143 (0.0107)	0.0229 (0.0385)	0.0246 (0.0388)	-0.0145 (0.0190)	-0.0142 (0.0191)	-0.0076 (0.0103)	-0.0108 (0.0104)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0067 (0.0105)	-0.0062 (0.0106)	-0.0850** (0.0406)	-0.0855** (0.0406)	0.0172 (0.0139)	0.0162 (0.0141)	0.0231 (0.0198)	0.0227 (0.0201)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0032* (0.0018)	0.0035* (0.0018)	0.0141** (0.0068)	0.0145** (0.0068)	0.0027 (0.0031)	0.0029 (0.0031)	0.0022 (0.0028)	0.0024 (0.0028)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0002 (0.0029)	-0.0003 (0.0029)	-0.0488* (0.0246)	-0.0470* (0.0246)	-0.0024 (0.0074)	-0.0026 (0.0074)	-0.0041 (0.0049)	-0.0031 (0.0049)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0022 (0.0023)	0.0024 (0.0023)	-0.0159 (0.0216)	-0.0180 (0.0218)	-0.0001 (0.0058)	-0.0005 (0.0059)	-0.0031 (0.0045)	-0.0039 (0.0045)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0035 (0.0032)	-0.0035 (0.0032)	-0.0017 (0.0231)	-0.0017 (0.0232)	-0.0006 (0.0055)	-0.0019 (0.0055)	-0.0027 (0.0065)	-0.0025 (0.0065)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0048 (0.0044)	-0.0048 (0.0044)	0.0133 (0.0234)	0.0140 (0.0235)	0.0028 (0.0084)	0.0027 (0.0088)	0.0271 (0.0212)	0.0216 (0.0216)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0009 (0.0025)	0.0010 (0.0025)	0.0120 (0.0079)	0.0117 (0.0081)	0.0011 (0.0050)	0.0010 (0.0050)	0.0034 (0.0046)	0.0038 (0.0047)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0014 (0.0034)	0.0017 (0.0034)	-0.0420* (0.0241)	-0.0392 (0.0245)	-0.0009 (0.0065)	-0.0007 (0.0065)	0.0010 (0.0063)	0.0013 (0.0063)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0036 (0.0031)	0.0039 (0.0032)	0.0018 (0.0189)	-0.0005 (0.0193)	-0.0041 (0.0074)	-0.0036 (0.0073)	-0.0080 (0.0049)	-0.0097* (0.0050)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0020 (0.0044)	-0.0018 (0.0045)	-0.0072 (0.0225)	-0.0057 (0.0227)	0.0178 (0.0111)	0.0173 (0.0111)	0.0087 (0.0056)	0.0094* (0.0057)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0033 (0.0053)	0.0032 (0.0053)	0.0318 (0.0233)	0.0298 (0.0235)	-0.0062 (0.0081)	-0.0070 (0.0082)	-0.0019 (0.0126)	-0.0035 (0.0127)
Observations	52634	52634	21214	21214	17507	17507	13913	13913
R <sup>2</sup>	0.177	0.177	0.176	0.176	0.303	0.303	0.265	0.265
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
County FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE <sub>s</sub>	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G12: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for Black Females: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0031 (0.0144)	0.0055 (0.0143)	0.0068 (0.0276)	0.0124 (0.0277)	-0.0194 (0.0236)	-0.0156 (0.0200)	0.0027 (0.0198)	0.0037
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0119 (0.0190)	-0.0175 (0.0190)	-0.0469 (0.0710)	-0.0421 (0.0715)	0.0374 (0.0288)	0.0324 (0.0284)	-0.0095 (0.0275)	-0.0265
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0106 (0.0203)	-0.0091 (0.0204)	-0.0036 (0.0721)	-0.0107 (0.0725)	0.0112 (0.0221)	0.0090 (0.0223)	0.0118 (0.0215)	0.0056
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0053 (0.0236)	-0.0078 (0.0235)	0.0002 (0.0791)	0.0047 (0.0792)	-0.0134 (0.0317)	-0.0115 (0.0314)	-0.0199 (0.0272)	-0.0361
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0284 (0.0237)	-0.0232 (0.0235)	0.0035 (0.0651)	0.0005 (0.0653)	-0.0507 (0.0372)	-0.0494 (0.0365)	0.0033 (0.0464)	0.0165
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0031 (0.0050)	-0.0025 (0.0051)	-0.0270** (0.0131)	-0.0257* (0.0133)	-0.0031 (0.0082)	-0.0027 (0.0084)	-0.0019 (0.0079)	0.0016 (0.0081)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0119 (0.0081)	0.0126 (0.0081)	0.0024 (0.0429)	-0.0017 (0.0433)	0.0168 (0.0181)	0.0159 (0.0179)	-0.0257** (0.0122)	-0.0246** (0.0121)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0118* (0.0064)	-0.0126** (0.0064)	0.0769 (0.0527)	0.0707 (0.0540)	-0.0041 (0.0153)	-0.0027 (0.0154)	0.0059 (0.0129)	0.0040 (0.0130)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0155* (0.0086)	-0.0146* (0.0086)	-0.1325** (0.0560)	-0.1317** (0.0564)	0.0051 (0.0126)	0.0042 (0.0124)	-0.0113 (0.0160)	-0.0111 (0.0162)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0101 (0.0130)	0.0108 (0.0130)	0.0387 (0.0421)	0.0425 (0.0423)	-0.0309 (0.0225)	-0.0281 (0.0227)	0.0758 (0.0564)	0.0569 (0.0567)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0133** (0.0061)	0.0114* (0.0061)	0.0119 (0.0160)	0.0111 (0.0164)	0.0180 (0.0126)	0.0180 (0.0127)	0.0013 (0.0123)	0.0067 (0.0126)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0106 (0.0096)	-0.0078 (0.0097)	-0.0674 (0.0421)	-0.0581 (0.0439)	-0.0001 (0.0147)	-0.0003 (0.0147)	-0.0080 (0.0186)	-0.0130 (0.0188)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0012 (0.0082)	-0.0014 (0.0082)	0.0555 (0.0372)	0.0488 (0.0382)	0.0196 (0.0143)	0.0200 (0.0141)	0.0084 (0.0123)	0.0014 (0.0123)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0033 (0.0109)	0.0042 (0.0110)	-0.0481 (0.0465)	-0.0433 (0.0469)	-0.0308* (0.0186)	-0.0311* (0.0185)	0.0200 (0.0145)	0.0200 (0.0147)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0199 (0.0132)	0.0437 (0.0132)	0.0366 (0.0396)	0.0252 (0.0399)	0.0228 (0.0248)	0.0228 (0.0244)	-0.0108 (0.0334)	-0.0108 (0.0334)
Observations	13825	13825	8109	8109	3067	3067	2649	2649
R <sup>2</sup>	0.254	0.255	0.284	0.284	0.372	0.374	0.336	0.341
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G13: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Males: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0007	0.0006	0.0031	0.0003	0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0022	-0.0020
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2949</i>	<i>0.3848</i>	<i>0.3080</i>	<i>0.3098</i>	<i>0.8805</i>	<i>0.8635</i>	<i>0.2002</i>	<i>0.2330</i>
Legislative Control	0.0014	0.0015	-0.0002	-0.0003	0.0030	0.0030	-0.0001	-0.0004
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0338</i>	<i>0.0270</i>	<i>0.9352</i>	<i>0.8974</i>	<i>0.0356</i>	<i>0.0368</i>	<i>0.9723</i>	<i>0.8786</i>
