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as Reflected in Recent World Values Survey Data**

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ABSTRACT

Islamism and Gender Relations in the Muslim World as Reflected in Recent *World Values Survey* Data

Ever since Goldin (1995) proposed the idea that there is a U-shaped female labor force participation rate function in economic development, empirical research is stunned by the question why the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are characterized by such low rates of female labor force participation. This gap in labor economics research is all the more perplexing since gender equality, particularly in education and employment, significantly contributes to economic growth. The research strategy of the present paper is within a relatively new tradition in labor market research, initiated by the recent article by Besamusca, Tijdens, Keune and Steinmetz (2015), which does not exclude anymore the “religious factor” and what these authors call “gender ideology”. Our analysis of the “gender ideology” of Islamism and gender values is based on an empirical analysis of *World Values Survey* data. In recent economic theory, Carvalho (2013) maintained that Muslim veiling is a strategy for integration, enabling women to take up outside economic opportunities while preserving their reputation within the community. The empirical data clearly support a pessimistic view. We show that Muslim Feminism, which implies according to our data analysis the rejection of the twin brothers – Islamism and the veil – and the democracy movement in the Muslim world are closely interrelated. Thus, it is imperative that Western Feminism develops solidarity with Muslim Feminism, and that labor economics does not exclude anymore “the religious factor” from the analytical frameworks explaining low female labor force participation rates.

JEL Classification: A13, C43, F66, J15, J16, J21, J42, N30, Z12

Keywords: social values, religion, female labor participation, political economy, comparative study, sociology of economics, economics of gender, index numbers, factor analysis, World Values Survey

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1. Background

Ever since Goldin (1995) proposed the idea that there is a U-shaped female labor force participation rate function in economic development, empirical research is stunned by the question why the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are characterized by such low international rates of female labor force participation (Gaddis and Klasen, 2014; Ganguli, Hausmann and Viarengo, 2014; Lechman and Kaur, 2015; Tsani, Paroussos, Fragiadakis, Charalambidis and Capros, 2015; Verme, 2015; Verme, Barry and Guennouni, 2014). The typical verdict of one of these recent empirical studies on the low female labor force participation rate in the MENA region was that the U-shape hypothesis *per se* does not provide clear leads on why female labor force participation rates in the MENA region are so low (Verme, Barry and Guennouni, 2014). This gap in labor economics research about a vital tendency in the economic development in one of Europe's most important neighboring regions is all the more perplexing since there seems to be a growing agreement in recent literature (de Haan, 2015; Kabeer, 2012; Kabeer and Natali, 2013) that *per se* gender equality, particularly in education and employment, significantly contributes to economic growth (Gaddis and Klasen, 2014). The educational deficiencies in the region, plausibly leading to so low female participation rates in labor markets in addition are well-known in international labor economics and have been highlighted once more in a recent study by the Brookings Institution (Steer, Ghanem and Jalbout, 2014). And, what's more, the MENA region is not only important for geographically adjacent Europe because the region is becoming such an important trading partner and location of production, but also in geo-strategical and also sheer demographic terms, highlighted by the recent "*European refugee crisis*". Recent research in labor economics thus already highlighted the importance of differential labor force participation rates of different cohorts of migrants in the leading countries of global inwards immigration over recent years (Donato, Piya and Jacobs, 2014).

The research strategy of the present paper is within the new tradition in labor market research, initiated by the recent article by Besamusca, Tjinders, Keune and Steinmetz (2015), which does not exclude anymore the "religious factor" and what these authors call "gender ideology".

Without question, international social science contributions published on the European "refugee crisis" of summer 2015 and beyond hitherto did not yet focus on the labor market and gender policy implications of what it will mean for Europe to integrate hundreds of thousands of young men from a mostly traditional environment in such countries as rural Syria, Iraq, Pakistan or Afghanistan. The already published literature (Baldacchino and Sammut, 2015; Carpenter, 2015; Carrera and Lannoo, 2015; Cooper, 2015; Hann, 2015; Hildebrandt, 2015; Martin, 2016; Mertes, 2015; Peters and Besley, 2015; Stewart, 2015) could not foresee that just as the Calendar Year 2016 began, international publics could read in the global media¹ that hundreds of women celebrating New Year's Eve in one of the major cities of Germany, Cologne, became victims of mass sexual assault by "*men with North African and Middle Eastern appearances*", as the German newsmagazine "*Der Spiegel*" put it."²

Most German politicians have been careful in their initial responses to the Cologne events so as to avoid playing into the hands of what is most often being called in Europe nowadays "*right-wing Islamophobias*". For days, German media were silent on the Cologne events and did not even report them at all, perhaps thinking that media can adapt to the behavior of the

¹ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-shocked-by-sexual-assaults-on-new-years-eve-a-1070583.html#spLeserKommentare>. All downloads of this article: January 7, 2016.