Full Control	0.0020	0.0021	-0.0006	-0.0011	0.0007	0.0008	-0.0039	-0.0064
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0771</i>	<i>0.0765</i>	<i>0.8489</i>	<i>0.7161</i>	<i>0.7812</i>	<i>0.7558</i>	<i>0.6286</i>	<i>0.4245</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0015	-0.0015	0.0090	0.0097	0.0016	0.0017	-0.0008	-0.0021
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4349</i>	<i>0.4215</i>	<i>0.1565</i>	<i>0.1301</i>	<i>0.6360</i>	<i>0.6243</i>	<i>0.8200</i>	<i>0.5602</i>
Legislative Control	0.0015	0.0014	0.0014	0.0007	0.0055	0.0054	0.0023	-0.0001
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4604</i>	<i>0.5132</i>	<i>0.7201</i>	<i>0.8691</i>	<i>0.1623</i>	<i>0.1705</i>	<i>0.6021</i>	<i>0.9780</i>
Full Control	-0.0021	-0.0022	0.0037	0.0039	-0.0014	-0.0011	-0.0038	-0.0085
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4498</i>	<i>0.4389</i>	<i>0.5120</i>	<i>0.4899</i>	<i>0.8114</i>	<i>0.8467</i>	<i>0.6186</i>	<i>0.2740</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0008	-0.0008	-0.0019	-0.0012	0.0001	0.0000	0.0032	0.0032
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2929</i>	<i>0.2542</i>	<i>0.5489</i>	<i>0.7055</i>	<i>0.9621</i>	<i>0.9990</i>	<i>0.0634</i>	<i>0.0619</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0005	-0.0003	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.0003	0.0003	-0.0017	-0.0017
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6299</i>	<i>0.7286</i>	<i>0.9467</i>	<i>0.9229</i>	<i>0.8848</i>	<i>0.9012</i>	<i>0.5290</i>	<i>0.5231</i>
Full Control	-0.0009	-0.0007	0.0006	0.0004	-0.0000	0.0001	-0.0007	-0.0011
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4887</i>	<i>0.6046</i>	<i>0.8514</i>	<i>0.8949</i>	<i>0.9878</i>	<i>0.9612</i>	<i>0.8847</i>	<i>0.8089</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G14: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Males: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0012	0.0013	0.0307	0.0308	-0.0140	-0.0140	-0.0056	-0.0052
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6320</i>	<i>0.6233</i>	<i>0.0096</i>	<i>0.0100</i>	<i>0.0454</i>	<i>0.0459</i>	<i>0.1322</i>	<i>0.1642</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0302	-0.0308	-0.0037	-0.0113	-0.0066	-0.0068	-0.0134	-0.0139
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.5762</i>	<i>0.0920</i>	<i>0.2002</i>	<i>0.1886</i>	<i>0.0157</i>	<i>0.0129</i>
Full Control	0.0080	0.0071	0.0117	0.0124	-0.0141	-0.0086	0.0180	0.0143
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1182</i>	<i>0.1658</i>	<i>0.2482</i>	<i>0.2235</i>	<i>0.2325</i>	<i>0.4625</i>	<i>0.2634</i>	<i>0.3753</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0171	-0.0160	-0.0219	-0.0120	0.0019	0.0018	-0.0149	-0.0154
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0029</i>	<i>0.0053</i>	<i>0.2472</i>	<i>0.5290</i>	<i>0.8569</i>	<i>0.8603</i>	<i>0.0384</i>	<i>0.0330</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0165	-0.0155	0.0143	0.0063	-0.002	-0.0054	-0.0090	-0.0115
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0112</i>	<i>0.0163</i>	<i>0.2385</i>	<i>0.6008</i>	<i>0.9852</i>	<i>0.6546</i>	<i>0.3296</i>	<i>0.2116</i>
Full Control	0.0129	0.0132	0.0551	0.0582	-0.0666	-0.0644	-0.0083	-0.0142
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1891</i>	<i>0.1797</i>	<i>0.0021</i>	<i>0.0011</i>	<i>0.0005</i>	<i>0.0007</i>	<i>0.6000</i>	<i>0.3767</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0019	0.0019	-0.0307	-0.0244	0.0187	0.0165	-0.0005	-0.0004
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5213</i>	<i>0.5030</i>	<i>0.0024</i>	<i>0.0170</i>	<i>0.0110</i>	<i>0.0034</i>	<i>0.8890</i>	<i>0.9094</i>
Legislative Control	0.0135	0.0125	0.0063	0.0014	-0.0106	-0.0111	0.0009	0.0008
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.3794</i>	<i>0.8455</i>	<i>0.1894</i>	<i>0.1658</i>	<i>0.8453</i>	<i>0.8644</i>
Full Control	-0.0019	-0.0030	-0.0154	-0.0162	-0.0115	-0.0110	0.0106	0.0091
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.7211</i>	<i>0.5655</i>	<i>0.1088</i>	<i>0.0911</i>	<i>0.3306</i>	<i>0.3510</i>	<i>0.2673</i>	<i>0.3436</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G15: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Males: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0017 (0.0015)	-0.0016 (0.0015)	0.0051* (0.0030)	0.0057* (0.0030)	-0.0044 (0.0029)	-0.0045 (0.0029)	-0.0012 (0.0031)	-0.0009 (0.0032)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0002 (0.0021)	0.0000 (0.0021)	0.0040 (0.0067)	0.0040 (0.0067)	0.0060 (0.0042)	0.0061 (0.0042)	0.0004 (0.0043)	-0.0011 (0.0043)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0006 (0.0019)	-0.0006 (0.0019)	-0.0005 (0.0054)	-0.0004 (0.0053)	0.0022 (0.0037)	0.0022 (0.0037)	-0.0014 (0.0037)	-0.0025 (0.0037)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0021 (0.0023)	0.0019 (0.0023)	0.0019 (0.0058)	0.0010 (0.0058)	0.0033 (0.0041)	0.0032 (0.0041)	0.0024 (0.0048)	0.0024 (0.0047)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0021 (0.0026)	-0.0020 (0.0026)	-0.0068 (0.0068)	-0.0065 (0.0068)	-0.0085 (0.0068)	-0.0081 (0.0054)	-0.0053 (0.0085)	-0.0062 (0.0085)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)	-0.0000 (0.0014)	0.0001 (0.0014)	0.0006 (0.0009)	0.0005 (0.0009)	-0.0010 (0.0012)	-0.0010 (0.0012)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0031 (0.0034)	0.0029 (0.0034)	-0.0003 (0.0020)	-0.0002 (0.0020)	-0.0011 (0.0019)	-0.0010 (0.0019)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0025*** (0.0006)	0.0025*** (0.0006)	-0.0016 (0.0039)	-0.0021 (0.0039)	0.0022 (0.0014)	0.0022 (0.0014)	0.0006 (0.0017)	0.0003 (0.0017)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0011 (0.0008)	-0.0010 (0.0008)	0.0010 (0.0039)	0.0014 (0.0039)	0.0018 (0.0039)	0.0008 (0.0014)	-0.0007 (0.0031)	-0.0007 (0.0031)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0001 (0.0012)	-0.0000 (0.0012)	-0.0035 (0.0036)	-0.0039 (0.0037)	-0.0025 (0.0029)	-0.0025 (0.0030)	-0.0016 (0.0088)	-0.0039 (0.0088)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0006 (0.0006)	-0.0015 (0.0016)	-0.0012 (0.0016)	0.0020 (0.0014)	0.0020 (0.0014)	0.0000 (0.0019)	0.0001 (0.0019)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0003 (0.0009)	-0.0003 (0.0009)	-0.0004 (0.0009)	-0.0004 (0.0033)	-0.0020 (0.0020)	-0.0020 (0.0019)	0.0032 (0.0026)	0.0032 (0.0027)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0002 (0.0008)	-0.0001 (0.0008)	0.0001 (0.0027)	0.0013 (0.0027)	0.0010 (0.0028)	0.0019 (0.0020)	-0.0020 (0.0021)	-0.0020 (0.0021)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0003 (0.0010)	-0.0002 (0.0010)	-0.0002 (0.0033)	-0.0014 (0.0034)	-0.0012 (0.0025)	-0.0016 (0.0025)	0.0003 (0.0024)	0.0002 (0.0024)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0003 (0.0013)	0.0005 (0.0013)	0.0026 (0.0034)	0.0019 (0.0034)	-0.0004 (0.0029)	-0.0004 (0.0029)	-0.0022 (0.0053)	-0.0026 (0.0053)
Observations	112829	112829	33595	33595	40008	40008	39226	39226
R <sup>2</sup>	0.582	0.582	0.326	0.326	0.264	0.264	0.241	0.241
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p <.10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G16: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Males: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0026 (0.0048)	0.0016 (0.0047)	0.0123 (0.0095)	0.0197** (0.0094)	-0.0146 (0.0094)	-0.0133 (0.0094)	0.0049 (0.0058)	0.0054 (0.0058)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0197*** (0.0062)	-0.0178*** (0.0061)	-0.0342* (0.0192)	-0.0316* (0.0191)	0.0165 (0.0135)	0.0151 (0.0134)	-0.0198* (0.0088)	-0.0208** (0.0089)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0105 (0.0068)	-0.0106 (0.0068)	0.0401** (0.0203)	0.0251 (0.0204)	-0.0204* (0.0123)	-0.0224* (0.0122)	-0.0032 (0.0175)	-0.0048 (0.0075)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0060 (0.0073)	-0.0049 (0.0073)	-0.0258 (0.0208)	-0.0187 (0.0208)	0.0202 (0.0134)	0.0170 (0.0134)	-0.0058 (0.0090)	-0.0066 (0.0090)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0465*** (0.0084)	0.0447*** (0.0084)	0.0628*** (0.0189)	0.0638*** (0.0189)	-0.0683*** (0.0187)	-0.0609*** (0.0187)	0.0156 (0.0175)	0.0127 (0.0177)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0048*** (0.0021)	0.0046*** (0.0021)	-0.0000 (0.0046)	0.0021 (0.0046)	-0.0071** (0.0033)	-0.0076** (0.0033)	-0.0005 (0.0025)	-0.0006 (0.0025)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0036 (0.0031)	-0.0034 (0.0031)	0.0307** (0.0128)	0.0287** (0.0128)	-0.0069 (0.0079)	-0.0064 (0.0079)	-0.0051 (0.0051)	-0.0045 (0.0045)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0049* (0.0025)	-0.0049* (0.0025)	0.0264* (0.0135)	0.0132 (0.0136)	-0.0216*** (0.0062)	-0.0206*** (0.0062)	0.0021 (0.0021)	0.0018 (0.0018)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0253*** (0.0034)	-0.0259*** (0.0034)	-0.0301** (0.0136)	-0.0244* (0.0137)	0.0150*** (0.0056)	0.0138** (0.0056)	-0.0155*** (0.0056)	-0.0157*** (0.0056)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0370*** (0.0055)	0.0367*** (0.0056)	-0.0153 (0.0130)	-0.0071 (0.0130)	0.0065 (0.0125)	0.0122 (0.0125)	0.0370** (0.0179)	0.0334* (0.0179)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0120*** (0.0027)	0.0121*** (0.0027)	0.0292*** (0.0056)	0.0268*** (0.0055)	-0.0099* (0.0055)	-0.0100* (0.0055)	-0.0078* (0.0041)	-0.0081** (0.0040)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0102*** (0.0039)	-0.0102*** (0.0039)	-0.0599*** (0.0110)	-0.0512*** (0.0112)	0.0286*** (0.0071)	0.0265*** (0.0071)	0.0073 (0.0073)	0.0077 (0.0073)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0197*** (0.0032)	0.0196*** (0.0032)	0.0634*** (0.0102)	0.0454*** (0.0105)	0.0098 (0.0073)	0.0112 (0.0073)	-0.0005 (0.0042)	-0.0005 (0.0042)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0062* (0.0037)	-0.0071* (0.0038)	-0.0572*** (0.0120)	-0.0440*** (0.0121)	-0.0203** (0.0084)	-0.0223*** (0.0084)	0.0014 (0.0045)	0.0013 (0.0045)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0172*** (0.0045)	-0.0175*** (0.0045)	0.0091 (0.0109)	0.0068 (0.0109)	-0.0196* (0.0110)	-0.0163 (0.0109)	0.0102 (0.0105)	0.0087 (0.0105)
Observations	71277	71277	31751	31751	17966	17966	21560	21560
R <sup>2</sup>	0.505	0.505	0.623	0.624	0.385	0.387	0.152	0.153
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G17: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Females: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0025	0.0024	0.0019	0.0015	0.0036	0.0034	0.0009	0.0011
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.0005</i>	<i>0.5991</i>	<i>0.6747</i>	<i>0.0477</i>	<i>0.0615</i>	<i>0.5777</i>	<i>0.5039</i>
Legislative Control	0.0015	0.0015	-0.0012	-0.0002	0.0031	0.0030	0.0011	0.0011
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0409</i>	<i>0.0367</i>	<i>0.5881</i>	<i>0.9433</i>	<i>0.0214</i>	<i>0.0302</i>	<i>0.6935</i>	<i>0.6911</i>
Full Control	0.0011	0.0010	0.0013	0.0006	0.0010	0.0003	0.0095	0.0080
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3793</i>	<i>0.3994</i>	<i>0.6761</i>	<i>0.8405</i>	<i>0.6998</i>	<i>0.8989</i>	<i>0.2409</i>	<i>0.3283</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0020	-0.0020	-0.0007	-0.0023	-0.0033	-0.0029	0.0036	0.0034
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3228</i>	<i>0.3318</i>	<i>0.9128</i>	<i>0.7332</i>	<i>0.3242</i>	<i>0.3951</i>	<i>0.3064</i>	<i>0.3372</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0028	-0.0029	-0.0027	-0.0025	-0.0039	-0.0033	0.0001	-0.0009
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2016</i>	<i>0.1778</i>	<i>0.5316</i>	<i>0.5579</i>	<i>0.3531</i>	<i>0.4245</i>	<i>0.9868</i>	<i>0.8331</i>
Full Control	-0.0029	-0.0029	0.0055	0.0051	-0.0108	-0.0103	0.0107	0.0087
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3482</i>	<i>0.3412</i>	<i>0.3681</i>	<i>0.3968</i>	<i>0.0729</i>	<i>0.0866</i>	<i>0.1659</i>	<i>0.2682</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0006	0.0005	0.0011	0.0005	0.0049	0.0050	-0.0012	-0.0012