² <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-shocked-by-sexual-assaults-on-new-years-eve-a-1070583.html#spLeserKommentare>

ostrich in moments of tension and conflict.³ Already in October 2015, 54% of Germans were preoccupied or very preoccupied with the unabated influx of refugees.⁴ It is noteworthy to reflect a moment on the national origins of these refugees in order to highlight that a sizeable proportion of them does not even come from zones of war and conflict: only a minority was from Syria (33.8%), Afghanistan (6.7%), and Iraq (6.3%), while such countries as Albania (13.3%), and Kosovo (8.4%) were ranked second and third, with sizable contingents also coming from Serbia (4.2%), Eritrea (2.6%), Macedonia (2.2%), and Pakistan (1.9%).⁵ Now, a simple glance at these statistics will convince anyone that Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia are already full candidates or official “potential candidates” (EU-newspeak) for EU-membership,⁶ implying that they are well on their way to fulfill the so-called Copenhagen criteria of EU-membership, i.e.:

- The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; and
- The administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement European Union law and the ability to take on the obligations of membership.⁷

The Mayor of the City of Cologne, Henriette Reker, meanwhile excelled all other German political leaders by even adding that women themselves should be careful to avoid such attacks as the ones in Cologne in future.⁸ Reker stated that women would be just advised to keep a certain distance of more than an arm’s length to people who are not known so they can avoid such attacks in future, and that’s it, that’s the solution.⁹

Whatever happened in Cologne, migration and gender will surely become THE issue in the coming months and years in Western countries. Most Western scientific publics identifying with the goals of an “*Open Society*” (Popper, 2012) still would reject the notion of cultural differences on gender issues between the Muslim world and the West (Moghadam, 2002). But Feminists from the Muslim world themselves increasingly criticize Western Feminism for overlooking “*oppressive gender relations*” in the non-Western world, and there seems to be some consensus in this literature (Mojab, 2001; Mir-Hosseini, 2011) that the Islamist rallying cry of ‘*Return to Shari’a*’ led to regressive gender policies, with devastating consequences for women: compulsory dress codes, gender segregation, and the revival of cruel punishments and outdated patriarchal and tribal models of social relations (Mir-Hosseini, 2011).

This is the central and inescapable topic of this article. This gender policy clash of civilizations now looms ahead all over Europe, and is all the greater because, without question, gender equality policies are nowadays very high on the agenda of Western democracies. The very same European governments, welcoming hundreds of thousands of migrants from the countries so aptly characterized by Mir-Hosseini, 2011 are untiringly promoting “*gender*

³ <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/fuer-ard-und-zdf-ist-silvester-in-koeln-weit-weg-14000633.html> and <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/76095/umfrage/asylantraege-ingesamt-in-deutschland-seit-1995/> Germany registered over 200.000 asylum applications in 2014 and over 400.000 asylum applications in 2015.

⁴ <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/allensbach-umfrage-mehrheit-besorgt-ueber-folgen-der-fluechtlingskrise-13866950.html>

⁵ [https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/statistik-anlage-teil-4-aktuelle-zahlen-zu-](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/statistik-anlage-teil-4-aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl.pdf;jsessionid=FAABBCD54FDD55F9F41E82052DD6D436.1_cid359?__blob=publicationFile)

[asyl.pdf;jsessionid=FAABBCD54FDD55F9F41E82052DD6D436.1_cid359?__blob=publicationFile](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/statistik-anlage-teil-4-aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl.pdf;jsessionid=FAABBCD54FDD55F9F41E82052DD6D436.1_cid359?__blob=publicationFile)

⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/package/index_en.htm

⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/package/index_en.htm and

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm

⁸ <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/cologne-attacks/422844/>

⁹ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/06/cologne-attacks-mayor-women-keep-men-arms-length-germany>

mainstreaming”, which is now on top of any priority list of European Union policy makers, in temporal correlation with financial austerity.¹⁰

A recent leading empirical study on these issues led two researchers who employed sophisticated statistical models and large-scale opinion surveys to the conclusion that Muslim support for patriarchal values is robust against various controls; and rising levels of education, labor market participation, and an emancipative trend diminish Muslim support for patriarchy, especially among women (Alexander and Welzel, 2011).

So, what connections – if any – exist between traditional gender roles in the Muslim world and the Islamist challenge? Is the Muslim veil an innocent symbol of religious devoutness, as most literature on the subject nowadays still suggests, or is it part of a larger anti-Western syndrome, and can it be contributing to an anti-Western cultural identity that under certain circumstances even can lead to more and more Islamism?

While most media and mainstream political forces in such Western countries as the U.K. or Germany still rather tend to view the “*veil*” simply as a “*protective shield*”,¹¹ allowing Muslim women their emancipation in their respective cultures, the cases of Ait Boulahcen, the Paris terrorist, who started wearing the *niqab* in parallel with her overall transformation from a “*party girl*” into a terrorist in the time span of six months before the attacks,¹² and of Tashfeen Malik, the *niqab* wearing mass killer in San Bernardino, have caught the imagination of global political commentators, integrations experts and analysts ever since.

There are now foreseeable heated debates everywhere on “*banning the burka*” (as the *niqab* is often incorrectly being called) in many Western countries, including in the Lombardia region of Italy and in Germany. While from the 1920s to 2008 such a headscarf ban indeed was in force in Kemalist Turkey, actually there are such bans in force in France and in Belgium, and also in the majority Muslim countries Albania and the Kosovo.¹³

In purely legal terms, such a ban even could well correspond to international and European law, since the European Court of Human Rights¹⁴ recently held by a majority that there had been no violation by the French ban on the headscarf from public life of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and no violation of Article 9 (right to respect for freedom of thought, conscience and religion); and also there had been no violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention.¹⁵

Prominent social scientific studies on the subject are divided in their opinion. A leading feminist study published in 2012 (Mahmood, 2012) pleaded in defense of the veil and said that more attention should be given to Islamic virtues of female modesty or piety, especially given that many of the women who have taken up the veil frame their decision precisely in these terms.

A large amount of well-received social science literature debated the issues from the viewpoints of feminist traditions and Muslim traditions and rather asked whether there is a general compatibility or incompatibility of these two and whether or not they might converge (Ahmed, 1992; Moghissi, 2005; Moghadam, 1994; Bouachrine, 2014). Valuable as insights from those studies may be, essentialistic arguments, based on philosophical or sociological “theory” – one way or the other – often overlook the facts of social mass realities and the *who*’s,

¹⁰ <http://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming>.