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.4342</i>	<i>0.4970</i>	<i>0.7787</i>	<i>0.8866</i>	<i>0.0226</i>	<i>0.0019</i>	<i>0.5212</i>	<i>0.5111</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0024	-0.0017	-0.004	-0.0005	-0.0006	-0.0007
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.7590</i>	<i>0.7877</i>	<i>0.3740</i>	<i>0.5157</i>	<i>0.8586</i>	<i>0.8483</i>	<i>0.8010</i>	<i>0.7837</i>
Full Control	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0010	-0.0013	0.0009	0.0006	0.0040	0.0033
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0925</i>	<i>0.0982</i>	<i>0.7773</i>	<i>0.7302</i>	<i>0.7820</i>	<i>0.8573</i>	<i>0.4059</i>	<i>0.4866</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G18: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Females: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0052	0.0054	0.0182	0.0181	0.0124	0.0119	-0.0023	-0.0018
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0343</i>	<i>0.0262</i>	<i>0.1117</i>	<i>0.1144</i>	<i>0.0722</i>	<i>0.0828</i>	<i>0.6045</i>	<i>0.6784</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0236	-0.0240	-0.0072	-0.0109	0.0066	0.0061	0.0007	0.0001
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.2980</i>	<i>0.1213</i>	<i>0.2021</i>	<i>0.2380</i>	<i>0.9199</i>	<i>0.9864</i>
Full Control	-0.0028	-0.0026	0.0136	0.0148	-0.0224	-0.0203	0.0255	0.0210
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5619</i>	<i>0.5865</i>	<i>0.1885</i>	<i>0.1525</i>	<i>0.0377</i>	<i>0.0611</i>	<i>0.2050</i>	<i>0.2985</i>
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Executive Control	-0.0292	-0.0293	-0.0614	-0.0581	0.0074	0.0063	-0.0123	-0.0145
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0035</i>	<i>0.0060</i>	<i>0.4535</i>	<i>0.5202</i>	<i>0.1574</i>	<i>0.0988</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0205	-0.0194	-0.0011	-0.0040	-0.0138	-0.0163	-0.0096	-0.0133
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0035</i>	<i>0.0057</i>	<i>0.9371</i>	<i>0.7704</i>	<i>0.2522</i>	<i>0.1791</i>	<i>0.3712</i>	<i>0.2178</i>
Full Control	-0.0240	-0.0237	-0.0077	-0.0063	-0.0713	-0.0704	-0.0051	-0.0133
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0225</i>	<i>0.0245</i>	<i>0.6884</i>	<i>0.7458</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.7876</i>	<i>0.4902</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Executive Control	0.0036	0.0042	0.0087	0.0110	0.0154	0.0152	-0.0050	-0.0050
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1972</i>	<i>0.1405</i>	<i>0.4457</i>	<i>0.3399</i>	<i>0.0080</i>	<i>0.0088</i>	<i>0.2530</i>	<i>0.2494</i>
Legislative Control	0.0043	0.0036	0.0071	0.0048	-0.0057	-0.0059	0.0046	0.0048
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2133</i>	<i>0.2975</i>	<i>0.3931</i>	<i>0.5622</i>	<i>0.4593</i>	<i>0.4478</i>	<i>0.4435</i>	<i>0.4174</i>
Full Control	-0.0117	-0.0116	-0.0007	-0.0006	-0.0179	-0.0183	0.0051	0.0032
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0227</i>	<i>0.0241</i>	<i>0.9513</i>	<i>0.9576</i>	<i>0.1096</i>	<i>0.0997</i>	<i>0.6672</i>	<i>0.7875</i>

Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G19: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality for White Females: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0013 (0.0015)	-0.0012 (0.0015)	0.0029 (0.0034)	0.0026 (0.0034)	-0.0063** (0.0028)	-0.0060** (0.0028)	0.0039 (0.0028)	0.0041 (0.0028)
Democrat Governor	-0.0008 (0.0021)	-0.0008 (0.0021)	-0.0037 (0.0070)	-0.0049 (0.0070)	0.0030 (0.0041)	0.0032 (0.0041)	-0.0003 (0.0042)	-0.0007 (0.0042)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0038* (0.0019)	-0.0031 (0.0055)	-0.0001 (0.0056)	-0.0089** (0.0041)	-0.0086** (0.0041)	-0.0086** (0.0041)	-0.0002 (0.0036)	-0.0001 (0.0036)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0010 (0.0023)	0.0009 (0.0023)	0.0003 (0.0064)	-0.0024 (0.0064)	0.0050 (0.0043)	0.0053 (0.0043)	-0.0001 (0.0047)	-0.0008 (0.0047)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0019 (0.0027)	0.0020 (0.0027)	0.0089 (0.0071)	0.0100 (0.0071)	-0.0036 (0.0056)	-0.0041 (0.0056)	0.0071 (0.0084)	0.0063 (0.0085)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0000 (0.0005)	-0.0000 (0.0005)	-0.0015 (0.0015)	-0.0015 (0.0015)	-0.0003 (0.0010)	-0.0002 (0.0010)	0.0008 (0.0012)	0.0008 (0.0012)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0025*** (0.0008)	0.0024*** (0.0008)	0.0034 (0.0039)	0.0030 (0.0039)	0.0038* (0.0021)	0.0036* (0.0021)	0.0001 (0.0019)	0.0003 (0.0019)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0021*** (0.0006)	0.0020*** (0.0006)	-0.0024 (0.0045)	0.0000 (0.0046)	0.0035** (0.0015)	0.0035** (0.0015)	0.0006 (0.0018)	0.0005 (0.0018)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0006 (0.0008)	-0.0006 (0.0008)	0.0011 (0.0046)	-0.0002 (0.0046)	-0.0004 (0.0014)	-0.0004 (0.0014)	0.0005 (0.0030)	0.0006 (0.0030)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0029** (0.0012)	-0.0029** (0.0012)	0.0007 (0.0039)	-0.0007 (0.0040)	-0.0057* (0.0030)	-0.0060** (0.0030)	0.0075 (0.0087)	0.0058 (0.0087)
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0003 (0.0007)	0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0037** (0.0018)	-0.0029 (0.0018)	0.0017 (0.0014)	0.0017 (0.0014)	0.0020 (0.0019)	0.0019 (0.0019)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0003 (0.0010)	0.0003 (0.0010)	0.0048 (0.0040)	0.0035 (0.0040)	0.0032* (0.0019)	0.0033* (0.0019)	-0.0032 (0.0027)	-0.0031 (0.0027)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0008 (0.0008)	-0.0008 (0.0008)	-0.0015 (0.0031)	0.0015 (0.0032)	0.0012 (0.0019)	0.0007 (0.0020)	-0.0020 (0.0021)	-0.0019 (0.0021)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0005 (0.0010)	0.0005 (0.0010)	-0.0009 (0.0038)	-0.0029 (0.0039)	-0.0017 (0.0025)	-0.0017 (0.0025)	0.0013 (0.0023)	0.0012 (0.0023)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0027** (0.0014)	-0.0026* (0.0014)	0.0003 (0.0040)	-0.0001 (0.0040)	-0.0036 (0.0031)	-0.0040 (0.0031)	0.0058 (0.0051)	0.0052 (0.0051)
Observations	112594	112594	33590	33590	39912	39912	39092	39092
R <sup>2</sup>	0.297	0.298	0.288	0.289	0.168	0.169	0.192	0.192
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G20: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality for White Females: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0089*	-0.0099*	-0.0169	-0.0054	-0.0044	0.0134*	0.0141**	
(0.0052)	(0.0052)	(0.0105)	(0.0106)	(0.0092)	(0.0092)	(0.0071)	(0.0071)	
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0203***	-0.0194***	-0.0416*	-0.0412*	0.0127	0.0108	-0.0257**	-0.0287***
(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0215)	(0.0216)	(0.0131)	(0.0132)	(0.0102)	(0.0104)	
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0154**	-0.0151**	-0.0021	-0.0093	-0.0040	-0.0045	-0.0026	-0.0048
(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0209)	(0.0211)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0088)	(0.0088)	
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0051	-0.0043	0.0010	0.0025	-0.0098	-0.0118	-0.0070	-0.0084
(0.0079)	(0.0079)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)	
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0257***	0.0250***	0.0547***	0.0558***	-0.0648***	-0.0604***	0.0168	0.0145
(0.0090)	(0.0090)	(0.0215)	(0.0215)	(0.0185)	(0.0185)	(0.0206)	(0.0206)	
<i>Lagged Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0039**	0.0040**	0.0094**	0.0103**	0.0005	0.0007	-0.0016	-0.0014
(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0030)	(0.0030)	
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0012	0.0014	0.0088	0.0078	0.0119	0.0112	-0.0007	-0.0004
(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)	(0.0079)	(0.0079)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0022	-0.0020	0.0231	0.0179	-0.0169***	-0.0152***	0.0120***	0.0114**
(0.0023)	(0.0023)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0058)	(0.0058)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0214***	-0.0221***	-0.0303***	-0.0287*	0.0235***	0.0214***	-0.0113	-0.0113
(0.0032)	(0.0032)	(0.0147)	(0.0149)	(0.0052)	(0.0052)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0157***	0.0160***	0.0026	0.0076	-0.0414***	-0.0383***	0.0271	0.0227
(0.0048)	(0.0048)	(0.0126)	(0.0127)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0217)	(0.0217)	
<i>Lead Effects</i>								
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0133***	0.0133***	0.0335***	0.0321***	-0.0120**	-0.0110**	0.0061	0.0063
(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0060)	(0.0060)	(0.0052)	(0.0052)	(0.0048)	(0.0048)	
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0097***	-0.0092***	-0.0248**	-0.0211*	0.0273***	0.0262***	-0.0111*	-0.0113*
(0.0037)	(0.0038)	(0.0125)	(0.0127)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0064)	(0.0064)	
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0116***	0.0116***	0.0246**	0.0161	0.0043	0.0056	-0.0013	-0.0015
(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0106)	(0.0110)	(0.0065)	(0.0065)	(0.0051)	(0.0051)	
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0073*	-0.0080**	-0.0175	-0.0113	-0.0100	-0.0114	0.0058	0.0063
(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0129)	(0.0130)	(0.0084)	(0.0084)	(0.0055)	(0.0055)	
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0196***	-0.0194***	-0.0164	-0.0164	-0.0275**	0.0055	0.0034	0.0034
(0.0049)	(0.0049)	(0.0125)	(0.0125)	(0.0107)	(0.0107)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	
Observations	63715	63715	29624	29624	16845	16845	17246	17246
R <sup>2</sup>	0.389	0.389	0.440	0.440	0.336	0.337	0.167	0.168
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Period	1968-2016	1968-2016	1968-1984	1968-1984	1985-2000	1985-2000	2001-2016	2001-2016

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal). \* p <.10, \*\* p< .05, \*\*\* p<.01.

### Appendix G.3 Quantile Regression

Table G21: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality Across Quantiles: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>											
Executive Control	0.0027	0.0026	0.0023	0.0022	0.0019	0.0019	0.0015	0.0015	0.0012	0.0012	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0022</i>	<i>0.0036</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0081</i>	<i>0.0160</i>	<i>0.1412</i>	<i>0.1471</i>		
Legislative Control	0.0016	0.0017	0.0013	0.0014	0.0010	0.0011	0.0007	0.0008	0.0005	0.0006	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0573</i>	<i>0.0434</i>	<i>0.0219</i>	<i>0.0142</i>	<i>0.0179</i>	<i>0.0102</i>	<i>0.1908</i>	<i>0.1477</i>	<i>0.5436</i>	<i>0.4845</i>	
Full Control	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0002	0.0004	0.0006	0.0007	0.0010	0.0011	0.0013	0.0014	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9444</i>	<i>0.9844</i>	<i>0.8040</i>	<i>0.7130</i>	<i>0.3817</i>	<i>0.3114</i>	<i>0.2831</i>	<i>0.2446</i>	<i>0.3188</i>	<i>0.2934</i>	
<i>Lagged Effects</i>											
Executive Control	-0.0014	-0.0013	-0.0016	-0.0016	-0.0018	-0.0018	-0.0020	-0.0021	-0.0022	-0.0023	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6112</i>	<i>0.6217</i>	<i>0.4019</i>	<i>0.4032</i>	<i>0.2007</i>	<i>0.1912</i>	<i>0.2708</i>	<i>0.2521</i>	<i>0.3982</i>	<i>0.3737</i>	
Legislative Control	0.0003	0.0002	0.0003	0.0002	0.0004	0.0003	0.0005	0.0003	0.0006	0.0004	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9286</i>	<i>0.9532</i>	<i>0.8598</i>	<i>0.9096</i>	<i>0.7578</i>	<i>0.8447</i>	<i>0.7714</i>	<i>0.8546</i>	<i>0.8131</i>	<i>0.8820</i>	
Full Control	-0.0018	-0.0016	-0.0017	-0.0016	-0.0015	-0.0015	-0.0014	-0.0014	-0.0012	-0.0013	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.6434</i>	<i>0.6727</i>	<i>0.5352</i>	<i>0.5619</i>	<i>0.4506</i>	<i>0.4657</i>	<i>0.5994</i>	<i>0.5984</i>	<i>0.7372</i>	<i>0.7267</i>	
<i>Lead Effects</i>											