¹¹ <http://en.qantara.de/content/muslim-women-on-the-niqab-the-veil-as-a-protective-shield>

¹² <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/hasna-ait-boulahcen-party-girl-who-became-paris-suicide-bomber>

¹³ Wading through the many regulations and debates, the Huffington Post’s collection of articles is very helpful: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/burqa-ban/>

¹⁴ This institution belongs to the architecture of the Council of Europe, and not the European Union

¹⁵ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raza-habib-raja/burqah-ban-multiculturalism_b_5551825.html

what's, to whom's, with what effects, when's and why's of the social processes in Muslim societies, which are now beginning to be studied with the help of large scale representative surveys in the framework of the “*World Values Survey*”.

A data oriented study, what accepting “*wearing the veil*” implies and what it does not, is all the more necessary, since many earlier studies on the subject (Carol and Koopmans, 2013; Ghumman and Ryan, 2013; Göle, 2014; Helbling, 2014) by and large eluded the question on what actually proponents and opponents of the veil among Muslim publics actually think on the subject themselves, and how these opinions correlate with other attitudes, from democracy to trust in central state security institutions, the separation of religion and state, the overall advancement of women in society and central personal values, manifesting themselves in the opinions on whether children should be educated to be tolerant or obedient.

Leading studies in this field are now beginning to be received in the larger literature on Muslim societies, and it is worthwhile to evaluate and develop this research tradition in the present essay (Adamczyk, 2013; Alemán and Woods, 2015; Blaydes and Linzer, 2012).

Blaydes and Linzer, in their path breaking study, 2012, contended for example that the issues under scrutiny here have a strategic implication for the national security of the West, because forms of piety and religiosity can become part and parcel of the syndrome of Anti-Westernism.

Norris and Inglehart, in their well-known 2012 study, already and even prophetically foresaw the necessity of such empirical studies on gender and Muslim societies by saying that they expect to find strong contrasts between Muslim migrants and the increasingly secular Western publics (Norris and Inglehart, 2012).

Among the vast empirical literature on the subject, Lussier and Fish, 2012, found out that in the global sample, Muslims express more traditional views toward sex-based inequality than non-Muslims do. The percentage of Muslims who agree or strongly agree that a university education is more important for a boy than a girl and the percentage of Muslims who agree that when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women are more than double the percentage of non-Muslims who agree with these statements (Lussier and Fish, 2012).

Norris and Inglehart, 2012 could show that orientations that are established in one's primary socialization, relatively early in life, such as gender roles, ethnic identities, and religious values, are likely to become part of one's core identity, which is relatively resistant to change. Conversely, the formative period for political and economic values seems to occur later in life; such orientations, instilled in one's secondary socialization, are more open to change. Consequently, Norris and Inglehart expect that migrants would be more likely to change their values concerning politics than those concerning religion and gender roles. Though Muslim publics clearly support the goal of democracy, a substantial cultural gap exists between Islamic and Western societies concerning gender equality and sexual liberalization. Moreover, this gap seems to have widened in recent years because, while advanced industrial societies in North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia have experienced rapid cultural change on issues such as tolerance of homosexuality, divorce and gender equality, the values of preindustrial societies have been changing relatively slowly.

2. Methods and data

This essay is a continuation of earlier studies on the subject (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015), and again draws on the data from the “*World Values Survey*”, the world's largest

collection of representative opinion surveys, covering some 90% of the global population.¹⁶ The chosen SPSS data-files from the WVS data base is “*WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014*”.

The global Muslim sample (71,773 representative Muslims) was drawn from this WVS file by selecting persons with the denominations given as “Druse” (18), “Muslim” (62,115), “Shia” (4,058), and “Sunni” (5,583) from a large number of countries.¹⁷ Our analysis is thus based on one of the largest surveys of global Muslim opinion ever undertaken, and covers a large portion of the global population.

The WVS data are freely available to any person across the globe. In order not to overburden our essay with tables and statistical data, we have made our results available for the specialists, interested in following up more closely our research results in the Appendix to this essay (Appendix Table 1-11). Any researcher around the globe with a proper access to the SPSS XXII statistical program and the WVS freely available data should be able to reproduce our findings on a 1:1 basis. For this reason, our presentation of the results will be rather brief.

In our empirical work, we took great care to properly take into account the fact that often in the *World Values Survey* project, the highest numerical values of a variable express something else than the original WVS variable labels. Our appendix tables take all these points into proper consideration and guide the interested readers on what true variable labels the highest numerical values of the *World Values Survey* data actually express in our multivariate analysis.

Our multivariate analysis uses the SPSS XXII standard statistical package for the social sciences, and we use ordinary cross tables, partial correlations and the promax factor analysis procedures as the chosen statistical methods presented at length in a recent work (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015). Occasionally, our *World Values Survey* data were augmented by country-level results from the PEW Research Institute in Washington DC.¹⁸

3. Mass support for traditional gender roles in the Muslim world

Focusing on compulsory dress codes, gender segregation, and the revival of cruel punishments and outdated patriarchal and tribal models of social relations (Mir-Hosseini) or on forced marriages, polygamy, domestic violence, and honor killings, as well as patriarchal beliefs about the traditional roles of women in the family, and the symbolic wearing of the *hijab*, *niqab* and *burqa* (Norris and Inglehart, 2012) amounts to willing to grasp the nettle and touching a sore spot in the entire debate about migration, integration, and asylum.