Executive Control	0.0012	0.0011	0.0008	0.0007	0.0005	0.0004	0.0001	0.0000	-0.0002	-0.0002	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2307</i>	<i>0.2807</i>	<i>0.2075</i>	<i>0.2710</i>	<i>0.3354</i>	<i>0.4407</i>	<i>0.8348</i>	<i>0.9410</i>	<i>0.8599</i>	<i>0.7936</i>	
Legislative Control	-0.0017	-0.0015	-0.0012	-0.0010	-0.0006	-0.0005	-0.0001	0.0001	0.0004	0.0005	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1501</i>	<i>0.2036</i>	<i>0.1440</i>	<i>0.2121</i>	<i>0.3144</i>	<i>0.4432</i>	<i>0.9401</i>	<i>0.9379</i>	<i>0.7106</i>	<i>0.6467</i>	
Full Control	-0.0010	-0.0007	-0.0011	-0.0008	-0.0011	-0.0009	-0.0012	-0.0011	-0.0012	-0.0012	
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.5541</i>	<i>0.6852</i>	<i>0.3631</i>	<i>0.4939</i>	<i>0.1937</i>	<i>0.2865</i>	<i>0.2884</i>	<i>0.3516</i>	<i>0.4335</i>	<i>0.4701</i>	
Location Health Controls											
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
State Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
State Time Trends (Quadratic)											
County Time Trends (Linear)	Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.90	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G22: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term”-Cause Mortality Across Quantiles: Marginal Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
Executive Control	0.0049	0.0046	0.0051	0.0049	0.0054	0.0052	0.0056	0.0055	0.0058	0.0057
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0244</i>	<i>0.0334</i>	<i>0.0005</i>	<i>0.0009</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0025</i>	<i>0.0029</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0000	0.0005	-0.0002	0.0002	-0.0004	-0.0001	-0.0005	-0.0003	-0.0007	-0.0006
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.9861</i>	<i>0.8401</i>	<i>0.9013</i>	<i>0.8942</i>	<i>0.7541</i>	<i>0.9519</i>	<i>0.7228</i>	<i>0.8194</i>	<i>0.7520</i>	<i>0.7875</i>
Full Control	-0.0015	-0.0008	-0.0013	-0.0008	-0.0012	-0.0009	-0.0011	-0.0009	-0.0010	-0.0010
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.7024</i>	<i>0.8346</i>	<i>0.6043</i>	<i>0.7457</i>	<i>0.5219</i>	<i>0.6405</i>	<i>0.6495</i>	<i>0.6996</i>	<i>0.7695</i>	<i>0.7755</i>
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
Executive Control	-0.0117	-0.0120	-0.0113	-0.0114	-0.0108	-0.0108	-0.0103	-0.0102	-0.0099	-0.0098
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0940</i>	<i>0.0864</i>	<i>0.0174</i>	<i>0.0158</i>	<i>0.0019</i>	<i>0.0018</i>	<i>0.0190</i>	<i>0.0195</i>	<i>0.1084</i>	<i>0.1132</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0135	-0.0140	-0.0111	-0.0116	-0.0085	-0.0090	-0.0061	-0.0066	-0.0041	-0.0046
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0878</i>	<i>0.0762</i>	<i>0.0378</i>	<i>0.0299</i>	<i>0.0286</i>	<i>0.0208</i>	<i>0.2150</i>	<i>0.1825</i>	<i>0.5533</i>	<i>0.5109</i>
Full Control	-0.0236	-0.0233	-0.0210	-0.0209	-0.0183	-0.0183	-0.0157	-0.0158	-0.0136	-0.0137
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0251</i>	<i>0.0264</i>	<i>0.0031</i>	<i>0.0033</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.0004</i>	<i>0.0169</i>	<i>0.0163</i>	<i>0.1421</i>	<i>0.1372</i>
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
Executive Control	0.0037	0.0035	0.0044	0.0042	0.0052	0.0050	0.0059	0.0057	0.0065	0.0063
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1433</i>	<i>0.1589</i>	<i>0.0094</i>	<i>0.0126</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.0030</i>	<i>0.0044</i>
Legislative Control	-0.0010	-0.0003	-0.0019	-0.0014	-0.0029	-0.0026	-0.0039	-0.0037	-0.0047	-0.0046
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.7638</i>	<i>0.9170</i>	<i>0.3827</i>	<i>0.5220</i>	<i>0.0687</i>	<i>0.1120</i>	<i>0.0567</i>	<i>0.0740</i>	<i>0.1024</i>	<i>0.1126</i>
Full Control	-0.0104	-0.0092	-0.0090	-0.0082	-0.0075	-0.0070	-0.0062	-0.0059	-0.0050	-0.0050
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0255</i>	<i>0.0468</i>	<i>0.0041</i>	<i>0.0095</i>	<i>0.0010</i>	<i>0.0023</i>	<i>0.0328</i>	<i>0.0426</i>	<i>0.2152</i>	<i>0.2224</i>
Location Health Controls										
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)										
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Time Trends (Linear)										
Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.90	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table G23: Political Party Determinants of All-Cause Mortality Across Quantiles: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0003 (0.0020)	0.0005 (0.0020)	-0.0001 (0.0013)	0.0001 (0.0014)	-0.0006 (0.0010)	-0.0004 (0.0010)	-0.0010 (0.0013)	-0.0009 (0.0013)	-0.0014 (0.0018)	-0.0013 (0.0018)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0016 (0.0029)	-0.0018 (0.0029)	-0.0014 (0.0020)	-0.0016 (0.0020)	-0.0012 (0.0015)	-0.0014 (0.0015)	-0.0009 (0.0019)	-0.0012 (0.0019)	-0.0007 (0.0019)	-0.0010 (0.0018)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0019 (0.0026)	-0.0018 (0.0026)	-0.0019 (0.0018)	-0.0018 (0.0018)	-0.0019 (0.0013)	-0.0018 (0.0013)	-0.0019 (0.0017)	-0.0019 (0.0017)	-0.0019 (0.0024)	-0.0019 (0.0024)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0021 (0.0032)	0.0019 (0.0032)	0.0022 (0.0022)	0.0020 (0.0022)	0.0023 (0.0016)	0.0021 (0.0016)	0.0024 (0.0021)	0.0022 (0.0021)	0.0025 (0.0021)	0.0023 (0.0030)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0007 (0.0035)	-0.0005 (0.0035)	-0.0004 (0.0024)	-0.0002 (0.0024)	-0.0002 (0.0018)	0.0001 (0.0018)	0.0001 (0.0023)	0.0004 (0.0023)	0.0003 (0.0033)	0.0006 (0.0033)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0006 (0.0006)	0.0006 (0.0006)	0.0006 (0.0004)	0.0006 (0.0004)	0.0006** (0.0003)	0.0006** (0.0003)	0.0006** (0.0004)	0.0006* (0.0004)	0.0006* (0.0004)	0.0006* (0.0005)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0021* (0.0010)	0.0019* (0.0010)	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0016** (0.0007)	0.0013** (0.0005)	0.0013** (0.0005)	0.0012** (0.0005)	0.0009 (0.0007)	0.0009 (0.0007)	0.0006 (0.0010)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0044*** (0.0008)	0.0043*** (0.0008)	0.0036*** (0.0005)	