By and large, the data from the present work confirm the skepticism inherent in the works of Mir-Hosseini and Norris and Inglehart, referred to above, about a real clash of civilizations regarding gender issues between the West and the Muslim world.

To begin our short and also shocking survey of the existing data and their respective country level values, we looked at a PEW data series on how people in Muslim countries prefer

¹⁶ <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>

¹⁷ The sample include countries and territories: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palestinian Occupied Territories, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

¹⁸ <http://www.pewglobal.org/>

women to dress in public.¹⁹ Respondents in the survey were shown images of women, ranging from a Lady with no hair cover to the full scale “Afghan” type of “Burka”. Except for the Lebanon with its large Christian minority population, acceptance of a Western dress style by Muslim publics has now become a minority affair, even in the once staunchly secularist and head-scarf-free Kemalist Turkey. In Lebanon, the percentage accepting a Western female hairstyle is 49%, in Turkey it is 32%, and in Tunisia it is 15%, while it is below 5% in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

The PEW data also reveal the astonishing rate of Muslim acceptance of the opinion that a wife should always obey her husband. In 20 of the 23 countries where the question was asked, at least half of Muslims believe a wife must always obey her spouse.²⁰ By contrast, the nowadays seemingly helpless consolidated legislation of the European Union contains 52 text pieces which mention the term “gender mainstreaming” and 117 text pieces which mention the term “gender discrimination”.²¹ Did any of the politicians in Europe, talking about the “*culture of welcoming refugees*” ever reflect on what mass migration from predominantly Muslim countries will mean for the future of gender equality in Europe for the coming generations?

In Malaysia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Tajikistan, Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Palestinian Territories, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, female obedience in marriage is supported $\frac{3}{4}$ or more of the total Muslim population, and in Lebanon, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, it is supported by more than half of the total Muslim population. Only in the former Communist Balkan countries of Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia, these percentages are below 50%.

A quick glance at the new *World Values Survey* data re-iterates the PEW findings. In our statistical Tables we show the aggregate country values of religiously supported traditionalism in the region, measured by support for the veil and also the support for polygamy.

More than 70% of Muslim publics think that the veil is important or very important, such as in Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Only Turkey with its tradition of Kemalism still stands out as a statistical outlier and a veil support rate of only 14%.²² However, in recent years there are tendencies for Islamists comeback to weaken the secular policies of Turkey.

Sizeable proportions of global Muslim publics not only support the veil, but also another concept, completely incompatible with civil law in the West – the idea of institutionalized polygamy. In Nigeria, a sizeable majority of almost $\frac{3}{4}$ of the entire Nigerian Muslim population supports it, and in Algeria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, this support rate is $\frac{2}{5}$; while in other mainly Muslim countries, the support rates are less but still a considerable minority. It also has to be observed that also a sizeable minority of Turkish Muslims – $\frac{1}{6}$ - in fact support polygamy, and Turkey, according to the combined wisdom of the European political elites, is an official EU member candidate country since the European Council meeting in Helsinki in 1999! That is to say, the combined interaction of the elites in Brussels and Ankara took 17 years to prepare the country for implementing European Union law, of which gender policy is an integral part,

¹⁹ <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/08/what-is-appropriate-attire-for-women-in-muslim-countries/>

²⁰ <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-women-in-society/>

²¹ [http://eur-](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/search.html?textScope0=te&qid=1452181322988&DTS_DOM=EU_LAW&type=advanced&lang=en&andText0=gender%20mainstreaming&SUBDOM_INIT=CONSLEG&DTS_SUBDOM=CONSLEG)

[lex.europa.eu/search.html?textScope0=te&qid=1452181322988&DTS_DOM=EU_LAW&type=advanced&lang=en&andText0=gender%20mainstreaming&SUBDOM_INIT=CONSLEG&DTS_SUBDOM=CONSLEG](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/search.html?textScope0=te&qid=1452181322988&DTS_DOM=EU_LAW&type=advanced&lang=en&andText0=gender%20mainstreaming&SUBDOM_INIT=CONSLEG&DTS_SUBDOM=CONSLEG)

²² The data from the PEW on the proper way to cover/not to cover the hair and from the *World Values Survey* on the importance of women wearing the veil seem to suggest divergent percentages for the case of Turkey. But looking at the wording of the questions the differences are explained: while more than $\frac{2}{3}$ of Turkish Muslims think that it is proper for a woman to cover her head, only $\frac{1}{6}$ think it is important.

with the hallmark of a still existing support rate for polygamy among the Turkish population to the tune of 1/6!

And although some praiseworthy Muslim publics in some countries around the globe are less inclined than their non-Muslim counterparts to accept male domestic violence against women, our evaluation of the “*World Values Survey*” data shows that more than a third and, in some countries, more than half of the entire Muslim population accepts male domestic violence against women (India; Thailand; Iraq; Rwanda; Mali; Egypt; Bahrain; Algeria; Lebanon; Ghana; Burkina Faso; Philippines; Malaysia; Nigeria; Russia; Singapore; Uzbekistan; Kuwait; Palestinian Territories; Germany; Yemen; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Morocco; and China).²³

4. The case for a Muslim feminist perspective, critical of the veil

A. correlations of opinions on the Western dress code, the veil and polygamy

In view of these tendencies, a case could be made for a kind of neo-Kemalism in the West and also in those Muslim countries which strive for Western political orientations and reforms (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011; Özçetin, 2013; Dedeoğlu, 2013; Kandiyoti, 2012; Arik, 2015; Cronin, 2014). For the empirical social scientist, it is clear at least that the acceptance of the veil and of polygamy cannot be separated from attitudes which largely must be deemed as incompatible with an overall functioning “*Open Society*”.

The following indicators of Islamism significantly correlate with the acceptance of the veil (variables mentioned in descending order of their significant positive correlations):

- Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office,
- Violation of Islam for male and female university students to attend classes together,
- Only laws of the Shari'a can be accepted,
- Men make better political leaders than women do,
- A truly Islamic country should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws,
- University is more important for a boy than for a girl,
- Reject neighbors: Jews,
- Religious leaders should influence how people vote,
- Exposure to the culture of the US and other Western countries harmful effect on our country,
- Islam requires country with majority of Muslims be governed by men of Islamic learning,
- Wife must obey,
- Important child qualities: obedience,
- Islam requires that political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims,
- No confidence: The European Union, and
- No confidence: The United Nations.

Also, the significant partial correlations of accepting polygamy (again mentioned in descending order of the size of the correlation coefficient) show that an open, corruption and prejudice free, gender-justice oriented and pro-Western society is not supported at all by support for polygamy:

²³ A very practical introduction to the logic of error margins in sample-based survey results is to be found in http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf. Clauß and Ebner, 1970, and a host of other literature recommend discarding survey results from samples which are smaller than 30.

- No confidence: NATO,
- Reject neighbors: Homosexuals,
- Reject neighbors: Jews,
- University is more important for a boy than for a girl,
- Men make better political leaders than women do,
- Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling,
- Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport,
- Islam requires country with majority of Muslims be governed by men of Islamic learning,
- No confidence: Parliament,
- Important child qualities: obedience,
- A truly Islamic country should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws,
- Competition harmful, and
- Justifiable: cheating on taxes.

B. Evidence from the multivariate analysis

A neo-liberal economist, on the basis of a mathematical model and a data analysis, based on global survey results, recently stated in one of the leading journals of economic science that:

“Veiling is a strategy for integration, enabling women to take up outside economic opportunities while preserving their reputation within the community. This accounts for puzzling features of the new veiling movement since the 1970s. Veiling also has surprising effects on the intergenerational transmission of values. Compulsory veiling laws can lead to a decline in religiosity. Bans on veiling can inhibit social integration and increase religiosity.” (Carvalho, 2013)

But our multivariate analysis suggests a totally different perspective. Our analysis uses the *World Values Survey* data on what Muslim publics actually think on the veil, on polygamy and on female obedience themselves, and how these opinions correlate with other attitudes, from democracy to trust in central state security institutions such as the Armed Forces, the separation of religion and state, the overall advancement of women in society and central personal values, manifesting themselves in the opinions on whether children should be educated to be tolerant or obedient. The variables chosen to measure these concepts were:

- Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people,
- Important child qualities: religious faith,
- Important child qualities: obedience,
- University is equally important for a boy and for a girl,
- Not important: Woman wearing the veil,
- Reject: more than one wife,
- Reject: wife must obey,
- No confidence: Armed Forces,
- Bad having a democratic political system,
- Never attend religious services,
- Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office,
- Gender (female), and
- Highest educational level attained.

After analyzing their correlation matrix, the SPSS XXII program extracted five factors, whose Eigenvalues corresponded to the standard criterion of being greater than 1.0. Applying

the promax factor rotation routine, the five factors, described in detail in our Appendix Table 10 can be interpreted as:

- Rejecting Islamism and the veil,
- Feminism,
- Upper strata distanced from the Army,
- Pro-democracy movement, and
- Authoritarian personality.

The factor “rejecting Islamism and the veil” is the most important factor in the model, explaining more than 1/6 of the variance. The most salient positive and negative loadings are reported in Table 1.

Table 1: The factor loadings

Rejecting Islamism and the veil:	
Not important: Woman wearing veil	0.765
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0.703
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.608
Feminism:	
Gender (female)	0.778
Never attend religious services	0.684
Reject: more than one wife	0.504
Upper strata distanced from the Army:	
Highest educational level attained	0.733
No confidence: Armed Forces	0.728
Pro-democracy movement:	
Bad having a democratic political system	-0.641
Reject: more than one wife	0.558
Authoritarian personality:	
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0.791
Important child qualities: obedience	0.553

Table 2 shows the correlations between the promax factors, and how closely rejecting Islamism and the veil; feminism; and the pro-democracy movement all interact in Muslim societies. It also should be noted with special emphasis that the pro-democracy movement is also closely linked to the rejection of polygamy, as the factor loadings above suggest.

Table 2: The factor correlations


Component	Rejecting Islamism and the veil	Feminism	Upper strata distanced from the Army	Pro-democracy movement
Feminism	0.213			
Upper strata distanced from the Army	0.034	0.015		
Pro-democracy movement	0.310	0.247	<i>0.114</i>	
Authoritarian personality	0.044	0.066	0.061	0.062

Table 3 and Graph 1 show the country values for the Muslim communities with complete data – Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, Turkey. Turkey and Bangladesh have a positive factor loading on the factor “*rejecting Islamism and the veil*”, while Iraq and Egypt are the two strongest bastions of Islamist thinking. In Jordan and Turkey, feminist currents are strongest, while in Nigeria and Bangladesh, Muslim feminism receives the weakest support. Our data analysis also suggests that the upper strata distance from the Army is strongest in two countries which experienced military rule, Algeria and Indonesia, while in Turkey and Jordan, where the Army enjoys great popularity, this phenomenon is weakest. The pro-democracy currents are strongest in Bangladesh and Jordan and weakest in Iraq and Nigeria. The syndrome of the authoritarian personality is strongest in Algeria and Nigeria and weakest in Bangladesh and Iraq.