0.0036*** (0.0005)	0.0036*** (0.0005)	0.0028*** (0.0004)	0.0027*** (0.0004)	0.0020*** (0.0004)	0.0019*** (0.0005)	0.0013* (0.0007)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0028*** (0.0010)	-0.0026*** (0.0010)	-0.0023*** (0.0007)	-0.0021*** (0.0007)	-0.0016*** (0.0005)	-0.0016*** (0.0005)	-0.0013*** (0.0005)	-0.0011* (0.0006)	-0.0009 (0.0006)	-0.0007 (0.0009)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0044*** (0.0015)	-0.0043*** (0.0015)	-0.0034*** (0.0010)	-0.0033*** (0.0010)	-0.0023*** (0.0010)	-0.0022*** (0.0007)	-0.0022*** (0.0007)	-0.0013 (0.0010)	-0.0012 (0.0010)	-0.0004 (0.0014)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0001 (0.0008)	0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0005)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0010 (0.0012)	0.0009 (0.0012)	0.0005 (0.0008)	0.0005 (0.0008)	0.0001 (0.0006)	0.0001 (0.0006)	-0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0004 (0.0008)	-0.0004 (0.0008)	-0.0008 (0.0011)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0009 (0.0009)	-0.0008 (0.0009)	-0.0006 (0.0006)	-0.0005 (0.0006)	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0004 (0.0011)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0008 (0.0013)	-0.0007 (0.0013)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	-0.0005 (0.0009)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	-0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0003 (0.0009)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0001 (0.0012)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0005 (0.0017)	-0.0003 (0.0017)	-0.0003 (0.0012)	-0.0005 (0.0012)	-0.0007 (0.0012)	-0.0010 (0.0009)	-0.0013 (0.0009)	-0.0013 (0.0011)	-0.0012 (0.0011)	-0.0014 (0.0016)
Observations	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504	117504
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)										
State Time Trends (Quadratic)										
County Time Trends (Linear)										
Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

Table G24: Political Party Determinants of “Short-Term” -Cause Mortality Across Quantiles: Coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	-0.0044 (0.0054)	-0.0038 (0.0054)	-0.0046 (0.0036)	-0.0041 (0.0036)	-0.0049* (0.0026)	-0.0045* (0.0026)	-0.0051 (0.0033)	-0.0048 (0.0033)	-0.0053 (0.0047)	-0.0051 (0.0047)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	-0.0073 (0.0075)	-0.0082 (0.0075)	-0.0066 (0.0050)	-0.0073 (0.0050)	-0.0059 (0.0037)	-0.0052 (0.0037)	-0.0054 (0.0047)	-0.0054 (0.0047)	-0.0046 (0.0047)	-0.0046 (0.0046)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0142** (0.0068)	-0.0105** (0.0068)	-0.0104** (0.0046)	-0.0104** (0.0046)	-0.0065* (0.0033)	-0.0064* (0.0033)	-0.0028 (0.0042)	-0.0027 (0.0042)	0.0004 (0.0059)	0.0005 (0.0059)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0008 (0.0086)	0.0002 (0.0086)	-0.0006 (0.0058)	-0.0012 (0.0058)	-0.0020 (0.0043)	-0.0026 (0.0043)	-0.0032 (0.0054)	-0.0033 (0.0054)	-0.0045 (0.0054)	-0.0050 (0.0076)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	0.0016 (0.0095)	0.0027 (0.0095)	0.0013 (0.0064)	0.0022 (0.0064)	0.0010 (0.0047)	0.0016 (0.0047)	0.0007 (0.0059)	0.0011 (0.0059)	0.0004 (0.0083)	0.0006 (0.0083)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0036** (0.0015)	0.0028*** (0.0015)	0.0028*** (0.0010)	0.0028*** (0.0010)	0.0019** (0.0008)	0.0019** (0.0008)	0.0011 (0.0010)	0.0011 (0.0010)	0.0004 (0.0014)	0.0005 (0.0014)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0013 (0.0026)	0.0011 (0.0026)	0.0023 (0.0018)	0.0021 (0.0018)	0.0034*** (0.0013)	0.0033*** (0.0013)	0.0045*** (0.0013)	0.0043*** (0.0013)	0.0054** (0.0016)	0.0052** (0.0016)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0059*** (0.0020)	0.0060*** (0.0020)	0.0052*** (0.0014)	0.0053*** (0.0014)	0.0044*** (0.0014)	0.0044*** (0.0010)	0.0044*** (0.0010)	0.0037*** (0.0010)	0.0037*** (0.0013)	0.0032** (0.0013)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0059** (0.0026)	-0.0055** (0.0026)	-0.0054*** (0.0018)	-0.0050*** (0.0018)	-0.0048*** (0.0018)	-0.0048*** (0.0013)	-0.0045*** (0.0013)	-0.0043*** (0.0013)	-0.0040** (0.0016)	-0.0038** (0.0016)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0063 (0.0039)	-0.0059 (0.0039)	-0.0063*** (0.0026)	-0.0060*** (0.0026)	-0.0062*** (0.0019)	-0.0060*** (0.0019)	-0.0062*** (0.0019)	-0.0061*** (0.0024)	-0.0061*** (0.0024)	-0.0061** (0.0024)
<i>Lead Effects</i>										
Democrat Governor (1 = Yes)	0.0018 (0.0021)	0.0013 (0.0021)	0.0018 (0.0014)	0.0015 (0.0014)	0.0018* (0.0010)	0.0016 (0.0010)	0.0018 (0.0013)	0.0018 (0.0013)	0.0018 (0.0018)	0.0019 (0.0018)
Democrat Governor & President (1 = Yes)	0.0019 (0.0031)	0.0022 (0.0031)	0.0026 (0.0021)	0.0028 (0.0021)	0.0034** (0.0015)	0.0034** (0.0015)	0.0041** (0.0019)	0.0041** (0.0019)	0.0039** (0.0019)	0.0044 (0.0027)
Democrat Majority, State Legislature (1 = Yes)	0.0021 (0.0025)	0.0025 (0.0025)	0.0010 (0.0017)	0.0012 (0.0017)	-0.0002 (0.0012)	-0.0001 (0.0012)	-0.0014 (0.0015)	-0.0014 (0.0015)	-0.0023 (0.0022)	-0.0024 (0.0022)
Democrat Majority, Federal & State Legislature (1 = Yes)	-0.0031 (0.0035)	-0.0028 (0.0024)	-0.0029 (0.0024)	-0.0027 (0.0024)	-0.0027 (0.0017)	-0.0025 (0.0017)	-0.0025 (0.0022)	-0.0025 (0.0022)	-0.0024 (0.0022)	-0.0022 (0.0031)
Democrat Governor & President & Federal & State Legislature Majority (1 = Yes)	-0.0139** (0.0047)	-0.0124** (0.0047)	-0.0115** (0.0032)	-0.0110** (0.0032)	-0.0098*** (0.0023)	-0.0098*** (0.0023)	-0.0094** (0.0023)	-0.0082** (0.0023)	-0.0079** (0.0029)	-0.0069** (0.0041)
<i>Observations</i>										
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
County FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE <sub>s</sub>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)										
County Time Trends (Quadratic)										
Quantile	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.90

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). \* p < .10, \*\* p < .05, \*\*\* p < .01.