Table 3: The country values

Country/ region	Rejecting Islamism and the veil	Feminism	Upper strata distanced from the Army	Pro- democracy movement	Authoritaria n personality
Algeria	-0.098	-0.042	0.513	-0.083	0.363
Bangladesh	0.080	-0.258	-0.034	0.329	-0.624
Egypt	-0.460	0.091	0.149	0.237	-0.002
Indonesia	-0.234	0.007	0.358	0.288	0.204
Iraq	-0.741	-0.109	0.217	-0.647	-0.053
Jordan	-0.200	0.271	-0.277	0.301	-0.039
Nigeria	-0.442	-0.948	0.110	-0.647	0.233
Turkey	1.079	0.182	-0.467	-0.030	0.088

Graph 1: The country values for rejecting Islamism and the veil, feminism and the pro-democracy movement



5. Conclusions and prospects

By focusing on an empirical analysis of the effects of gender ideology (Besamusca, Tijdens, Keune and Steinmetz, 2015) of Islamism we could highlight some of the factors which possibly explain the low labor force participation rates of women in the MENA region and which should be taken into consideration in future cross-national labor economic research. In recent economic theory, Carvalho (2013) maintained that Muslim veiling is a strategy for integration, enabling women to take up outside economic opportunities while preserving their reputation within the community. Our empirical data analysis on the basis of the “*World Values Survey*” clearly support a pessimistic view of the gender ideology of Islamism, so prevailing nowadays in large sections of the MENA region and many countries of the Muslim world in general.

The empirical results show that more than 70% of surveyed Muslim publics in our surveyed countries think that the veil is important or very important. Sizeable proportions not only support the veil, but also polygamy. Our evaluation also shows that more than a third and, in some countries even more than half of the entire Muslim population accepts male domestic violence against women. We show that Muslim Feminism, which implies according to our data analysis the rejection of the twin brothers - Islamism and the veil - and the democracy movement in the Muslim world are closely interrelated and could become the multiple basis for a real democratization of the region. Thus, it is imperative that the Western Feminism develops solidarity with Muslim Feminism, and that labor economics does not exclude anymore “the religious factor” from the analytical frameworks explaining low female labor force participation rates.

A host of indicators of an “*Open Society orientation*” significantly and negatively correlate with the acceptance of the veil and polygamy. After analyzing their correlation matrix, the SPSS XXII program extracted five factors, whose Eigenvalues corresponded to the standard criterion of being greater than 1.0. The factor “*rejecting Islamism and the veil*” is the most important factor in the model, explaining more than 1/6 of the variance. We show the correlations between the promax factors, and how closely rejecting Islamism and the veil, feminism, and the pro-democracy movement all interact in Muslim societies. It also should be noted with special emphasis that the pro-democracy movement is also closely linked to the rejection of polygamy. For the West, it is time to take sides and to act in solidarity with the secular, feminist and pro-democracy movements in the region. To this day, Muslim majority countries, especially those which never experienced Communist or Kemalist rule, are the countries with the worst ranks on the World Economic Forum’s “*Closing the Global Gender Gap Index*”.²⁴

And concerning the veil and Muslim mass migration to the developed countries in the zones of higher geographical latitude, there is a conspicuous silence in Western feminist literature on the path-breaking medical research on osteoporosis and vitamin D deficiency as a consequence for women of wearing the veil in adult life (Lips, 2007; El-Sonbaty, Riad, and Abdul-Ghaffar; 1996; Meddeb et al., 2005).

As even only a quick glance at the basic information about osteoporosis, available from the United States *National Osteoporosis Foundation*,²⁵ spells out the consequences in old age: bones become weak and may break from a minor fall; bones have lost density or mass and the structure of the bone tissue has become abnormal, bones become weaker and are more likely to break. Far from being a “protective shield”, Islamism is a prison for the women concerned, and the veil is an integral part of it.

²⁴ <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/>

²⁵ <http://nof.org/>

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Data Appendix

World Values Survey data file WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014; Muslim respondents only

Appendix Table 1: PEW data on Muslim acceptancy of a Western dress style

	% saying that the Western style of dress (without a headscarf) is appropriate for women
Lebanon	49.0
Turkey	32.0
Tunisia	15.0
Egypt	4.0
Iraq	3.0
Saudi Arabia	3.0
Pakistan	2.0

Appendix Table 2: PEW data on the insistence of Muslim society on female obedience in marriage

	% of Muslims who completely or mostly agree that a wife must obey her husband
Malaysia	96.0
Afghanistan	94.0
Indonesia	93.0
Tunisia	93.0
Morocco	92.0
Tajikistan	89.0
Thailand	89.0
Pakistan	88.0
Bangladesh	88.0
Palestinian Territories	87.0
Egypt	85.0
Uzbekistan	84.0
Jordan	80.0
Kyrgyzstan	75.0
Lebanon	74.0
Russia	69.0
Turkey	65.0
Azerbaijan	58.0
Kazakhstan	51.0
Bosnia Herzegovina	45.0
Albania	40.0
Kosovo	34.0

Appendix Table 3: *World Values Survey* data on global Muslim support for the veil and for polygamy

	% Muslims saying woman wearing the veil is very important or important	% Muslims agreeing strongly or agreeing: more than one wife
Algeria	74.7	43.0
Bangladesh	74.9	5.4
Egypt	94.9	10.6
Indonesia	73.8	19.8
Iran	87.0	11.6
Iraq	91.0	47.5
Jordan	85.3	19.5
Nigeria	77.1	74.0
Pakistan		1.1
Saudi Arabia	91.9	42.7
Turkey	14.9	15.9

Appendix Table 4: the acceptancy of domestic violence among global publics and among global Muslim publics according to the *World Values Survey*

	% of the population saying it is justifiable for a man to beat his wife	observ ations	% of the Muslim population saying it is justifiable for a man to beat his wife	observ ations	Muslim domestic violence above/below overall society
<i>Georgia</i>	<i>9.3</i>	<i>2675</i>	<i>4.8</i>	<i>83</i>	<i>-4.5</i>
<i>Canada</i>	<i>6.4</i>	<i>2141</i>	<i>5.6</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>-0.8</i>
<i>Indonesia</i>	<i>11.5</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>11.2</i>	<i>1840</i>	<i>-0.3</i>
France	9.2	1001	12.8	47	3.6
<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>22.4</i>	<i>1490</i>	<i>17.8</i>	<i>157</i>	<i>-4.6</i>
Trinidad and Tobago	16.5	1995	17.9	123	1.4
<i>Bulgaria</i>	<i>26.3</i>	<i>967</i>	<i>19.1</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>-7.2</i>
Great Britain	12.4	1019	19.5	41	7.1
Jordan	19.5	2399	19.8	2333	0.3
<i>Turkey</i>	<i>20.0</i>	<i>2936</i>	<i>19.9</i>	<i>2903</i>	<i>-0.1</i>
Cyprus	17.8	2044	20.9	497	3.1
Netherlands	11.3	2888	20.9	43	9.6
Qatar	23.4	1057	23.4	1057	xx
Slovenia	19.1	2051	25.8	31	6.7
<i>Iran</i>	<i>26.0</i>	<i>2660</i>	<i>25.9</i>	<i>2617</i>	<i>-0.1</i>

<i>Libya</i>	30.2	2068	29.8	2015	-0.4
<i>Pakistan</i>	30.3	1201	30.2	1196	-0.1
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	30.5	1002	30.4	974	-0.1
<i>South Africa</i>	50.6	6438	31.3	83	-19.3
Tunisia	31.3	1189	31.3	1189	xx
China	34.8	3824	35.0	100	0.2
Morocco	35.1	2317	35.1	2303	0.0
<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	37.2	1495	35.8	1331	-1.4
Kazakhstan	36.8	1502	37.1	757	0.3
Yemen	38.0	985	38.0	985	xx
Germany	27.3	4038	41.0	139	13.7
<i>Palestinian Territories</i>	44.4	994	44.2	991	-0.2
Kuwait	44.6	1261	44.6	1261	xx
Uzbekistan	44.7	1499	45.1	1425	0.4
Singapore	44.1	1970	45.6	320	1.5
Russia	25.1	4406	46.6	251	21.5
<i>Nigeria</i>	53.2	1759	46.8	758	-6.4
<i>Malaysia</i>	48.8	2501	47.9	1509	-0.9
Philippines	48.2	1200	48.6	74	0.4
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	51.5	1477	50.4	782	-1.1
Ghana	37.3	3060	51.7	393	14.4
Sweden	9.3	2182	53.3	30	44.0
Lebanon	46.4	1200	53.7	622	7.3
<i>Algeria</i>	59.4	1139	59.2	1133	-0.2
Bahrain	59.3	1200	59.3	1200	xx
Egypt	61.1	1523	61.1	1523	xx
Mali	62.1	1352	62.4	1263	0.3
<i>Rwanda</i>	73.1	3030	63.9	305	-9.2
Iraq	65.1	1197	65.1	1185	0.0
Thailand	49.1	2727	69.2	65	20.1
India	55.0	3293	70.1	355	15.1

Appendix Table 5: The partial correlations of the accepting the veil (constant: gender) estimated from individual level *World Values Survey* data

	Accepting the veil		
	Correlation	Error p (two-tailed)	Degrees of freedom
Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.302	0.000	13160
Violation of Islam for male and female university students to attend classes together	0.286	0.000	3314
Only laws of the Shari'a	0.263	0.000	11073
Men make better political leaders than women do	0.241	0.000	16889
A truly Islamic country should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws	0.218	0.000	2743
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	0.208	0.000	17196
Reject neighbours: Jews	0.202	0.000	6452
Religious leaders should influence how people vote	0.195	0.000	12777
Exposure to the culture of the US and other Western countries harmful effect on our country	0.168	0.000	1091
Islam requires country with majority of Muslims be governed by men of Islamic learning	0.161	0.000	1081
Wife must obey	0.139	0.000	17434
Important child qualities: obedience	0.134	0.000	17569
Islam requires that political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims	0.116	0.000	2957
No confidence: The European Union	0.108	0.000	1041
No confidence: The United Nations	0.102	0.000	14758
Important child qualities: hard work	-0.144	0.000	15321

Appendix Table 6: The partial correlations of accepting polygamy (constant: gender) estimated from individual level *World Values Survey* data

	More than one wife		
	Correlation	Error p	Degrees of freedom
No confidence: NATO	0.437	0.000	1963
Reject neighbours: Homosexuals	0.257	0.000	15024
Reject neighbours: Jews	0.221	0.000	6445
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	0.188	0.000	18310
Men make better political leaders than women do	0.170	0.000	18008
Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling	0.168	0.000	15147
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	0.150	0.000	12976
Islam requires country with majority of Muslims be governed by men of Islamic learning	0.137	0.000	2247
No confidence: Parliament	0.131	0.000	13948
Important child qualities: obedience	0.124	0.000	18705
A truly Islamic country should not have a parliament with the right to pass laws	0.123	0.000	3923
Competition harmful	0.121	0.000	1274
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	0.117	0.000	11561