## Appendix H Supplemental Estimation Results: Net Migration

Table H1: Marginal Effects of Ideology on All-Cause Mortality: Controlling for Net Migration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>				
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0030	-0.0031	-0.0019	-0.0023
P-value	0.0002	0.0001	0.0066	0.0009
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0024	-0.0025	-0.0013	-0.0016
P-value	0.0034	0.0029	0.0707	0.0209
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0025	-0.0025	-0.0012	-0.0015
P-value	0.0027	0.0025	0.0848	0.0292
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>				
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0037	-0.0033	0.0007	0.0004
P-value	0.1746	0.2234	0.7916	0.8877
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0033	-0.0029	0.0009	0.0007
P-value	0.2204	0.2933	0.7386	0.7989
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0036	-0.0032	0.0006	0.0004
P-value	0.1784	0.2398	0.8133	0.8918
<i>Lead Effects</i>				
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0008	-0.0001	0.0010	0.0011
P-value	0.4524	0.8878	0.2698	0.2308
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0006	0.0001	0.0016	0.0017
P-value	0.5684	0.8986	0.1026	0.0796
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0006	0.0002	0.0014	0.0015
P-value	0.6035	0.8759	0.1413	0.1256
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Migration Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N
State x Decade FEs	Y	Y	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table H2: Marginal Effects of Ideology on Short-Term Mortality: Controlling for Net Migration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Lagged Effects</i>				
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0093	-0.0098	-0.0077	-0.0092
P-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0078	-0.0081	-0.0057	-0.0071
P-value	0.0004	0.0003	0.0031	0.0003
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0084	-0.0087	-0.0060	-0.0074
P-value	0.0002	0.0001	0.0018	0.0002
<i>Contemporaneous Effects</i>				
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	-0.0101	-0.0098	-0.0003	-0.0007
P-value	0.1932	0.2197	0.9681	0.9300
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.0094	-0.0089	0.0015	0.0011
P-value	0.2299	0.2674	0.8509	0.8879
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	-0.0106	-0.0103	0.0000	-0.0005
P-value	0.1755	0.2007	0.9978	0.9534
<i>Lead Effects</i>				
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.0036	0.0042	0.0023	0.0024
P-value	0.1757	0.1278	0.3817	0.3660
1 $\sigma$ ↑ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.0024	0.0029	0.0018	0.0018
P-value	0.3695	0.2949	0.4847	0.5009
1 $\sigma$ ↑ Full Liberalism	0.0025	0.0030	0.0013	0.0013
P-value	0.3629	0.2917	0.6233	0.6373
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Migration Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N
State x Decade FE	Y	Y	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Decade dummies pool 1968-1979 together. Marginal effects evaluated at sample means. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table H3: Marginal Effects of Ideology on Net Migration

	(1) Ages 0-4	(2) Ages 5-9	(3) Ages 10-14	(4) Ages 15-19	(5) Ages 20-24	(6) Ages 25-29	(7) Ages 30-34	(8) Ages 35-39
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.9618	1.9447	0.3154	-0.1411	-1.1803	-1.4008	-0.6361	-1.5829
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1497</i>	<i>0.0075</i>	<i>0.6726</i>	<i>0.8666</i>	<i>0.2749</i>	<i>0.1704</i>	<i>0.6418</i>	<i>0.0994</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	0.5615	1.0344	0.2889	-0.7455	-2.3693	-2.4673	-0.6184	-2.0145
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.3824</i>	<i>0.1387</i>	<i>0.6843</i>	<i>0.3550</i>	<i>0.0168</i>	<i>0.0053</i>	<i>0.6197</i>	<i>0.0252</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	-1.1985	-2.2306	0.6199	0.7937	-1.6798	-2.6754	1.5011	0.5632
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0302</i>	<i>0.0027</i>	<i>0.3635</i>	<i>0.2849</i>	<i>0.1375</i>	<i>0.0213</i>	<i>0.2681</i>	<i>0.5452</i>
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Migration Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table H3 (cont.): Marginal Effects of Ideology on Net Migration

	(1) Ages 40-44	(2) Ages 45-49	(3) Ages 50-54	(4) Ages 55-59	(5) Ages 60-64	(6) Ages 65-69	(7) Ages 70-74	(8) Ages 75+
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Executive Liberalism	0.1708	1.1615	-0.4658	-1.4017	-2.6226	-3.0572	-0.7339	2.2157
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8238</i>	<i>0.0738</i>	<i>0.4534</i>	<i>0.0449</i>	<i>0.0124</i>	<i>0.0029</i>	<i>0.2939</i>	<i>0.0349</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ State & Federal Legislative Liberalism	-0.1430	0.7763	-1.2340	-2.5050	-4.3877	-4.7187	-1.8866	2.0194
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.8414</i>	<i>0.2048</i>	<i>0.0370</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0054</i>	<i>0.0233</i>
$1\sigma \uparrow$ Full Liberalism	1.1006	1.2105	-0.3836	-1.5306	-1.5740	-1.8672	-1.1354	-0.1858
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.1242</i>	<i>0.0536</i>	<i>0.5243</i>	<i>0.0255</i>	<i>0.0317</i>	<i>0.0073</i>	<i>0.0434</i>	<i>0.8347</i>
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Migration Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table H4: Marginal Effects of Political Party on Net Migration

	(1) Ages 0-4	(2) Ages 5-9	(3) Ages 10-14	(4) Ages 15-19	(5) Ages 20-24	(6) Ages 25-29	(7) Ages 30-34	(8) Ages 35-39
Executive Control	0.9167	2.6181	1.3204	1.2485	1.1990	1.4711	2.4212	1.6333
<i>P</i> -value	<i>0.0229</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0044</i>	<i>0.0101</i>	<i>0.1636</i>	<i>0.0917</i>	<i>0.0463</i>	<i>0.0187</i>
Legislative Control	-1.0916	-0.3573	0.8151	1.4802	0.6857	0.9966	1.8978	1.4131
<i>P</i> -value	<i>0.0018</i>	<i>0.3780</i>	<i>0.0247</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.2900</i>	<i>0.0607</i>	<i>0.0041</i>	<i>0.0036</i>
Full Control	0.0043	-0.0161	-0.2615	0.1921	1.2149	2.1697	1.0787	1.1259
<i>P</i> -value	<i>0.9939</i>	<i>0.9809</i>	<i>0.6446</i>	<i>0.7522</i>	<i>0.1691</i>	<i>0.0043</i>	<i>0.2908</i>	<i>0.1295</i>
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, white/female, black/male, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).

Table H4 (cont.): Marginal Effects of Political Party on Net Migration

	(1) Ages 40-44	(2) Ages 45-49	(3) Ages 50-54	(4) Ages 55-59	(5) Ages 60-64	(6) Ages 65-69	(7) Ages 70-74	(8) Ages 75+
Executive Control	1.4650	0.9466	0.9926	1.1489	1.0881	1.5224	0.3468	-1.6374
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0046</i>	<i>0.0224</i>	<i>0.0135</i>	<i>0.0053</i>	<i>0.0184</i>	<i>0.0010</i>	<i>0.3740</i>	<i>0.0239</i>
Legislative Control	1.1101	0.6868	0.7032	1.0820	1.6924	1.4511	0.8028	-0.8441
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.0025</i>	<i>0.0284</i>	<i>0.0212</i>	<i>0.0019</i>	<i>0.0001</i>	<i>0.0003</i>	<i>0.0227</i>	<i>0.0902</i>
Full Control	0.7117	0.5607	1.7683	2.5021	2.9854	2.8717	1.1538	-1.7047
<i>P-value</i>	<i>0.2095</i>	<i>0.2358</i>	<i>0.0002</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0000</i>	<i>0.0172</i>	<i>0.0135</i>
Location Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Population Health Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Inequality Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trends (Linear)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
State Time Trends (Quadratic)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
County Time Trends (Linear)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Dependent variable in logs. Location health controls include population shares across 18 different age categories. Population health controls include population shares by education (HS degree, some college, and at least a 4-year college degree) and population shares by gender and race (white/male, black/male, white/female, black/female, and other/male). Income inequality controls include state income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and each interacted with county urban status. Lagged values correspond to the effects over the prior four years (constrained to be equal). Lead values correspond to the effects over the future three years (constrained to be equal).