A factor analytical model

N = 9995; 5 factors with an Eigenvalue above or equal to 1.0 were interpreted; 53,965% of total variance is explained

Appendix Table 7: The variables of the model

	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	Highest numerical value suggests interpreting the variable as
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0.660	0.474	9995	Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.740	0.437	9995	Important child qualities: religious faith
Important child qualities: obedience	0.480	0.500	9995	Important child qualities: obedience
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	2.800	1.074	9995	University is equally important for a boy and for a girl
Traits in a woman: Woman wearing veil	2.250	1.499	9995	not important: Woman wearing veil
More than one wife	3.410	1.174	9995	reject: more than one wife
Wife must obey	1.870	0.986	9995	reject: wife must obey
Confidence: Armed Forces	1.970	0.936	9995	no confidence: Armed Forces
Political system: Having a democratic political system	1.490	0.654	9995	bad having a democratic political system
How often do you attend religious services	3.980	2.834	9995	never attend religious services
Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	1.910	1.246	9995	reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office
Sex	1.440	0.497	9995	Gender (female)
Highest educational level attained	4.370	2.343	9995	Highest educational level attained

Appendix Table 8: estimates of factor analytical communalities

Highest numerical value suggests interpreting the variable as	Percentage of total variance explained
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0.647
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.544
Important child qualities: obedience	0.477
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	0.444
Not important: Woman wearing veil	0.632
Reject: more than one wife	0.508
Reject: wife must obey	0.398
No confidence: Armed Forces	0.662
Bad having a democratic political system	0.547
Never attend religious services	0.519
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.375
Gender (female)	0.650
Highest educational level attained	0.611

Appendix Table 9: how the five factors explain the variance of the variables

	Eigenvalue	% of variance explained	Cumulated percentage of variance explained
Rejecting Islamism and the veil	2.172	16.710	16.710
Feminism	1.504	11.571	28.282
Upper strata distanced from the Army	1.256	9.662	37.944
Pro-democracy movement	1.080	8.310	46.254
Authoritarian personality	1.002	7.711	53.965

Appendix Table 10: Rejecting Islamism and the veil – the factor analytical model, based on promax rotation

	Rejecting Islamism and the veil	Feminism	Upper strata distanced from the Army	Pro-democracy movement	Authoritarian personality
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0.113	0.052	-0.051	-0.060	-0.791
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0.703	-0.033	0.035	-0.060	0.096
Important child qualities: obedience	<i>-0.341</i>	0.032	-0.056	-0.221	0.553
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	0.296	<i>0.460</i>	0.150	<i>0.498</i>	0.290
Not important: Woman wearing veil	0.765	0.182	-0.123	0.103	0.105
Reject: more than one wife	0.165	0.504	-0.101	0.558	-0.108
Reject: wife must obey	<i>0.409</i>	<i>0.468</i>	0.244	<i>0.374</i>	0.062
No confidence: Armed Forces	-0.218	-0.009	0.728	-0.220	-0.063
Bad having a democratic political system	0.046	0.125	-0.081	-0.641	0.029
Never attend religious services	0.138	0.684	0.050	-0.033	0.016
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.608	0.091	0.061	0.137	0.011
Gender (female)	-0.001	0.778	-0.097	0.092	-0.009
Highest educational level attained	0.143	-0.015	0.733	0.327	0.108

Appendix Table 11: Definition of the factors

Rejecting Islamism and the veil:	
Not important: Woman wearing veil	0.765
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0.703
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.608
Reject: wife must obey	0.409
Important child qualities: obedience	-0.341
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	0.296
No confidence: Armed Forces	-0.218
Reject: more than one wife	0.165
Highest educational level attained	0.143
Never attend religious services	0.138
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0.113
Bad having a democratic political system	0.046
Gender (female)	-0.001

Feminism:	
Gender (female)	0.778
Never attend religious services	0.684
Reject: more than one wife	0.504
Reject: wife must obey	0.468
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	0.460
Not important: Woman wearing veil	0.182
Bad having a democratic political system	0.125
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.091
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0.052
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0.033
Important child qualities: obedience	0.032
Highest educational level attained	-0.015
No confidence: Armed Forces	-0.009

Upper strata distanced from the Army:	
Highest educational level attained	0.733
No confidence: Armed Forces	0.728
Reject: wife must obey	0.244
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	0.150
Not important: Woman wearing veil	-0.123
Reject: more than one wife	-0.101
Gender (female)	-0.097
Bad having a democratic political system	-0.081
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.061
Important child qualities: obedience	-0.056
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0.051
Never attend religious services	0.050
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.035

Pro-democracy movement:	
Bad having a democratic political system	-0.641
Reject: more than one wife	0.558
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	0.498
Reject: wife must obey	0.374
Highest educational level attained	0.327
Important child qualities: obedience	-0.221
No confidence: Armed Forces	-0.220
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.137
Not important: Woman wearing veil	0.103
Gender (female)	0.092
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0.060
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0.060
Never attend religious services	-0.033

Authoritarian personality:	
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0.791
Important child qualities: obedience	0.553
University is equally important for a boy and for a girl	0.290
Reject: more than one wife	-0.108
Highest educational level attained	0.108
Not important: Woman wearing veil	0.105
Important child qualities: religious faith	0.096
No confidence: Armed Forces	-0.063
Reject: wife must obey	0.062
Bad having a democratic political system	0.029
Never attend religious services	0.016
Reject: politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office	0.011
Gender (female)	-0.009